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Summary 
There has been an increase in the number of populist parties and movements, especially in 
Europe, yet their electoral successes have been sporadic. In Scandinavian countries the 
presence of such parties and movements has become a steady and, it seems, permanent 
feature of the political landscape. Their once shocking rhetoric and policies have become 
part of the political mainstream. The ability of populist political parties in Scandinavia to gain 
electoral success, hence to stabilise, may suggests that populism in Scandinavia may either 
result from a peculiar type of diversification within the very broadly conceived populist political 
stream, or may be one of unexpected outcomes of the so-called Scandinavian model of 
politics to be regarded then as a rather fertile ground for populists. The contribution that this 
study aims to offer is two-fold: placing Scandinavian populism in a wider context, thereby 
addressing the issue of the uniqueness of Scandinavian political culture; problematizing the 
rather common assumption that the variance among populist phenomena has increased 
exponentially over time.  Indeed, the following specific key-questions have been asked and 
answered: are there distinctive facts that set today’s populist movements in Scandinavia 
apart from populist and nationalist ideas and programmes of the past?  What are the ties 
relating the different populist movements in Scandinavia to each other? Are there any 
compelling indicators that may convince us that Scandinavian populism is somewhat different 
from its counterparts elsewhere? Finally, based on a number of findings, we shall evaluate 
the claim that a distinct, Scandinavian form of populism exists. The first part of the text deals 
with the complex question choosing a working definition of populism. It then moves on to 
describing the historical understandings of ‘populism’ and ‘nationalism’, as well as identifying 
some of the main distinguishing features of populist and nationalist movements in the past, 
for then to describe, through case studies, some of the many features we may find in different, 
contemporary, populist party ‘families’. We sustain the that a typology defined by two 
overarching families of populism - whether it allows for further sub-families or not - fails to 
capture the full range of phenomena referred to as populist politics in Scandinavia. By first 
identifying some of the historical cases in which evident traces of populism are detectable, 
we shall see that the split nature of populism itself is not a result of a process of diversification, 
but rather a case of different phenomena that, from the very outset, happened to share a few 
common features. We propose an interpretation by which, rather than fascism being a form 
of populism, or combining populism with another ideology, the two belong to a similar type of 
ideology: they can both be understood as belonging among the so-called ‘thin-centred 
ideologies’. Here we do not mean that a similarity in content is necessarily significant, but 
rather that they both, when combined with ideological content from the more traditional left – 
or right-wing, or with a combination of policies from both ends of the spectrum, become 
political programmes with high potential and appeal, especially during times of (perceived) 
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crisis.  Thus, what we have been able to observe is that the theory that nationalism arises in 
times of crises where, typically the lower middle classes, or the lower classes, feel the 
pressure of economic decline in combination with factors such as immigration, seems to hold 
the first test against historical cases. We further conclude that populist radical right parties in 
Europe share a core ideology of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. In the 
contemporary context, we conclude that a definition of populism in terms of one or more fixed, 
necessary and exclusive common feature(s) is unfeasible, and we must then continue with a 
definition of populism which is in line with Sartori’s minimal definition, in combination with the 
presumption that a plethora of sub-categories may exist. The common denominators are 
thus: the reference to the ‘people’ as harbouring the real essence of a particular society, to 
the ‘populists’ as having discovered the best way of letting the spirit of the people speak, and 
to the perceived conflict of interest between the people on the one hand and a particular, or 
general, elite on the other. The investigation of the parallels between the historical definitions 
of ‘populism’ and ‘nationalism’ helps us understand the ideological roots of each of the 
populist parties and movements in Scandinavia. For example, the abandonment of the use 
of the rational and legal concept of ‘citizenship’ in favour of the use of the vague concept of 
‘Volk’ among the German romantics is one of the features that emphasize how the 
Scandinavian parties have adopted many of the ideas of this particular movement; especially 
in terms of defining the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘national-culture’, or ‘-character’. The second 
part of the text includes a general introduction to some interesting social and political features 
of each of the national contexts within which our subjects of study belong. We propose the 
term ‘national-populist’ to denominate the general typology of most Scandinavian populist 
parties and movements. We also show how many of these parties have direct links with both 
national-socialist parties of the past and with each other, and how the promotion of 
Scandinavian regionalism has created a sense of shared experience and ontology. We also 
show, however, how local circumstances and historical features have shaped some of these 
parties. We then move on to treat the societal features that are most frequently used by 
journalists and scholars, not to mention by Scandinavian populist leaders themselves, to 
explain the founding of the populist parties and movements in Scandinavian countries on the 
one hand, and their relative popularity on the other. It becomes clear that many of the features 
of the populist parties in Scandinavian countries are shared (such as ideas about what 
constitutes a ‘folk’ and a nation, a shared Scandinavian regionalism and a common 
perception of economic and social crisis), the emphasis on each of these features differs from 
party to party. It also become clear, however, that the features that are shared among these 
parties, cannot claim exclusivity. Scandinavian national-populist parties and movements do 
thus not constitute a separate sub-category of populism, but rather constitute examples of 
the slightly wider sub-category of ‘national-populism’.  
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Introduction  
 
This introductory section has the purpose of rendering the analytic framework of our 
research intelligible. By analytic framework we mean the set of basic assumptions on which 
we relied, and through which some light can be shed on the problems that marked our attempt 
to understand the concept of populism at the intersection of theory and practice, and to 
examine the question of the historical and doctrinal roots of Scandinavian national-populism. 
Towards the end of the section a reference shall be made to the method we employed in our 
attempt to exam and interpret the historical roots of Scandinavian National-Populism.   
Research on populism encompasses a large body of scholarship. In 2013, Marco 
D’Eramo examined the University of California Library database, which is of particular interest 
because it includes journal articles that do not figure in other catalogues on an initial search. 
The examination shows an exponential growth in scholarly work since 1920. In particular, in 
the period between 1980 and 2013 more than five thousand five hundred studies have been 
published on the topic. Hence, the systematic use of the word ‘populism’ appears to be a 
distinctively post-war phenomenon1. This extensive body of literature presents specific 
features that deserve our attention in so far as they constitute issues that are relevant from 
the methodological point of view. We are going to focus on some of these issues, although 
given the complexity of the latter, and the limited scope of this introduction, our account 
cannot be expected to be exhaustive.  
Provided that the distinction between populism as a phenomenon and as a concept 
may be maintained for analytic purposes, even though the two spheres appear to be 
interwoven, the first issue we wish to address is related to the indeterminateness of the 
concept of populism. Scholars have made numerous attempts to identify the core, or the 
essence, uniting a multiplicity of phenomena which have been taken to have a populist 
nature. What is it, for a phenomenon, to have populist nature? This qualification is the result 
of either an activity of self-perception within groups or movements that styled themselves 
populist, or, more often, of a definitional activity carried out by scholars claiming to identify 
analogies between one group or movement and another. Margaret Canovan pointed out that 
whoever has used the word ‘populism’ has also been able to attach to it a variety of meanings. 
“The more flexible the word has become”, the English political theorist noted, “the more 
tempted political scientists have been to label ‘populist’ any movement or outlook that does 
not fit into any established category”. Canovan provided a short list of definitions of populism: 
the type of socialism which emerged in backward peasant countries facing the problems of 
                                                          
1 D’Eramo suggests that the increased use of the word ‘populism’ developed in proportion to the decreasing use 
of the word ‘the people’: “the more peripheral the people in political discourse, the more central populism 
becomes”. See M. D’ERAMO, Populism and the New Oligarchy, in «New Left Review», 82 (2013), pp. 5-28, 15-19. 
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modernization; the ideology of small rural communities threatened by industrialization and 
financial capitalism; a rural movement seeking to realize traditional values in a changing 
society; the belief that the majority opinion of the people is oppressed by an elitist minority; 
the belief that true virtue resides in the ordinary people who are the majority in a country, and 
in their ways of life: the belief that the will of the people as such is supreme over every other 
standard; a political movement supported by the mass of the urban working class and/or 
peasantry but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power of either of 
these two groups. Each definition, in spite of some overlaps, stands for a family of related 
ideas, some of them contradictory to others. It seems we cannot hope to reduce all cases of 
populism to a single definition, or find a single essence behind all established uses of the 
word2. Ought we then to stop using the word ‘populism’?  
A plethora of scholars lamented the vagueness of the concept to an extent that, as 
Luca Scuccimarra pointed out, the semantic quagmire with which we are accustomed to 
associate it, has become a common-place3. In 1969 Ghiţa Ionescu and Ernest Gellner 
opened the book they edited comprising a limited number of papers originally read at the 
London conference of May 1967 on populism4, asserting that a new spectre is haunting the 
world – populism. At the end of the preceding decade, a question frequently asked was how 
many of the new nations that were emerging into independence were also to join the 
Communist camp. Ten years later, this question appeared to have been superseded by the 
question of populism. The latter was not an outlook restricted to the new nations. In the 
Communist world too strong currents seemed to move in a populist direction, and in the liberal 
democracies populist themes had become prominent. If there were no doubts about the 
importance of populism, there was no clarity about what it is. Ionescu and Gellner viewed the 
concept of populism as “elusive and protean”, having made its appearance everywhere, but 
in many and contradictory forms5. Canovan too acknowledges that, frequently used, the word 
‘populism’ is vague for it refers, in different contexts, to “a bewildering variety of phenomena”. 
The general usefulness of much of the studies available on the topic seems to be impaired 
for want of conceptual clarification6. Pierre-André Taguieff noted that while the suggestion 
has repeatedly been made that the concept of populism must be erased from the vocabulary 
of the social sciences, the exponential growth of interest in the topic, and the familiarity with 
which the concept continues to appear self-evident in public discourse, make its obliteration 
                                                          
2 M. CANOVAN, Populism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York-London 1981, pp. 4-6.  
3 L. SCUCCIMARRA, Democrazia e populismo. Un itinerario storico-concettuale, in C. CALABRÒ, M. LENCI (a cura di), 
La democrazia liberale e i suoi critici, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 2017, pp. 269-287, 269.  
4 The conference was entitled “To Define Populism” and held from 20 to 21 May 1967 at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. A summary of the proceedings appeared in «Government and Opposition» 3/2 
(1968), pp. 137–179. The complete transcript of it can be consulted at the library of the LSE and is entitled London 
School of Economics Conference on Populism, May 20–21, 1967: Verbatim Report, HN 17 C74. 
5 G. IONESCU, E. GELLNER (eds.) Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics, Weidenefeld and Nicolson-
Macmillan, London-New York 1969, pp. 1-5, 1. 
6 M. CANOVAN, Populism, cit., pp. 3, 16.  
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impossible to achieve7. In more recent years, Paul Taggart spoke of the “essential 
impalpability” and “slipperiness” of the concept of populism8. Not all scholars view negatively 
the vagueness of the concept of populism. Yves Mény and Yves Surel, for example, see its 
ambiguity as constitutive9. Ernesto Laclau too sees vagueness and imprecision as “an 
essential component of any populist operation”. Populism, he argued, is not a type of 
movement identifiable with a special social base or a particular ideological orientation, but a 
“political logic”, that is, a system of rules of inclusion and exclusion related to the institution 
of political subjectivity by the bringing together a plurality of social demands that in turn work 
towards the construction of internal frontiers and the identification of an institutionalized 
Other. The language of populist discourse - whether of Left or Right — is “always going to be 
imprecise and fluctuating”. After all, it is so because “it tries to operate performatively within 
a social reality which is to a large extent heterogeneous and fluctuating”, certainly not on 
account of a cognitive failure10.  
Once upon a time Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that a name represents an object in a 
proposition, although a proposition can only say how a thing is, not what it is11. If there is one 
thing that the existing literature makes clear beyond any reasonable doubt is that it is 
impossible to establish unequivocally what populism as a noun stands for. To ask what 
populism actually is amounts to pose an ontological question, one about being and reality. 
Attempts to identify a fixed substantive referent, an essence, behind all current uses of the 
word ‘populism’ seem to have resulted in a series of conflicting statements about what 
populism really is. In spite of its relevance, Wittgenstein’s idea that in a large number of cases 
“the meaning of a word is its use in the language” does not solve the problem of the 
ontological status of populism12. That is one of the main reasons why, in dealing with it, many 
scholars have doubted whether the concept itself could be said to mean anything at all. Yet, 
the notion of populism is far from being dropped. According to Canovan it is so partially 
because it has comparatively clear and definite meanings in a number of contexts – notably 
U.S. and Russian history and Latin American politics - and partially because it functions as a 
“pointer” with regard to a very intriguing area of social and political experience and 
expertise13. This argument is one of axioms of our study. We too, as already suggested by 
Canovan and others, shall rely on the notion of ‘family resemblance’ (Familienähnlichkeit), 
                                                          
7 P-A. TAGUIEFF, Le populisme et la science politique. Du mirage conceptuel aux vrais problèmes, in «Vingtième 
Siècle. Revue d’Histoire», Numéro special: Les populismes, LVI (1997), pp. 4-33, 4-7. 
8 P.A. TAGGART, Populism, Open University Press, Buckingham 2000, p. 1. 
9 Y. MÉNY, Y. SUREL, The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism, in Y. MÉNY, Y. SUREL, Democracies and the Populist 
Challenge, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2002, pp. 1-21 
10 E. LACLAU, On Populist Reason, Verso, London-New York 2005, pp. 117-118. 
11 L. WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), 3.22, 3.221, ed. C.K. Ogden, Routledge London-New 
York 1996, p. 49. 
12 L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigation (1953), I, 43, ed. G.E.M. 
Anscombe, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford-Malden (Mass.) 2008, p. 18.   
13 M. CANOVAN, Populism, cit., p. 6. 
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one of paramount importance for Wittgenstein's later philosophy. So, instead of assuming 
that a number of diverse phenomena have definitely nothing in common justifying the use of 
the same word for all of them, we will be assuming that the latter can be examined in the 
same way in which the proceedings that we call ‘games’are examined. All we can establish 
is internal and external relationships, namely a “complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing”. These are sometimes “overall similarities”, sometimes 
“similarities of detail”14. It is worth mentioning here that Taguieff suggested that a solution 
may be sought by selecting a case that functions as a recognizable prototype in order to 
present its basic constitutive features – for example, the case of Peronism – and 
subsequently search for sub-types and empirical variants which with a reasonable degree of 
certainty can be said to share some of the basic features originally attributed to the 
protoptype15. It remains to be established how the latter strategy can be expedient as a way 
to bridge the gap between the two strategies generally employed in the study of populism 
which Canovan herself has identified. In an essay published in 1982 the English political 
theorist argued that on the one hand, a fairly large number of scholars is primarily interested 
in edifying a general theory of populism in order to identify the “essential characteristics” and 
“conditions of appearance” of populism as a phenomenon, regardless of both the historical 
circumstances in which this phenomenon manifests itself, and the ways in which it does so. 
In this respect, obviously, the very question of whether a general theory of populism is 
justifiable at all is posed and answered in different ways. On the other hand, an equally large 
number of scholars is primarily concerned with surveying in a descriptive, comparative and 
pluralist manner, the existing, historically determined, hence observable, types of populism16.  
In current scholarly work, the 1967 London conference on the meaning of populism is 
mostly mentioned in connexion with the book edited by Ionescu and Gellner two years later, 
a book which is still widely cited. Not a few scholars take the latter to be an account for the 
conference proceedings. Certainly the book does not reproduce the richness of the 
discussion as it actually took place at the conference. In fact, while the volume provides the 
texts of ten authors, of whom nine participated in the conference, the latter was attended by 
forty-three scholars, including Isaiah Berlin, whose contribution, in the capacity of one of the 
seven chairmen of session, did not appear in the 1969 book. The circumstance is curious 
because Berlin’s metaphor of the Cinderella’s complex, which he presented during the 
conference, is cited ceaselessly. One of the first to cite it was the sociologist John B. Allcock, 
who participated in the conference17. We believe it is worth offering a brief account of the 
reasoning behind Berlin’s methaphor. What is not widely known perhaps is that at the 
                                                          
14 L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigation, cit., I, 66-67, pp. 27-28. 
15 P-A. TAGUIEFF, Le populisme et la science politique. Du mirage conceptuel aux vrais problèmes, cit., p. 7. 
16 M. CANOVAN, Two Strategies for the Study of Populism, in «Political Studies» XXX/4 (1982), pp. 544-552, 550. 
17 J.B. ALLCOCK, Populism: A Brief Biography, in «Sociology» 5/3 (1971), pp. 371-387, 385.   
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conference Berlin used another metaphor - “the biting of the sour apple” – to point at the 
problem of the formulation of the definition into which to make the types and nuances of 
populism, which can be possibly described, fit. He acknowledged that that producing, or 
attempting to produce, a model useful to identify populism - either populism everywhere at 
all times and in all places, or populism in specific circumstances at particular times - was a 
task of paramount importance methodologically. On one side, an attempt can be made to 
produce an analytical model of populism irrespective of all empirical and historical 
determinations. On the other, on account of the problem of historical change, the need is felt 
to emphasise the specific nature of the development of populism in particular areas and 
times, namely the characteristics of specific populisms. According to Berlin most scholars 
would agree that a single formula to cover all populisms everywhere would not be helpful. 
“The more embracing the formula, the less descriptive”. Viceversa, “the more richly 
descriptive the formula, the more it will exclude”. He warned against the risk of suffering from 
“the Cinderella complex”, namely from the assumption that “there exists a shoe – the word 
‘populism’ – for which somewhere there must exist a foot”. In fact, “there are all kinds of feet 
which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly-fitting feet”. The prince is 
“always wandering about with the shoe”, and somewhere “there awaits it a limb called pure 
populism”. This would be its essence, all other populisms being derivations and variants of 
it. Possibly, “somewhere there lurks true, perfect populism”. That is the idea of “Platonic 
populism”, all the others being “dilutions of it or perversions of it”. This approach would be 
useful to all persons who think that words have fixed meanings. One must not be tempted in 
the opposite direction to suppose that the word ‘populism’ is simply a “homonym”, argued 
Berlin. This would in fact mean that there are movements in America, in Russia, in the 
Balkans and in Africa that are called populist “owing to confusions in human heads”, while 
they have too little in common. Given that their differences are far greater than their 
similarities, confusion can be sown by using general descriptions. The solution in this case 
would be trying to fit a number of perfectly precise terms to all the different things that have 
little in common. Berlin was of the opinion that whenever a word is much used, even if it is 
an exceedingly confusing word, “something real is intended; something, not quite nothing”. 
Eventually, “there is a sense in which one should look for the common core”18 This 
assumption too is of fundamental importance in the context of our investigation.  
The question of the lack of clarity surrounding the concept of populism must now be 
addressed and possibly answered. Canovan noted that scholars have generally looked at 
populism from two broadly different perspectives, and that many of the contradictions in the 
literature that caused confusion result from the clash between “two families” of populism 
                                                          
18 I. BERLIN, London School of Economics Conference on Populism, May 20–21, 1967: Verbatim Report, HN 17 
C74, § 114, 136, 139. 
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corresponding to “two different sorts of interest” that play a major role especially on the part 
of the scholars concerned with the study of populism. In the first place we find “agrarian 
populism”, a kind of radicalism, namely a type of movement with a particular kind of 
socioeconomic base - peasants or farmers - liable to arise in particular socioeconomic 
circumstances - modernization of one sort or another. This approach, Canovan argued, does 
not give rise to a unified and internally consistent image of populism because there exist too 
many differences among the numerous agrarian movements usually so named. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify “an extended family of rural populism”, and to argue 
intelligibly about their similarities and differences. The second, broad, family of populism 
corresponds to “a particular kind of political phenomenon where the tensions between the 
elite and the grass roots loom large”. In this case, the emphasis is upon certain political 
charachteristics, and the word ‘populism’ is employed to indicate either devices of direct or 
participatory democracy such as referenda, or phenomena such as the mobilization of the 
masses, as well as the idealizations of the man in the street, and of the virtues of the common 
people. Even within this second broad category, that is, “political populism”, we find highly 
controversial differences. The very distinction between agrarian and political populism is 
controversial to begin with. The People’s Party in the U.S.A., for instance, can be seen both 
as an agrarian uprising, and as a grass-roots revolt against the elite. The second relevant 
source of confusion, according to Canovan, is related to the role that analysts and 
commentators play in identifying and labelling populist movements. When we seek to clarify 
the concept of populism, the object of our enquiries is not so much determined by the features 
of the object itself, that is, the movements concerned, but especially by the attitudes of the 
intellectual community that has been interpreting them. Inevitably, interpreters force their 
interpretations upon the findings they assume to have gathered, and in this way they 
construct the very object of their investigations. Interpretations of populism have therefore 
been influenced by the fears and hopes of the scholars who have tried to understand 
populism19. As Michel Foucault once put it, “there is never […] an interpretandum that is not 
already interpretans”20. On these grounds, it is only logical to conclude that the normative or 
ideological nature of some of the assumptions that are in the background of the study of 
populism are, or might be, a significant source of confusion.    
So far we have established that another distinctive feature is that the existing body of 
scholarly work vehicles both negative and positive evaluations, depending on whether 
populism is equated either with an anti-systemic threat to the current functioning of liberal 
democracy, and even with certain kinds of dictatorships, or with the most effective remedies 
                                                          
19 M. CANOVAN, Populism, cit., pp. 8-11. 
20 M. FOUCAULT, Nietzsche, Freud, Marx (1964), in Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, ed. J. Faubion, 
Penguin Books, London-Ney York 1998, vol. 2, pp. 269-278, 275.  
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against the pathologies of representative politics. It is existentially, if not politically, significant 
that a powerful motivation in studying populism derives from both its positive and negative 
normative valence, which is in turn something presupposing the complex distinction between 
judgments that are directly concerned with the phenomenon entailed in a concept, and 
judgments that are concerned with the consequences of this phenomenon. Tim Houwen 
spoke of populism as a ‘motivating concept’21. Within the range of the ongoing controversies 
on conceptualization and classification, either in relation to democracy22, or to fascism, as 
exemplified in one of his studies by Paolo Armellini23, populism continues to be be examined 
and valued either for itself, or because it has valued consequences. Paul Taggart saw 
populism as the most effective remedies against the pathologies of representative politics24. 
Jan-Werner Müller viewed it as “a permanent shadow of modern representative democracy”, 
and “a constant peril”. He argued that a proper grasp of populism helps deepen our 
understanding of democracy today25. Along this line some links can be found, or established, 
between populism and the Anti-political, which is the label that Geoff Mulgan employed to 
indicate the major paradigm shift which has made the industrial logic that sustained ‘the age 
of politics’ archaic and obsolete. It is a shift whereby transaction took precedence over 
production, economic organization moved towards more fragmented and flexible 
configurations, the physical aggregation of people in cities and productive units were replaced 
by small-scale forms, and information and finance became driving forces flowing through 
every pore of society26. Matteo Truffelli too agrees that some ties between populism and the 
Anti-political do exist, yet he warned against any uncautious synonymical employment of 
such terms that, due to their undeterminatedness, may easily be turned into misleading 
conceptual devices27. How are we to solve the problem of confusion surrounding the concept 
of populism? 
In an essay published in 1956, Walter Bryce Gallie distinguished conceptual confusion 
from conceptual contestation. In the first case, confusion partially derives from the repeatedly 
inconsistent usage of a concept, that is, the inability to specify the relationship between words 
and meanings, partially from the failure to grasp the definitions employed by other scholars. 
                                                          
21 T. HOUWEN, The Non-European Roots of the Concept of Populism, Sussex European Institute, Working Paper 
120, University of Sussex, Brighton 2011, p. 12. 
22 L. SCUCCIMARRA, Democrazia e populismo. Un itinerario storico-concettuale, cit., pp. 269-287. Scuccimarra 
relies on the work of Reinhart Koselleck in emphasising the constitutive polyvocality of the basic concepts of 
politics. See R. KOSELLECK, Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte, in Id. Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik 
geschichtlicher Zeiten, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1979, pp. 107-129.  
23 P. ARMELLINI, Populismo e fascismo: un confronto tra categorie politiche affini e diverse, in R. Chiarelli (a cura 
di), Il populismo tra storia, politica e diritto, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 2015, pp. 161-176 
24 P.A. TAGGART, Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics, in Y. MÉNY, Y. SUREL (eds.), Democracies 
and the Populist Challenge, cit., pp. 62-80. 
25 J-W. MÜLLER, What is Populism? University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia (Penn) 2016, p. 11.  
26 G.J. MULGAN, Politics in an Antipolitical Age, Polity Press, Cambridge 1994, pp. 1-6. 
27 M. TRUFFELLI, L’ombra della politica. Saggio sulla storia del pensiero antipolitico, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 
2008, pp. 20-31. 
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In the case of conceptual contestation, the strong normative valence associated with some 
concepts motivates users to prefer a particular meaning, whereas others contend that 
alternative meanings are the best or simply correct28. We may feel tempted to conclude that 
populism is both conceptually confused and a contested concept. After all, its meaning has 
been debated for at least fifty years. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the confusing 
character of the concept of populism is in itself a contested issue. To the extent that it is 
actually so, populism can be seen as a confused concept only within the epistemological 
paradigm of classical descriptivism. Laclau, for example, maintained that in descriptiviam the 
operations that naming performs are limited “by the straitjacket within which they take place”. 
The descriptive features inhabiting any name “reduce the order of the signifier to the 
transparent medium through which a purely conceptual overlapping between name and thing 
- the concept being their common nature - expresses itself”. The semantically libertarian drive 
of the Post-Structuralists, and in Laclau’s perspective Lacanian psychoanalysis, have marked 
“the beginning of an autonomization of the signifier”. The parting of the ways between naming 
and description, naming and conceptual determination has not necessarily led to any 
increase in the complexity of the operations that naming itself can perform, Laclau added. In 
the anti-descriptive perspective “the identity and unity of the object result from the very 
operation of naming”. This, however, is possible only if naming is not subordinated either to 
description or to a preceding designation. In order to perform this role, “the signifier has to 
become, not only contingent, but empty as well”. Hence, Laclau maintains, “the identity and 
unity of an object result from the very operation of naming it”29. This position reflects some of 
the major instances discussed in French philosophy throughout the 1960s and beyond. 
Foucault insisted on that “interpretation has at last become an infinite task”, and as such “it 
will disappear as interpretation, perhaps involving the disappearance of the interpreter 
himself”. This, in his view, did not mean that interpretation would be deprived of its primacy 
for the idea that “interpretation precedes the sign” just implied that “the sign is not a simple 
and benevolent being”. Signs are “interpretations that try to justify themselves”30. For his part 
Jacques Derrida had announced the historical closure of the epoch of the sign. He argued 
that “the thematics of the sign have been for a century the agonized labor of a tradition that 
professed to withdraw meaning, truth, presence, being etc., from the movement of 
signification”31. By contrast, according to Herbert Paul Grice, in speaking a language we 
attempt to communicate things to our hearers by means of getting them to recognize our 
intention to communicate just those things. The meaning is conveying the intention to 
                                                          
28 W.B. GALLIE, Essentially Contested Concepts, «Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society» 56 (1956), pp. 167-
198. 
29 E. LACLAU, On Populist Reason, Verso, London-New York 2005, pp. 104-105 
30 M. FOUCAULT, Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, cit., pp. 274, 277. 
31 J. DERRIDA, Of Grammatology (1967), trans. G. Chakravorty Spivak, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
(Md) 2016, pp. 14-15. 
12 
 
produce particular effects32. John R. Searle argued that this account of meaning “does not 
show the connection between one’s meaning something by what one says and what that 
which one says actually means in the language”. According to Searle «one’s meaning 
something when one says something is more than just contingently related to what the 
sentence means in the language one is speaking». Meaning is connected to the relationship 
between intentionality and the conventional aspects of language33.  
In our study, as already pointed out, we shall follow Canovan’s recommendation to use 
the concept of populism, within certain limit of fluctuation concerning the meanings 
extrapolated by its usage, as a pointer. We need now to make a reference to another 
important source of inspiration. How have we analysed the normative or ideological content 
of the politically relevant and sensitive messages embodied in Scandinavian national-
populism? We have relied on instances that are to be found in the work of Max Weber. In his 
1904 essay on objectivity in social science and social policy (Die «Obiektitität» 
sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis), in line with a long-standing 
tradition in Western philosophy, Max Weber attacked the mixture of ethical evolutionism and 
historical relativism, popular at the time in the social sciences, in the light of which it was 
assumed that what was normatively right was identical with “the immutably existent”, and, 
within the latter, with “the inevitably emergent”. Weber noted that in their modern 
configuration the sciences treating institutions, processes, and events pertaining to human 
culture arose in connexion with practical considerations, in particular the attainment of value-
judgments concerning measures of State economic policy. The German sociologist lamented 
that the modification of this paradigm still required the establishment of a firm distinction 
between knowledge of what is (das Seiende) and knowledge of what ought to be (das 
Seinsollende). The inspiration that has guided our research may be called Weberian in the 
sense that it presupposes that historical-political investigation extends beyond technical 
skills, to encompass knowledge for its own sake, provided that the process of 
intellectualization or rationalization of which all specialized sciences is an important segment, 
does not necessarily produce increased general knowledge about our conditions of 
existence. As Weber pointed out, nowadays no one believes that science can teach us 
anything about the meaning of the world, or, if anything, it tends to eradicate the belief that 
there is such a meaning. Our inspiration is Weberian also in the sense that it accepts the idea 
that every type of scientific inquiry must presuppose that its findings are of interest. The social 
sciences presuppose value-judgments that guide the selection of topics for study. In this 
perspective tacit presuppositions must be replaced with self-conscious value analysis 
                                                          
32 H.P. GRICE, Meaning, in «The Philosophical Review», 66/3 (1957), pp. 377-388 
33 J.R. SEARLE, What is a Speech Act? in M. BLACK (ed.), Philosophy in America,  Allen and Unwin, London 1965, 
pp. 221-239 
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(Wertanalyse). It is part of the moral duty to foster clarity and responsibility34. Eventually, in 
his 1906 Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences (Kritische Studien auf dem 
Gebiet der kulturwissensschaftlichen Logik), Weber argued that subjective judgments 
regularly influence our decisions in the selection and delimitation of research problems, 
namely they play a decisive role in determining what is worth knowing as an object of 
research, and why. Max Weber, who strenuously opposed the practice of deriving ‘scientific’ 
prescriptions from the empirically given, stressed the importance of transforming our vague 
understanding of socio-political notions, including the most confused and the most contested, 
in so far as affected by personal commitments, into explicit judgments of value relatedness. 
Value interpretation (wertbeziehende Interpretation) or value analysis (Wertanalyse) can help 
clarifying the grounds of our interest in certain objects if we separate those grounds from the 
causal analysis of these phenomena35. 
Is populism an unstoppable trend? Is it the political actualization of the Zeitgeist? There 
have been many references in scholarly work to the phases of populism in a variety of socio-
political contexts. A large number of references, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser 
recalled, are concerned with Latin American politics, within which several waves of populism 
have been identified. Many others are concerned with European countries, where new 
populist parties and movements gained ever more influential positions in political action and 
debate. As a phenomenon, populism has been called sometimes a ‘wave’, and sometimes a 
‘contagious’ trend36. In public discourse it has been repeatedly suggested we had better 
defend democracy from the threat of populists in opposition and in government alike. Indeed, 
in recent decades we have seen a remarkable increase in the number of populist parties and 
movements especially in Europe, although their electoral successes have been sporadic. 
Nevertheless, in Scandinavian countries the presence of such parties and movements has 
become steady and their once shocking rhetoric and policies have become almost 
mainstream by now37. It is thus the case that while populism fares well in some countries, it 
is unable to gain influence in others38. The ability of populist political parties in Scandinavia 
to gain electoral success, hence to stabilise is an element suggesting that populism in 
Scandinavia may either be the result of a peculiar type of diversification within the very 
broadly conceived populist political stream, or one of unexpected outcomes of the so-called 
Scandinavian model of politics to be regarded after all as a somewhat fertile ground for 
                                                          
34 M. WEBER, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in Max Weber on The Methodology of the Social 
Sciences, trans. E.A. Shils, H.A. Finch, Free Press, New York 1949, pp. 49-112, 80-81, 86-87, 92-95, 103-104. 
35 Ivi, pp. 113-188. 
36 C. MUDDE, C. ROVIRA KALTWASSER, Populism: Corrective and Threat to Democracy, in Id., Populism in Europe 
and the Americas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, pp. 205-222, 218. 
37 C. MUDDE, The Populist Zeitgeist, «Government and Opposition», 39/4 (2004), pp. 541-563, 550. 
38 In arguing that despite the increasing socio-economic homogeneity among the European nations, the fortunes 
of populist radical right parties differ significantly country by country, Mudde meant to react to the idea that deepfelt 
and widely shared socio-economic discontent within a democratic system will surely lead to populism. See C. 
MUDDE, Who’s Afraid of the European Radical Right?, «Dissent», fall 2011, pp. 6-11, 9 
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populists of different kinds. The diversity among the parties and movements we nowadays 
tend to place within this popular catchall category is notable, yet not necessarily increasing 
over time. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser believe that studying different types, or sub-families 
of populism, as well as comparing specific cases with each other, are feasible activities. The 
main types, or sub-families they identify are populism of the so-called inclusionary type as far 
as Latin America is concerned, and of the so-called exclusionary type as far as Europe is 
concerned39. We shall be investigating how the Scandinavian cases fit within these types, 
and therefore, either sustain, or challenge, their overarching typology. Thus, in investigating 
the ideological roots of the Scandinavian national-populist parties, we also wish to show the 
extent to which, and on which account, local nationalist-populist parties fall within the 
category of exclusionary populism, and to what extent the distinction between inclusionary 
and exclusionary populism is a useful tool in the attempt to understanding the ideological 
roots of such parties and movements. We will attempt to show that it is not only feasible, but 
also clarifying and conceptually useful, to dentify, and consistently use, several, distinct 
categories of populism. Although, we will also show that a typology that is defined by two 
overaching families of populism - whether it allows for further sub-families or not - fails to 
capture the full range of phenomena referred to as populist politics in Scandinavia. By first 
identifying some of the historical cases in which evident traces of of populism are detactable, 
we shall see that the split nature of populism itself is not a result of a process of diversification, 
but rather a case of different phenomena that, from the very outset, happened to share a few 
common features. The contribution that this study aims to offer is two-fold: placing 
Scandinavian populism in a wider context, thereby addressing the issue of the uniqueness of 
Scandinavian political culture; problematising the rather common assumption that the 
variance among populist phenomena has increased exponentially over time.    
 
Part I: The many faces of populism 
 
When we examine the galaxy of political parties and movements, we may realize that 
not all protest parties, that is, parties or movements that rely on popular engagement in 
politics, regardless of the degree of emamcipatory force they embody, are radical right parties 
precisely in the same sense in which not all radical right parties or movements possess a 
protest-charge. However, the distinction between the many names given to related 
phenomena such as ‘protest party’, ‘anti-democratic movements’, ‘right-wing populist parties’ 
and ‘radical right parties’ is, to say the least, blurred. What is certain is the negative 
connotation which most of these names bear. This is the reason why parties and movements 
                                                          
39 C. MUDDE, C. ROVIRA KALTWASSER, Populism: Corrective and Threat to Democracy, cit., pp. 221-222.  
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themselves are generally reluctant to use these terms while engaging in self-descriptive 
practices, with the exception, perhaps, of ‘protest parties’. Furthermore, many parties or 
movements have, either in the press or by scholars, been assigned to several of these 
categories. It is symptomatic that in Scandinavian countries the tendency to make use of all 
these different terms is considerably strong. We see that parties call themselves Folkeparti 
(Party of the People, or People’s Party), Sverigedemokratarna (Sweden Democrats), and, 
like the cases just mentioned imply, they are called ‘right-wing populist parties’, or ‘radical 
right parties’, by scholars as well as by journalists and media commentators. Rather than a 
lack of definitions or of failing definitions, the problem seems to be rooted in how scholars 
and analysts of different kinds tend to take one or several specific cases as their starting point 
for a definition. This strategy is legitimate, but it introduces complications whenever an 
attempt is made to amplify its euristic validity. Efforts made at granting a clear and 
overarching definition of populism have, contrastingly, but not surprisingly, led, as we have 
emphasised already, either to mallible definitions that take shape after the subject they try to 
capture, or to definitions so vague that further division into sub-categories seems to be 
inevitable. The circumstance points at two factors at least in contemporary democratic politics 
that are of importance to understanding the diversity of populist parties and movements: core, 
populist traits appear to be shared among different parties and organisations throughout the 
world, especially in democratic countries; definitions of populism are occasionally so far-
reaching that it is difficult to tell them apart from mainstream political parties.40 While these 
widespread phenomena take different forms under different circumstances, they are 
generally critical of elitism and liberal-democratic pluralism. In fact, the wish is to either limit 
liberal-democracy, to implement different, more participatory, variants of democracy, or to 
exchange the democratic political elite for another.   
Firstly, we shall look at some of the historical manifestations of populism to determine 
the elements of continuity and discontinuity with current manifestations of populism in 
different parts of the world. Then we shall present the specific cases chosen for this study, in 
order to see if, and to what extent, these movements resemble previously historically 
determined cases of populism. Finally, the question of whether a so-called ‘Scandinavian 
populism’ exists, or has existed, will be addressed through the the analysis of several 
parametres. The following specific key-questions shall be addressed: are there distinctive 
facts that set today’s populist movements in Scandinavia apart from populist and nationalist 
ideas and programmes of the past?  What are the ties relating the different populist 
                                                          
40 On example of such a broad definition of populism has been advanced by Ivan Cerovac. More specifically, he 
juxtaposed a system where the role of experts in a decision-making process is emphasized (elitism) and a system 
where “a capable and considered population” should have equal access to all aspects of the decisionmaking 
process (populism). See I. CEROVAC, Egalitarian Democracy between Elitism and Populism, in «Journal of 
Education, Culture and Society», 2 (2014), pp. 31-42. 
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movements in Scandinavia to each other? Are there any compelling indicators that may 
convince us that Scandinavian populism is somewhat different from its counterparts 
elsewhere? Finally, based on a number of findings, we shall evaluate the claim that a distinct, 
Scandinavian form of populism exists. 
  
Ancestry of National-populism 
 
It is popular fancy that the current populist movements and parties in Europe have no 
equals in history, that is, they are mostly disconnected from history, from a shared ideological 
background, and they only exist because of current economic, political and/or social crises 
that are local, or regional, in scope and nature. In other words, the portrayal of the different 
populist phenomena shows that besides developing independently from one another, they 
are also detached from political phenomena that occurred in the past. Certainly, one part of 
the assumption we are examining derives from the rhetoric employed by the leaders of the 
movements or parties themselves, who, with very few exceptions41, are keen on keeping the 
rigidity of the dividing line separating their own ideas and policies, and the ideas and policies 
of the national-socialist and fascist parties. Downplaying the emphasis on the possible 
connections with such movements of the past elsewhere also seems to encourage the 
projection of the following ideas onto the image, and self-image, of the party leadership: 
innovation of mind; stamina; uniqueness. In addition, by not clearly referring to the 
connections between similar parties in different countries, the party leadership can more 
easily appeal to the protectionist-nationalist segments of the electorate, which are 
quintessentially against any contamination of ideas. It is, however, not only the parties 
themselves profiting from the ‘hush-hush approach’ to party genealogy and external sources 
of inspiration. It is convenient to both the political adversaries and to tendentially sceptical 
political commentators and analysts to stick with this tendency42. In the case of historical 
references, this is maybe more penetrable than in the case of references to other national 
contexts. By drawing parallels between either the ideologies, or the methods, of 
contemporary populist parties on the one hand, and those of fascist or revolutionary 
                                                          
41 Tatjana Festerling, co-founder of the PAGIDA in Germany, is a case in point. In an interview, she claimed that 
Germans are “more afraid of being called racists or nazi than they are of their children being abducted, thrown 
down the stairs or under a metro-train”. She believes that “the West has long since been lost, it is also morally so 
depleted”. “We have nothing left that we want to defend. There is only this collective, suicidal madness. The 
people hang onto illusions and do not care at all about the future, not even the future of their children”. The 
interview has been posted on Gates of Vienna, an anti-islamization website. See T. FESTERLING, “There is no will 
to defend; there is only this collective suicidal madness”, in Gates of Vienna: viewed at 
https://gatesofvienna.net/2017/09/tatjana-festerling-there-is-no-will-to-defend-there-is-only-this-collective-
suicidal-madness/ (last accessed 30/05/2018). 
42 Especially in Denmark, and despite a generally harsh tone in the national political debate there, the critics of 
Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) have, more often than not, lost legal disputes regarding the use of 
references to what they found to be international or historical parallelisms. 
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movements on the other, journalists and politicians expose themselves to excessive risk, as 
they can expect an indignated reaction from the parties in question, and even face legal, and 
more generally political, repercussions. Moreover, by identifying how they fit within a wider 
tendency, critics using this type of examples to point out what they perceive as dangers in 
the ideology or political methods of these parties and movements, may end up lending them 
legitimacy through parallelism and an idea that stimulate a sense primordial belonging. 
Finally, the electorate itself will be reluctant to admit that the ideas and core-values they 
share, wholesale or in part, may be reminiscent of such ideologies as socialism, fascism, and 
national-socialism. This reluctance results in a lack of positive response and accusations of 
exaggeration on the part of public opinion when direct or indirect criticism is voiced in public 
debates. Some historical comparisons can be made between the crisis in which the 
ideological flame of fascism was kindled during the 1930s, and the critical situation in which 
the new populist parties have enjoyed, and are enjoying, wide support. In both periods, the 
economic crisis seemed as profound as to call for extreme measures, and in both periods, 
the so-called ‘established’ political parties seemed apathetic, turned away from the problems 
that part of the population deemed in the need of a solution, and stubbornly continued along 
the line of compromise and consensus-seeking. We shall now take a step back and try to 
determine what the past has meant to our current perception of nationalism and populism in 
general, and national-populism in particular. Why do these terms have a negative 
connotation? Did they always have such negative connotation? How do contemporary 
Scandinavian national-populism fit with the historical populist and nationalist thoughts and 
ideals? Are they simply a combination of the two, and, if so, how do the latter fit together in 
the context of the life of contemporary parties and movements? If not, then has there been 
some continuation of the two earlier political ideals within contemporary national-populist 
parties and movements? We must thus, first of all, attempt to identify the doctrinal roots of 
both populism and nationalism.  
 
Populism 
 
Populism, as it has been repeatedly said, is an elusive concept, or, at least, it has 
become an elusive concept. It has taken different shapes from the very outset, covering 
emancipatory movements belonging to diverse political orientations at the extremes of the 
political spectre. Indeed, the concept of populism has been used to characterise a plethora 
of instances from the Russian Narodniki to fascism43, from the American Agrarian movement 
                                                          
43 As far as Fascism in Italy is concerned, Armellini emphasised, in a manner which is typical of the investigations 
that are part of the vast field of the critique of ideology, how deep the gap has been between populism and 
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and to present-day anti-establishment movements in various parts of Europe44. It is thus not 
a simple task to determine what is meant by populism in the national and international political 
and theoretical discourses today. We may become the wiser, by looking at what populism 
used to mean and then identify how the current understanding compares to the historical one. 
Most authors concerned with the concept of populism trace its roots to the French Radical 
tradition of thought. 
  
French Radicalism 
 
During the French Revolution, it became accepted by the part of the population that 
had gained the upper-hand, that the people was the only legitimate source of political power. 
The contrast with the ideas of the Ancien Régime could hardly have been stronger. 
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès expressed this view in Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-État? (1798) in the 
following way:  
subtract the privileged order and the Nation would not be something 
less, but something more. What then is the Third Estate? Everything; 
but an everything that is fettered and oppressed. What would it be 
without the privileged order? Everything; but an everything that would 
be free and flourishing45.  
The people could thus not only govern themselves, but govern themselves better than the 
political elite. This was the real revolution in thought; that even the humble classes had the 
capacity, with proper guidance and institutional infrastructure, to be their own masters. Many 
of the intellectual movements in Europe took the French example to heart, and tried to 
pressure their own authorities to embrace some, similar, kind of radical form of 
constitutionalism46. The French radicals were populist because of their idea that the people 
had a collective will, and that, in one way or the other, it was possible to distill the people’s 
will and place it at the helm of government. Of course, there were differing opinions as to 
which role popular consultation should play in the new society, but there was wide-spead 
agreement that efforts should be made, not necessarily to listen to the people, but to 
                                                          
Fascism. See P. ARMELLINI, Populismo e fascismo: un confront tra categorie politiche affini e diverse, cit., pp. 170-
176. 
44 On the topic see G. HERMET, Les populismes dans le monde. Une histoire sociologique, XIXe – XXe siècle, 
Paris, Fayard 2001 
45 The passage in cited in U. ÖZKIRIMLI, Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction (2000), Palgrave-
Macmillan, Basigstoke 2010, p. 16.  
46 See also J. ISRAEL, A Revolution of the Mind. Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern 
Democracy, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ)-Oxford 2010, pp. 37-91. 
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implement the people’s wishes. Two premises must be made about the understanding the 
radicals had of ‘the French people’. The first premise is that the radicals conceived of ‘the 
people’ as a united and uniform, essence-like unit, and certainly not as a collection of 
individuals. That is not to say that they disregarded individual freedoms, but merely that, when 
determining socially and politically relevant questions, they would seek to think of the ‘ideal 
French citizen’, rather than try to distinguish diverging opinions or interests. Therefore, the 
majority became the imagined whole constituting ‘the French people’. The second premise 
is that they thought that it was possible for the political leaders to identify this ‘extended’ 
popular will and to implement the necessary policies and instate the necessary institutions to 
turn the people’s will into reality. This was a radical age, alive with humanistic, and populist 
ideals47. 
  
Russian Pre-Revolution Populism  
 
The developments concerning the Russian populist movement are particularly relevant, 
because many of the traits that distinguish families of populist movements in the twenty-first 
century were already present in this movement. The movement was born out of concerns 
very similar to those harboured by many of the supporters of the so-called ‘new populist 
parties’: the weakening of the state in favour of new economic powers, and economic crises, 
in combination with wider societal modernizing changes. The reasons for supporting the 
populist movement then, or the new populist parties today, only in part, and indirectly, 
describe the actual ideological aspirations of thinkers and leaders within the movements. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, in Russia, there were ongoing discussions in 
liberal intellectual circles, about the special position of Russia in the history of the world. In 
Orlando Figes’ view, they welcomed the recent emancipation of the serfs as ‘a national 
reawakening’, and threw themselves into the support of the resulting new rural class by 
building rural schools and hospitals. Figes, along with several other scholars, see the populist 
movement (Narodnichestvo) foremost as a pre-cursor to the October revolution48. The 
populists (narodniki), although by no means uniform in their methods of political action, 
shared a common and distinctive epistemology and ideology of progressive and 
emancipatory self-development. Among the early Narodnichestvo groups, a particularly 
                                                          
47 S. SCHAMA, Citizens. A Chronicle of the French Revolution, Penguin Books, London-New York 1989, pp. 123-
247, 333-368 
48 Figes suggests that it was these groups of intellectuals who would eventually spur the Revolution. Their ideas 
of a more just future for Russia, many suggest, were a consequence of their identification of the rural way of life 
as the evidence of true virtue. See O. FIGES, Revolutionary Russia: 1891-1991. A History, Metropolitan Books, 
Henry Holt and Company; New York 2014, pp. 7-38.  
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developed, tendentially Rousseauesque, understanding of the virtues of the simple, rural, 
population of Russia existed, although with a twist. As we shall see, it were their ideas of 
Russian particuliarism, and of the importance of bookish instruction of the masses, which set 
them apart from the French Revolutionaries. One could argue that they were nationalist, but 
without support for the national, centralised state. More than a decade later, some factions 
of the movement were to manifest this particularist idea through expressed patriotism, but 
that was not the case among the early narodniki. It has been argued, by persons such as 
Pyotr Tchaikovsky and Nikolay Mikhaylovsky, that Russia might be an exception to the 
Marxist idea that industrial revolution, by then well underway in England and at its beginning 
elsewhere, was a necessary step in the economic development of modern society. Although 
they assumed that either a social or an industrial revolution was necessary in most other 
cases, they insisted that Russia had a unique position in history, but not, as one might expect 
from such a claim, because of a high level of economic, social, or political development but 
precisely because of its economic and social backwardness. After many years of strict Tsarist 
control of the economy and societal structures, especially through the policy of keeping the 
manufacturing class under control and operating under restrictions, and because of the long 
duration of bound serfdom of the majority of Russia’s population, the claim was advanced 
that the road of industrialisation was much longer in Russia than elsewhere49. In addition, the 
fact that the vast Russian rural areas were, economically, still organised by, and divided into, 
village-based communes, spurred these liberal thinkers to believe that the Russian 
population was somewhat in a privileged position to learn from the mistakes made abroad 
and, thereby, to avoid suffering the consequences of such mistakes. In other words, they 
believed that, if only the Tsar could be convinced to transfer most of his powers to a 
democratically elected council, Russia would be able to pass directly from an oppressive, 
and feudal, system to a democratic and egalitarian one, without having to pass through the 
miseries of urban overpopulation. This nostalgic and egalitarian ideas seem, at a first glance, 
to be compatible with the French progressive and humanistic ideals. However, the favour 
shown to the simplicity of rural life by those supporting the early populist movement in Russia 
was more extensive than that experienced among the French humanists. Yet, the Russian 
populists did not share Rousseau’s mistrust of education and study with regard to those 
allegedly unsuited for it50. On the contrary, they believed that e civic education would be a 
benefit to all members of the lower classes: serfs, farmhands, and small land owners.   
                                                          
49 A process of emancipation of serfs in Russia started only in 1861, after the publication of the Proclamation of 
Statues on the Abolition of Serfdom on 5 May. This process was concluded slightly prematurely in 1907. See D. 
MOON, The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia: 1762- 1907 (2001), Routledge, London-New York 2014, pp. 84-109.  
50 On learning from experience versus bookish study, see J-J. ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Sciences and the 
Arts, in Id. The Major Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Two Discourses and The Social Contract, 
ed. J.T. Scott, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London 2012, pp. 1-36;  Id. Émile or Treatise on 
Education, trans. W.H. Payne, D. Appleton, New York-London 1918, pp. 130-190.  
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The populists were organised in groups, not surprisingly mostly urban groups. The 
groups that orbited around figures such as Tchaikovsky and Mikhailovsky, called themselves 
populists because of their belief that the role of intellectuals and revolutionaries within the 
movement should be very restricted, and exclusively facilitative to letting the real, 
spontaneous will and intelligence of the population come to its fruition. Mikhailovsky, on of 
the main characters among the realy populists, and on of the few who continued to believe 
in the value of the emancipation of the individual, refused to believe that the division of labour 
constituted progress. Yet he maintained that progress consisted in evolution from the simple, 
or homogenous, towards the complex, or heterogeneous. In the view of Mikhailovsky, the 
central mover of history was not class struggle, but rather “the universal struggle for the 
fullness of human personality”.51 The Tchaikovsky circle, to which Mikhailovsky belonged, 
and of which he had been a co-founder together with Tchaikovsky and Mark Natanson, in 
turn the founder of the Partiia Narodnogo Prava (People’s Rights Party)52, inspired sister-
circles in several other cities, such as Kiev and Odessa. The focus of the circles was, at the 
out-set, the setting up of a solidarity system in which each member was expected to help 
other members in need and could expect the same help him/herself in difficult times. Each of 
the circles had its own, illegal library from which members could (and were expected to) 
borrow reading materials. In the view of the founder of the circle, self-perfection, or 
improvement of the self, and development of personality were the final objectives and this 
could happen, in their opinion, only through the accumulation of knowledge. Their goal was 
thus not economic emancipation, but intellectual emancipation, that is, not the emancipation 
of the lower social classes, but the emancipation of the individual53. They were, as such, to 
be the beacon of the supposed ‘authentic Russian peasantry’ rather than acting on their own 
on what they believed to be the will of the people. The difference might not yet be evident but 
let us focus on a specific comparison which may shed some light on this. Where populism 
(Narodnichestvo) started with the same concern for the oppressed and struggling rural 
workers as the French radicals had for the starving French rural population, their ideal of 
emancipation was built on instruction of basic literacy- and economic skills, next to the 
political propaganda needed. Where the French republican ideas relied on a natural 
                                                          
51 J.H. BILLINGTON, Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1958, pp. 34-35, 40.  
52 M. HILDERMEIER, The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party before the First World War, St. Martin’s Press, New 
York 2000, p. 382. 
53 The authors mostly selected for these illegal libraries included Proudhon, Blanc, Lamennais, Lange, Lasalle, 
Marx, Comte, Mill, Spencer, Chernyshevsky, and Lavrov. The circle regarded Louis Blanc as ‘the father of modern 
socialism’. Author of the formula ‘from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs’, Blanc 
preached a socialism that appealed to sentiments of justice and brotherhood. Even more permeating than the 
influence of Blanc, however, was that of Proudhon, who was admired for his moral passion and his belief in the 
mystic force of ‘the people’ as bearer of the new ‘social order’. The populists were not on a large-scale Marxist, 
although it was populist writers such as Mikhailovsky who made the thoughts of Mill, Spencer, Marx, and, above 
all, Proudhon available in the Russian language. See J.H. BILLINGTON, Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism, cit., 
pp. 64-65. 
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inclination among men towards democratic participation, the Russian populist view regarded 
democratic developments as long-term goals. The priority for them was neither conflict, nor 
revolution. Only after a successful civil education programme, designed to broaden the 
knowledge of the rural and urban workers, would populism turn to major political reform, or 
revolution if you will. Populism, as Billinton noticed, was begun by Aleksandr Herzen, whose 
vision of the originally medieval, peasant organisation into mir, the self-governing assemblies 
of free landownersthat distributed farmland in an equitable way, and where everyone could 
be heard, would be the perfect organising principle in a reborn, equal, and just Russia54. 
These romantic ideas about a harmonious, self-governing existence was adopted and 
adapted by several populist authors, such as Gregory Eliseev, who believed that the 
obshchina, wich can be understood to mean a commune, would be the more appropriate 
organising body. He claimed that in the obshchina, a ‘brotherhood’ could be found, which 
was unequal to any seen in Western Society “despite the equality there of equal rights”. 
Eliseev also emphasized that is was by no special merit of the Russian rural population or 
religion, but by the “natural profusion of types and the preserved family character of the village 
commune – a commune not corrupted by bureaucratic transformations and enforced 
changes”. He pointed out that the spontaneous collaborative and mutually respectful 
organisation of the village commune had also existed elsewhere “until bureaucracy interfered 
in the internal life of the commune and violated the moral element in it”. The scope and the 
social purpose of the populist project was thus set to re-create the natural and balanced 
organisation of life, whether into mir or obshchina as it had been in the village before the 
process of state centralisation began55.  
The early populists also saw their own agency as very limited. They were waiting for 
the suppressed, with the exclusive stimulation of instruction, to ‘wake up and smell the coffee’ 
and act on their own accord, which unfortunately did not happen. In fact, the most important 
contribution to the history of political movements was the so-called ‘movement to the people’ 
(khozhdenie v narod), which reached its peak in 1874. This was the actual, spontaneous, 
and disorganised movement of more than three-thousand intellectuals and students, who left 
the cities, and in many cases their studies, to venture into all corners of the vast territories of 
European Russia. They were responding to Bakunin’s call, and their scope - as it was said 
in the 1873 manifesto published in Lavrov’s Paris-based journal Vpered! - was “to develop 
our obshchina in the sense of the communal working of the land and the communal use of 
its products, to make of the mir the basic political unit of the Russian social order”. Their 
method was to work the land together with the paseants during the day, and at night, teach 
                                                          
54 The mir were places in which each member of the community could be heard and in which it would decided on 
the equitable distribution of farmland and resources among those living within its territory. 
55 See J.H. BILLINGTON, Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism, cit., pp. 47-48. 
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and study together with the same paseants. For them, emancipation had long prospects and 
would certainly not see them, the intellectuals whose duty it was to kindle the flame within 
the rural population until the time was ripe for the people to take control, as frontfigures. Their 
main demands included cheaper credit and popular education. Regrettably, the response of 
the paseants was not to be as heartily felt as the populists had hoped, and in several cases, 
their presence was denounced to the authorities by some of the very people they wished to 
help. In spite of the non-political message and non-violent methods, the authorities treated 
the movement as they might have a budding revolution. The movement was perceived as a 
clear threat to the Tsarist regime and status-quo. For this reason, the Tsarist supporters and 
forces clamped down hard on the movement which, as a result, was decimated within a few 
months. Although the movement continued for a few years in the more resilient enclaves, it 
practically disappeared as a large-scale movement, and due to the disenchantment with the 
reaction of the population whom they were trying to help, the Russian populist thinkers moved 
onto considering more violent alternatives56. 
Many strands would develop within Russian populism, some unrecognisable as part of 
the same moment as the first populists. In addition to this division, or rather as a significant 
contributing factor to the division, the views of the social intellectuals in Russia were -more 
often than not- influenced by events abroad. A significant split within the populist movement 
resulted. At first between the Slavophil and the westernizers57. However, as nihilists took over 
leadership of the radical wing, with accompanying requirements of loyalty and disciplin, the 
more moderate ‘westernizers’ became more and more estranged from the existing 
movement. They felt room was needed for subjectivity and the valuation of each individual. 
Later, another noteworthy division of the movement took place between those who believed 
in a moderate, and exclusively social and economic oriented political programme on the one 
hand, and those who believed that violent revolution was both inevitable and would awaken 
the vast population in favour of swift political reform, as it happened in the French revolution. 
The ideals of these factions remained a dream, as they would be dissolved and/or integrated 
in the ideology of yet other political groupings before Russia was to see the important political 
changes they were hoping for58. 
After the apparent failure of the French revolutionaries to establish a better society, free 
of the ‘tyranny of the masses, the revolutionary wing of the movement (Zemlya I Volya) lost 
momentum. The disillusioning unwillingness of the new Tsar, Alexander II, to introduce 
                                                          
56 Ivi, pp. 79-81.  
57 We may, for example, count Constantine Aksarov and Yury Samarin among the Slavophil, whereas figures 
such as Vissarion Belinsky and Michael Bakunin should be considered Westernizers. 
58 For further details about the development of each of the main factions of the Russian populist movement, see 
the doctoral thesis by G.J. GAMBLIN, Russian Populism and its Relations with Anarchism 1870-1881, University of 
Birmingham, December 1999: viewed at http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/1401/1/PhD1999Gamblin.pdf  (last accessed 
30/05/2018). 
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economic and social reforms, as well as his severe treatment of the revolutionaries captured 
by the authorities, contributed to the disheartenment. The so-called ‘1860 Generation’ of 
Russian populists that followed were dedicated to two main, moderate ideas. The first was 
that the people was simply in need of instruction and once it would have received such 
instruction would organize itself and put pressure on the authorities to draft a constitution. 
The other main idea was that the Russian people possessed a reasonableness and simplicity 
in its economic organisation which was unique in the modern world, although only unique in 
its resistance to change. This dedication is what makes these populists stand out from the 
populist and nationalistic movements in Europe today. They thought their country had an 
advantage over others, not due to national virtue, skill, history, or military or economic power, 
but because it was underdeveloped. They did not regard this underdevelopment as a positive 
factor, but simply as a circumstance which should be exploited in order to explore viable 
alternatives to society organised around industrial production. It was a return to the initial 
ideas of narodnichestvo.  
Even after the demise of the populist movement in Russia, individual fragments of its 
main ideas were presented in the political program of, for example, the Union of the Russian 
People (Soiuz Russkogo Naroda), founded in 1905. The element that lived on in this, in the 
eyes of the establishment, more acceptable movement, was the claim it represented the 
people, although the leadership of the movement consisted of individuals from the higher 
stata of society. It this movement, we can recognise many of the features of nationalism that 
we will be studying below: the popular movement in defense of the fatherland and autocracy, 
although it was also in favour of the Tsar and the Church. They requested popular 
representation in government councils and recognition of the grievances of the peasants and 
workers. While its deputies sat on the Duma - in the third Duma, there were about fifty 
deputies of the extreme Right, more than ten percent of the total - they worked hard to 
discredit it and to keep it from doing any useful work. This party had picked features from the 
previous populist movement (i.e. the romanisation of the mir and the simple, rural life 
promoted by an elite). Only, this time around, it was not an intellectual elite, but the 
landowners who promoted the ‘old, spontaneous ways’. It had also adopted the anti-Semitism 
which was, according to F.L. Carsten, probably promoted by the government. In this sense, 
the party’s violence was almost in the norm, and so was its ideological stance. In 1909, the 
party split. It continued in a moderate form, more closely connected to the Conservatives, 
and in a smaller, more radical group, with oderate success in areas where national and 
religious differences and conflicts played into its hands59.  
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As ideology in Russia, in the 1870s, populism implied several political programs, 
diverging more in terms of method than scope. The question is whether or not it already 
showed the volatility that so characterises the term ‘populist’ today. Let us compare it to 
Breuilly’s idea that whenever the branched-out nationalist ideology is adopted by political 
movements, it must necessarily start to compact and solidify. The Russian populist 
movement either falls outside this pattern, or is not to be considered a full-fledged, or mature, 
ideology.  If Breuilly is right, as far as nationalism is concerned, then our observations about 
the Russian populist movement must mean that a qualitative difference existed between the 
nationalist doctrine on the one hand, and the populist doctrine, as interpreted in the Russian 
context, on the other. In what does this qualitative difference consist? We thus conclude that 
the Russian narodniki, who initially almost exclusively belonged to the urban, well-educated, 
middle-class youth, tried to gain the support of all classes of society for their programme of  - 
by order of importance in their eyes - social, economic, and political emancipation of the less 
fortunate. Furthermore, when they spoke of the virtues of the rural population, they were 
actually speaking in ideological terms of the societal effects which the administrative 
organisation in rural mir or obshchina could have on the poor and simple-minded rural 
population, as well as of the emancipatory effect that the implementation of a parallel type of 
socio-economic organisation in other parts of the Russian economy could have. They 
imagined that this effect would, to an overwhelming degree, take the form of increased 
societal and political awareness among the population, an increased level of education 
among the entire population which, in turn would make each individual wish to reach their 
highest potential. It was, in other words, far removed from, for example, contemporary Latin 
American populist movements which, as we shall see below, were majority-based populist 
movements which combined populism with more ‘thick-core ideologies’, such as socialism, 
revolutionary Peronism, and/or nativism. Nevertheless, the features that were shared by 
Russian populists and the national socialists, have become clear. Did it share more, or more 
important, features with the American populist movement of landowners than it did with 
nationalism? Let us turn our gaze across the Atlantic to see what other populist movements 
at the end of the nineteenth century were like. 
 
American Agrarian Populism 
 
The United States saw a new type of populism, distinct from the link between land and 
the original people. Although American Agrarian Populism appealed to racial sentiments, the 
reference was not to the original people because of the presence of Native Americans. This 
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movement would become a defining type of populism too60. For the Russian populists, at the 
basis of a naturally organising principle should be the connection between the individual and 
the land on which he grew up, and/or toiled, and the social connections that facilitate the life 
of peasants. For the American populists the question was one of social identification, rather 
than one of geographical identification. But that was not the only point on which the two 
populisms diverged. According to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, the common feature among 
the Russian and the American populists was that both regarded the peasantry as the main 
pillar of society and the economy61. However, there were significant differences between 
Russian and North American populism as well. The American movement and political party, 
was based in the North American West and Midwest and was strongly anti-urban, anti-
capitalist and prohibitionists. The movement started out as many separate movements, such 
as the 1870’s Farmer’s Alliance in the South and the short-lived, anti-slavery Free Soil Party 
in Ohio, New York and Massachusetts62. Furthermore, because of the completely different 
context in which it arose, in a society where there was already popular representation and 
which was moving forward at full speed in the process of mechanisation, accumulation of 
agrarian land, and urbanisation- the movement had the need foremost to attract the support 
of the voters. The eyes of the North American populists were more on their perceived 
adversaries and ways to damage them, than had been those of the early Russia populists. 
In this, the American party shared more with the radical wing of Russian populism than with 
the 1860s generation of populists.  
One aspect of Mudde and Kaltwasser’s treatment of the concept of populism may be 
cause for reconsideration. When defining which phenomena to consider populist, they 
include, for example, the Social Credit Movements. We would argue that although such 
initiatives are based on populist ideals, they do not, on their own, constitute a populist, political 
movement. Moreover, if a shared ideal of mutual help among the sections of the population 
under threat from industrialisation and urbanisation would land whichever initiative the label 
‘populist movement’, also the corporatist movements should receive such a label. 
Furthermore, one could include most liberation movements and nationalist movements in this 
category. They certainly did regard ‘the common people’ of this or that country, region, or 
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town, as the genuine nation and appealed to their support. This slippery slope brings up to a 
point where ‘populist’ is nothing more than a synonym of ‘popular’. We must then ask 
ourselves whether it is useful to distinguish between popular politics and political populism at 
all. This a point to which we shall return in a later section. Although there certainly were 
undeniable differences among the Russian and American populist movements, there were, 
as Kristoffer Löfgren has observed, several important similarities. We may argue that these 
similarities are in no way perfect and do not allow us to claim ideological correspondence 
among the two phenomena, but they may indicate a path towards a definition of just what 
exactly is a populist party. Indeed, Löfgren writes that both movements reacted against 
production of scale and centralisation, as well as against the inequality and xenophobic 
effects that were suggested to be caused by it, although some Russian populist groups briefly 
embraced antisemitism as we have seen above. Moreover, both movements were suspicious 
of the state and idealised the small-scale producer, “but on unequal terms”. Another common 
feature, again shared among the early populism movements on both sides of the Atlantic, 
was the focus on a social distinction between the upper-classes on the one hand and the 
exploited -but virtuous- lower social classes on the other. Löfgren represents the Russian 
movement as part of a "collectively minded community", whereas the American movement, 
he observes, was inserted in an individualistic social environment. He observed:  
[B]oth movements claimed to speak on behalf of the people and 
turned to it from a petit bourgeous image of the world. In spite of the 
inequalities among the movements, they utilized the same methods, 
appealed to the same target groups, in the same tone, and wanted 
to create a third way between capitalism and communism63.  
Although part of his claim seems to have the purpose of enthusing his readers about the 
similarities, rather than understading the subtle, as well as the overt, differences, we will take 
with us the notion that even the two first populist political movements should not be assumed 
to have made use of the same methods. In addition, because they didn’t wholeheartedly buy 
into Marxist Socialism as formulated by Marxists in Russia during those years, the Russian 
populists did not formulate themselves in Marxist terms, or see any need for a transitional 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.  
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Conclusion 
 
Having, in this way, searched the historical uses of the term ‘populist’ for any common 
denominators, we may conclude, as both Isiah Berlin and Margaret Canovan did before, that 
the assortment of populist phenomena offer only limited help in defining the term. We must 
therefore look elsewhere for this important methodological starting point. One could, as René 
Cuperus did, try to identify the type of parties that European populist parties are, by explaining 
who their voters are. He thus writes about the ‘new populists’ that: “[They] did fill the new 
vacuum of left/right-depoliticization”, and that they wish to attract “the worried working classes 
[…] segments of the middle-class and nouveaux riches who don’t feel represented by today’s 
political system”64. This approach, however, will account for the motivational factor behind 
each individual’s sympathy for populist ideas, but will not explain differences in the ideas 
proposed to these individuals. The ideological legacy of contemporary populist parties in 
Scandinavia has been associated, not only to the populist movements in Russia and North 
America, but also to nationalism. This link does exist, but the question is whether nationalism 
can be perceived as part of a distinct type of populist ideology, exclusive to, or at least typical 
of, Scandinavian populism. 
 
Nation and nationalism 
  
“It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny”, argued Benedict Anderson65. 
The first question to be confronted is "what is a nation?" It is not for us to sit in judgement 
over the many definitions. We merely wish to consider some of the definitions to understand 
what it is that scholars, lay persons, and nationalists refer to as the nation: Is it connected to 
ethnicity, culture, shared history, shared contemporary experiences, uniformity of language, 
religion etc., or is it defined mostly by a state of conflict with other nations, or yet, is it an 
imagined community? This, in turn, we wish to make use of to understand the logic which lies 
behind, either the instrumental use of nationalism as a political tool, or the sincere quest for 
national independence. There are at least four main theories of the nation that most scholars 
relate to, either individually or in combination. They are the so-called primordalist, or 
perennial, theory, the modernist theory, the ethnosymbolist theory, and the functionalist 
theory. We shall treat each of these theories briefly in the following paragraphs, for then to 
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propose the positioning of our interpretative framework within this wider theoretical 
framework. Firstly, the primordialists refer to nations as another form of group identity. They 
maintain that nations are inevitable because it is in our nature to try to group our fellow human 
beings into in-groups and out-groups.  This means that “there is no definitional way of 
distinguishing ethnicity from other types of collective identity”. It also means that there is no 
significant, qualitative difference between nations and other social groupings, such as family, 
school class and/or religious community, but there is a quantitative one. Humanity, according 
to primordialists, consists of a, more or less, fixed set of distinguishable nations, each with a 
consciousness of being united by history and destiny, and some even claim, of being 
metaphysically connected to a bespoke ‘homeland’. True primordialists also claim that each 
of these nations should be sovereign and have a spatial claim. The claims primordialists 
make, are often connected to the idea of glorious periods in the (distant) past, the future 
awakening of the nation, national heroes and/or titans that will come to the defence of the 
nation in troubled times66. There has been significant criticism of the primoridalist idea of 
nation. Rogers Brubaker presents such a criticism when he argues that the idea of nations 
as primordial and unchanging has been surpassed and, much like Canovan, he deliberates 
how we are often left with what he calls a “substantialist treatment of nations as real entities” 
which “adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis”67. In other words, those who 
analyse politics, take the existence of distinct nations for granted because the political actors 
do so. This is again reflected in Canovan’s observation from 1996 that “assumptions about 
the existence of bounded, unified political communities that seem suspiciously like nation-
states” were, at the time, still present in all aspects of political thinking and, we may add, 
remain so today68. According to Brubaker, scholars should move away from using the nation 
as a starting point for studying nationalism to avoid indirectly sustaining the commonly held 
misconception that nations are real entities, independently af where and when they were first 
constructed. And yet, this is the exact picture which some of the nationalist populist leaders 
in Europe are attempting to construct of their own nation. 
A group of scholars, otherwise supportive of the primordial theory, have moved away 
from the idea that nations are stable and objective ethnic groups. Although they believe that 
nations are a manifestation of a natural group identification, they regard their significance to 
have been recurring and circular through history. Although, also here there is some deviance 
in the interpretation, as some view the modern state as having permeated many more 
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aspects of the personal life of co-nationals than other facets of our social identification, and 
certainly when compared to pre-modern nations. Based on such views, the modernists claim 
that the nation is a wholly modern phenomenon. Indeed, the distinction between the 
primordial camp and the modernist camp continues to blur. We shall try to identify some 
distinguishing features.  As suggested by Bauman and Giddens, a combination of factors in 
modern life have, effectfully brought about the nation as we know it today. For instance, 
Giddens insists that the nation-state arose as a consequence of the expansion of 
industrialisation. He maintains that the nation may be understood “as symbols or beliefs” 
which attribute “a communality of experience” to the members of a particular regional, ethnic 
or linguistic category, which may or may not be convergent with the demarcation of a nation-
state69. The post-modern way of life broadly understood carries with it an uprootedness, 
which the poor and dispossessed struggle to feel at home in. Furthermore, transnationalism 
has caused anxiety about the ability to maintain national autonomy, especially among the 
citizens of small states without a strong international presence70. Gellner adds an emphasis 
on just how influential a generic education system has been in spreading the ideas of 
nationhood. He claims that the industrial state must disconnect the loyalty of the masses from 
the land, the monarch and the faith, and instead link it to a national culture71. Even if Gellner’s 
theory does not aid our understanding of the choice in favour of a nationalist identificantion 
over other, possible, identifications it does contribute to the understanding of how the power 
that nationalism seems to sway over the larger population, even in modern, democratic, 
knowledge economies, first arose. The national education system thus uniforms language, 
creates national history as opposed to local, regional, administrative and religious history, 
and identifies the ‘physical’ borders of the nation-state72. In a parallel fashion, Hobsbawm 
emphasizes the influence of history writing, and the fashion of national historiographies, on 
those same processes. Within the stream of modernist theory of the nation which we treat 
presently is the so-called ‘functional’ understanding of the nation and, ultimately, of 
nationalism. It is the idea that nationalism serves the purpose of, for example, providing 
uprooted individuals with a form of identity, or promoting the middle classes wish for a 
different political representation or promoting modernisation73. Michael Billig’s idea of ‘banal 
nationalism’ connects two central observations, one about what produces national sentiment 
and another about how and why this sentiment may be actively cultivated. He does thus not 
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focus on the origins, but on the reproduction and instrumentalization of national sentiment. 
He defines banal nationalism as the collections of everyday activities, events and 
circumstance that reproduce nationalist feelings or, in his own words, the “ideological habits 
which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced”. Everyday items like 
coins, stamps, flags on public buildings, (national hymns) become small reminders of one’s 
place as part of a nation within a world of nations, with ideas of nationalism instrumentalised 
to reinforce a sense of cohesion and shared experience74. Benedict Anderson conceives of 
the nation as an ‘imagined’ community because, among other reasons, “regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as 
a deep, horizontal comradeship”75. One of the main thesis in Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities, is that sepecially the development of a venicular languages in protestant 
Europe helped the development of national identity within this region. John Breuilly, sees 
nationalism as purely political movements that aim at seizing and/or maintaining their control 
over the state, through the use of nationalist argumentation and strategies. The nationalist 
arguments thus include that nations of distinct character exist and that they should have 
control of their own states. Nationalism then uses historicist (re)interpretations to mobilize the 
masses and create a sense of community. To Breuilly, the nationalist feeling within the 
community creates a sense of ownership of the state, whereby the unity of identity becomes 
political unity76. This is a likely explanation for the motivation of the parts of the ‘elites’ that 
promote nationalist ideas, but, as Smith and Hutchinson have pointed out, it does not account 
for the deepfelt cultural inspirations and contents of the nationalisms in question. Is it a 
question of the elites simply grabbing at any historical fact that may be interpreted in 
nationalist terms? Or is there something more behind the idea of the individual nation; 
something which accounts for the fact that so many are willing to sacrifice so much in the 
name of ‘their’ nation? According to Özkimli, in the ethno-symbolism of Anthony Smith, the 
emphasis is on the role of “myths, symbols, memories, values and traditions in the formation, 
persistence and change of ethnicity and nationalism”77. Yet, Smith does not claim to belong 
among the perennialists, as he gives due attention to transformations. Neither is Smith a 
modernist, like Kedouri, Minogue and Gellner. His emphasis is on the cultural and ethnic 
aspects of what defines a nation78. He thus understands the nation as a contemporary 
phenomenon which, nevertheless, springs from earlier, existing ethnic groups79. Smith’s 
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analysis emphasizes just how many factors contribute to explaining the rise and development 
of nations, however, a clear distinction between ethnie, nation, and nationalism is absent 
from his work. Not with regards to definitions, but with regards to the use he makes, 
throughout his work, of all three concepts. Smith’s definition of nationalism is: “an ideological 
movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a 
population deemed by some of its […] members to constitute an actual or potential nation”80. 
It thus includes a process of forming and maintaining the nation, a consciousness of 
belonging to the nation, a language and symbolism of the ‘nation’, an ideology (including a 
cultural doctrine of nations), and a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the 
nation and realise the national will81. Furthermore, Smith and Hutchinton, although they 
acknowledge that elites are in a special position to promote national identity, they write that 
mass feeling of nationhood  
[…] are created through a complex interplay between rival elites and 
other strata of the designated population, and elites are constrained 
by the beliefs and traditions of ‘the masses’ (the other strata) whom 
they wish to mobilise and whose culture they usually share82.  
There is thus competition about which elite may associate itself with the nations, but there is 
also restriction in terms of the willingness of the population to accept a certain image of the 
nation – a sort of critical consensus83. Montserrat Guibernau points out the absence of a 
clear-cut distinction between nation and state in Smith and has suggested to integrate Smith’s 
theory with more thorough considerations of the political implications of nations84. Moreover, 
                                                          
the reader with the following considerations: In a lateral ethnie, social divisions were overcome through a shared 
culture, which helps unite the members of the ethnie, and therefore makes for a stronger in-group ties and higher 
‘barriers to admission’. Integration in a vertical ethnie could be promoted in two ways, both of which involved the 
‘return’ of the past; either in the form of an original, often primitive, ‘poetic space’ (usually nature) that represented 
the birth-place of the nation, or by reverence to a golden age (in the past) of the nation. Either way, these strategies 
were first promoted by ‘educator-intellectuals’.  
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81 Ivi, pp. 154, 157. In this historical interpretation, the distinction between ethnic, ethnie, nation, and ethnic group 
is blurred. In fact, as Özkirimli points out, “O’Leary puts this very succinctly, when he argues that it is not too 
surprising to find nationalism in the 1500s if one grants the term such empirical range”. According to him, most of 
those who discuss ‘nations’ before ‘nationalism’ are in fact “establishing the existence of cultural precedents, and 
ethnic and other materials, which are subsequently shaped and re-shaped by nationalists in pursuit of nation 
building”. 
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84 M. GUIBERNAU, Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity. A Critical Assessment, in «Nations and 
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Walker Connor accuses Smith of focusing too much on nationalist feelings among the elite 
and thus overlooking the nation as a phenomenon of mass appeal85. Although the first of 
Connor’s criticisms is well grounded, we consider his second criticism to be misdirected. 
Indeed, we believe it to be a matter of different definitions of ‘nation’ and ‘nationhood’. 
Connor’s modernist point-of-view will not allow him to embrace, as Smith does, that a national 
consciousness could exist before the modern period, and among a relatively large minority 
only. We wish to build on Smith’s ethno-symbolism, and especially on the idea that, although 
nation-states are a modern phenomenon, they are usually constructed on a foundation of 
already existing ideas of group identity, be it ethnic, religious, monarchic etc., or any 
combination thereof. However, there is another point which must be considered: the choices 
made about which elements of history, cultural objects, dress, language, religion and custom 
should be included in the representation of the nation. An additional, problematic aspect of 
ethno-symbolism is that it is an attempt to explain current nationhood and nationalism merely 
in terms of pre-existing ethnicities. After all, not all ethnicities from the past can reasonably 
be considered nations and there is a special challenge in rendering justice to the qualitative 
difference between the collective identities of the past and the ethnically based nations of 
today86. The question here could be whether we even need to make such a distinction. We 
might alternatively consider them all as part of the same category of phenomena, and at that 
point, it becomes interesting to consider whether populism could also be considered on equal 
terms with them. Many have emphasized that the formation of a nation is an ongoing process 
of selection. The purpose of this selection is to among all possible representations of the 
nation, at every given moment, make choices and thereby limit the legitimate interpretations 
of that nation’s identity. In other words, mechanisms are in place through which choices are 
continuously made about what a given nation is. It is up to the analyst to always beware of 
choices made and, especially about the fact that choices, whether inclusive or exclusive, are 
usually motivated by underlying interest and are almost never inevitable, but rule ruling out 
or alternative representations. For example, Schlesinger agrees with Gellner’s statement that 
nationalism “sometimes takes per-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes 
invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures”. Those who are its “historic agents” 
do not know what they do, and this is another matter87. Schlesinger’s comment that, as a 
matter of sustainable fact, historic agents may know very well what they do is a matter of 
overzealousness, as it can reasonably be assumed that Gellner hinted not at ignorance of 
outcome, but rather at a lack of serious consideration for long-term consequences on the 
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side of these agents. Nevertheless, these decisions continuously limit the possibilities of 
understanding a particular nation available to its members. This brings us to the Foucauldian 
‘eventualisation’ procedure of analysis. “Eventalization”, Foucault asserts, “means making 
visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an 
immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformily on all”. 
What one must do, is to identify all the interests, connections, encounters, strategies etc. that 
help the choices to later be seen as “self-evident, universal, and necessary”88. This 
observation could also be applied to other types of identities. Rather than presenting an 
exhaustive account of the main streams of thought about the concept ‘nationalism’, it is our 
purpose here merely to describe the main arguments behind our choice in terms of our 
utilisation and understanding of the concept. Hans Kohn tries to account for a substantial 
change in nationalism, from the first nationalism in Western Europe, which sprang from ideas 
of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism, to the later nationalism which arose in many 
areas outside Western Europe and North America, and which was largely a reaction against 
external interference. Kohn presents the example of German nationalism, which substituted 
for the legal and rational concept of ‘citizenship’ the vaguer concept of ‘folk’, which, first 
discovered by the German humanists, was later fully developed by Herder and the German 
romanticists. “Its roots seemed to reach into the dark soil of primitive times and to have grown 
[…] in the mysterious womb of the people, deemed to be so much nearer to the forces of 
nature”. Kohn further interprets this difference as being a consequence of the ‘geographical 
division’ between renaissance and reformation in Europe. If so, the protestant Scandinavian 
nations should have developed nationalism according to the pattern of the German example. 
Before addressing the case of Scandinavia, let attention be given to understanding what the 
German humanists and romanticists saw as a nation89. 
An idea of national pride is as old as the establishment of the first national groupings, 
although it has been called by many names and it has, certainly, had more spontaneous 
connotations than those that have been added over time. The main cause of the shifts in 
connotation has been the accumulation of practical examples of nationalism at work, in the 
form of political doctrines. We may regard early nationalism simply as another form of inter-
group competition. Some authors argue that national attachment goes back several 
centuries90. Even if we accept the distant historical roots of national feeling, it does not make 
claims about nationalism as a political programme or doctrine. Neither does it explain exactly 
how it is different from other group formations. Through the observation of historical 
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phenomena, however, we have come to accept that a fundamental prerequisite for the 
development of nationalism as a doctrine is that an idea of the existence of an identifiable 
and distinct, genuine, ‘people’ is widely shared, although not necessarily among the majority 
of the population. The defining features of the genuine ‘people,’ as opposed to the outsider, 
vary over time and space. One of the most influential clusters of ideas about what defines a 
genuine people, however, has been that developed by the German Romantics.  
 
German Romanticism and the Nation  
 
Nationalism as a doctrine is often traced back to German Romantic thought, and its 
contribution has, without doubt, been of a most direct and long-lasting influence. The German 
Romantics were a quite diverse grouping of thinkers at the end of the eighteenth century and 
the beginning of the nineteenth century91. These thinkers were strongly influenced by earlier 
political thought. Umut Özkirimli claims that particularly Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau - two influential figures of the Enlightenment tradition – determined the possibilities 
of thought available to the romantics92. Rousseau pointed out the weakness of social man to 
the tyranny of his fellow men. To prevent this, his will must be exchanged for the general will. 
Formulated differently, we must be citizens before individuals. But what do individuals gain 
from subjecting themselves to the general will? Rousseau writes: “each of us puts his person 
and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will”, and “as a body 
our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an invisible part of the whole”. 
Rousseau’s idea of popular sovereignty took for granted that an option always exists, which 
is in the general interest. He claimed that the sovereign cannot have an interest which 
contradicts the interests of the individuals that make it up. “Consequently, the sovereign 
power has no need of a guarantor towards the subjects, because it is impossible for the body 
to want to harm all its members, and we will see below that it cannot harm any of them 
individually. The sovereign, by the mere fact of what it is, is always all that it ought to be”93.  
German romantics, and some pre-romantic authors, reflect in a clear manner the basic 
idea of the existence of a link between the land and a so-called ‘Ur-Volk’, or ‘original people’. 
Identification with the land had become important – not only to the personal life of the 
individual – but to international relations. For example, Johann Gottfried Herder believed in 
the unique and diverse national cultures. He especially paid attention to the factor of language 
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in determining the natural borders of a nation. In fact, he saw the nation as a phenomenon 
as natural as the family, resoving to compare it to ‘extended family’. The fundamental idea 
behind this claim was that there are different levels of social organisation and social links that 
are each equally valid and that vary only in the number of individuals that it links together. 
Consequentially, he was against the conquest of other nations because it would mean the 
weakening of the bonds of sentiment that held the nation together. Although Herder viewed 
the separation of Prussia from the rest of Germany as unnatural and against the 
completeness of the German ‘Volk’, the German nation had, according to him, no claim on 
other nations. Germany was, in other words, not an especially privileged nation. This was to 
change with the cult-like popularity that arose around Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who presented 
Die Reden an die deutsche Nation after Prussia’s defeat by France at Jena, more precisely 
in the period 1807 and 1808. He claimed that Germans were the ‘Urvolk’, or ‘genuine people’, 
and, because of their High culture and superior language, they had a mission towards 
humankind, that is, the creation of the perfect State. He believed that each nation must be 
linguistically homogenous, and as a logical consequence, when individuals wish to use a 
language different from the dominant language in the physical area in which they live, he/she 
should migrate to a place where their own language is the dominant one. If no such place 
exists, they should give up on their language altogether for  
it is true beyond doubt that, wherever a separate language is found, 
there a separate nation exists, which has the right to take 
independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself… Where a 
people has ceased to govern itself, it is equally bound to give up its 
language and to coalesce with conquerors94.  
Fichte’s understanding of the nature of nations was thus not of a static, but of a social entity 
whose aim is to become less composite. It is this development of increasing identification 
with other nationals that give expression to the ‘Volksgeist’. The most popular interpretation 
of Fichte’s throught is that he aimed at extolling patriotism and enthusiasm among the 
German people. For this purpose, he had identified education as the most efficient way for a 
state to ensure its survival and proliferation. In effect, his philosophical idea was subtler than 
that. He identified the end of the individual with his existence, not as an isolated spirit, but as 
part of society, acknowledging his place in the world. The end of the individual and the end 
of society should thus be in balance and could be formulated as the development towards 
the perfection of humanity. A society, or what at a particular level of abstraction we may call 
a nation, was thus considered successful if it was a harmonious, homogenous, expression of 
                                                          
94 The fragment is cited in D. HEATER, The Theory of Nationhood. A Platonic Symposium, Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 1998, pp. 69, 79. 
37 
 
a general will to move towards perfecting all aspects of social life as a social manifestation of 
philosophy. His idea was that German culture had made a fundamental contribution to this in 
the form of philosophy and that it should, therefore take position as the leading society among 
societies. The model for others to follow as a step towards their own contributions to the 
perfection of humanity. This implies that each individual should seek, not only to achieve his 
highest potential, but also to disseminate his ideal among others. This ideal that each 
individual should be acting according to, can be defined in negative and positive terms. In 
prohibitive terms, the prerogative is that we must always treat others as ends and not means. 
This is to keep to the fundamental idea that society is the reciprocality of action in freedom.  
In presecriptive terms, the fundamental moral imperative tells us to strive for both our internal 
unity and the spiritual unity of society as a whole. The progressive unification of individual 
aspirations and sentiment was thus, according to Fichte, the final end of society95. The tool 
that can be used to streamline the collection of individual wills and ideals was instruction. 
This tool was not to be employed lightly because of its power over weaker minds, but was to 
be performed by particularly enlightened individuals. The key was philosophical instruction, 
which would convinse each individual to leave behind freedom of will and creating, in its place 
an inevitable mechanism whereby each individual sees the necessity of unity of will, and that 
this is the highest he could possibly attain. Only in this way could the individual be completely 
free, and at the same time create the perfectly harmonious society. Is national feeling then a 
matter of instruction as Fichte suggested in his Reden? Certainly, Fichte made explicit the 
use that national elites can make of education in furthering their cause by fashioning the 
minds of the people. When such uses are made of education, they can only be partial 
implementations of Fichte’s idea of the purpose of educating the members of a society. 
Indeed, nationalist instruction, especially instruction of children, tries to streamline the minds 
of the population and is an effective way to create ‘banale nationalism’. However, it only aims 
at nationalist ends, and not at the perfection of humanity. Where Fichte would most likely 
have encouraged enlightened individuals to disseminate their ideal, also among other 
societies and nations, nationalism seeks to separate societies and, at its worst, to divide 
humankind96. Fichte’s thought is an example of how the later use made of German Romantic 
ideas has stringly influenced our perception of these ideas. Thus, although there is a clear 
link between National-Socialism and German Romanticism, it is not a direct link and, as is 
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always the case, history could have seen the romantic inspiration go in a very different 
direction, had the circumstances been different. 
 
Nationalism as Political Doctrine  
 
“In a world where everyone is a nationalist”, wrote John Breuilly, “in some way or 
another, it becomes more important to distinguish between nationalism than to have a theory 
of nationalism”97. Having looked at what the romantics believed define a nation, it is now time 
to turn our gaze at nationalism. It is, it seems, a less evasive concept than populism.  For 
although German Romanticism was later taken up and transformed by the initiators of the 
First World War, it did not, in its early form, have a political programme, least of all an 
expansionist one. Although the details are inconsistent among the numerous definitions of 
nationalism, the core concept is very often similar. It is a collection of shared beliefs that 
should have practical consequences on actions and preferences of individual members of 
nations. These shared beliefs include 1) that distinguishable nations exist, 2) that a nation 
shares some of the following features: language, religion, history, a shared, contemporary 
experience or an especially elevated level of civilisation - or societal organisation – each of 
which can be propped up by means of foundation and/or creation myths, heroes, great 
statesmen etc., 3) that nations should strive to gain a nation-state within which its members 
are sovereign, and 4) that the members of the nation owe their political allegiance to the 
nation to which they belong. Hastings tries to depict a clear relationship between nationalism 
in the sens of an understanding of the world as divided into national entities on the one hand, 
and as ideology on the other. Nationalism as ideology, he uncontroversially thinks, implies a 
belief that each nation should be harboured within its own state. He adds, however, that 
nationalism as ideology also implies the idea that one’s own nation merits more consideration 
and acknowledgement, which it can get through the founding or expansion of a nation-state 
that corresponds with the physical boundaries of the nation98. Over the last couple of 
decades, it has been claimed repetitively by theorists, researchers, and journalists alike, that 
the nation-state is in decline and, consequently, so is nationalism as ideology. After having 
looked at the different theories of the origins of nations, we may now move towards a 
qualitative understanding of nationalism as either an ideology or a political instrument. John 
Breuilly sought to set up a systematic study of nationalism by introducing a typology. 
Furthermore, his definition of nations as “political movements seeking or exercising state 
power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” relies heavily on the Weberian 
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idea of the state as a community which can exercise a legitimate monopoly on violence in a 
specific territory, but adds the use of nationalist arguments as the signifier of nationhood99. 
The main nationalist arguments, according to Breuilly, are that characteristic and 
distinguishable nations exist, that the interest of the nation reigns supreme over all other 
interests, and that the independence of nations is paramount100. The underlying idea is of the 
general will of (a portion of) the subjects of the modern state being stimulated, if not 
manipulated, by a powerful elite to believe in a collective character-focused nationalism, or 
cultural nationalism. The growing need for support from the masses led to a mixed approach 
by the elites, depending on their own programme, power, and position. Nationalism is 
therefore, according to Breuilly, ideologically neutral. What is meant here is not that it is free 
of ideological content, but rather that it does not belong to any specific position along the left 
– right political continuum. The defining features, or typological criteria, of nationalism are 
instead 1) the relationship between the nationalist movement and state (i.e. opposition or 
control); 2) the goals of the movement (is it a program of separation, reform, or unification); 
3) whether the (opposed) state poses itself as a nation-state or not. Depending on these 
criteria, we may, according to Breuilly, be able to predict how particular nationalist 
movements will behave, and which strategy they will employ to gain and maintain nationhood.  
Indeed, to all the various categories of nationalist movements, the purposes served by 
nationalist ideas are ’coordination’, ‘mobilization’, and ‘legitimacy’101. A consequence is, as 
Paul R. Brass notes, that the nationalists have the possibility to choose to, depending on the 
historical circumstances, downplay the differences of opinion and seek collaboration with 
other groups or with state authorities102. Nationalism does, therefore, not exclude a 
collaborative attitude or belonging to grater alliances and even wider collective identities, as 
long as they are not in competition with the identifying features of the nation. 
This idea of nations being instruments, constructed and invented, is reverberated in 
both the theories of Hobsbawm and Anthony Smith. Hobsbawm’s theory builds on 
instrumentalist theory as well as on Smith’s idea that nationalism is a tool applied to overcome 
insecurities. This idea, to some extent, is based on the observation of German Romanticism 
as a reaction to economic and social instability. Hobsbawm presents us with the ‘invention of 
Tradition’ theory. The idea that invented traditions establish a perceived continuity with the 
past. These traditions can either be adaptations of older traditions to new situations, or 
entirely new inventions. The complete invention of traditions, according to Hobsbawm, occurs 
when the political and social need to create order and unity is preeminent; more specifically, 
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during periods of hefty, or rapid, social change. For him, nationalism is the principle that there 
should be correspondence between political unit and national unit, in a nation-state. 
Hobsbawm uses the example of the period preceding the introduction of mass democracy to 
introduce a range of tools with which the elite may promote the unifying idea of nation, or 
rather nationalism: the development of primary education, the invention of public - or state - 
ceremonies, and the multiplication of state monuments. These approaches, in combination 
with initiatives such as the introduction of a national church, the promotion of a royal family 
and so forth, rolled nationalism in position as the substitute for previous social cohesion103. 
To Hobsbawm, the implication is that nationalism aims to make the political duties to the 
nation the main obligation of its members. It is this high level of required commitment that 
places modern forms of nationalism apart from all earlier forms of collective identification.  
What used to be called nationalism has, Billig writes, through “a rhetorical sleight of 
hand”, and for reasons connected to the negative connotation that nationalism has gained 
over recent decades, been reframed as ‘patriotism’, revival of cultural identities or tribalism104. 
An interesting interpretation that links the criticism of the modernist theory of nation to the 
populist idea among the Russian narodniki is the ideas fostered by the Neo-Marxist, Tom 
Nairn. According to Ozkimli, Nairn wished to, in his The Breakup of Britain, compensate for 
Marxism’s failure to develop a theory of nationalism. The presumption is that economic and 
social developmental phases are universal phenomena and that, therefore, it is enough to 
know about the economic developments in one part of the world in order to predict what will 
happen in another part of the world. This is somewhat similar to the ideas that the Russian 
narodniki harboured, although with two very significant differences: 1) that they sincerely 
thought Russia could become the exception to the rule that society had to go through a period 
of exploitative capitalism and revolutions before it could really start to prosper, and 2) that 
Nairn maintains that the fundamental conflict is that of nationality rather than class as 
Marxists claim, or levels of freedom and autonomy, as the narodniki claimed105. The narodniki 
were not, in general, concerned with nationality, or with ethnicity106. Elie Kedourie sees 
nationalism, as distinct from patriotism and xenophobia and as depending on a particular 
anthropology. It thus contains an, at least partial, ideological goal in terms of its doctrine of 
state. This, according to Kedourie, leads to nationalism often making use of the naturally 
occurring patriotic and xenophobic sentiments “to the service of a specific anthropology and 
metaphysics”. In order to sustain this last point, Kedouri must transpose from the romantics 
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their endeavour to reach perfection, in the sense of the particular ideas that they held about 
what real freedom might entail, onto the other nationalist movements. This is where the 
interpretation of nationalism as metaphysics comes to fruition. He writes: 
 
the total demand which nationalism makes on the individual 
originates, we must remember, in the solicitude for his freedom. Real 
freedom, it holds, is a particular condition of the will which, once 
attained, ensures the lasting fulfilment of the individual and his 
bliss.107 
The tools of xenophobia and patriotism serve the nationalists well in this endeavour, and 
politics becomes a method of reaching a metaphysical goal. This is in sharp contrast to 
Smith’s attempt to put the profile of elite manipulation of nationalism in a wider context. 
Furthermore, Kedourie claims that it is a political doctrine which is detached from the left-right 
distinction in politics. This distinction, to Kedourie, looses its meaning when observed 
seperately from the specific historical context in which it first arose. So, he points out that the 
perception of nationalism has fluctuated throughout contemporary history between 
progressive and left-wing on the one hand, and racist and right-wing on the other. Indeed an 
impressive number of nationalism political leaders have moved from being markedly left-
oriented to being decidedly right-oriented. He mentions Pilsudski, Mussolini, Chiang Kai-
shek, and Hitler. He mentions that the measuring sticks we used to measure whether a 
movement was left- or right-wing, whether it was progressive or retrogressive, was the extent 
to which they supported revolution. Nationalism could thus be right-wing in Europe, and left-
wing in Asia and Africa. Therefore, the left – right distinction, according to Kedourie, only 
confuses our understanding of nationalism as phenomenon. In fact, political policies, aiming 
at equal opportunities, as a rightist party would do, or at social and economic equality, as a 
leftist party would do, is subsidiary to the nationalist aim of increasing national autonomy and 
the level of self-fulfilment the individual may realise, living in a sovereign state. We have a 
natural need to ‘belong together’ in a coherent and stable community. What happened at the 
time of the German romantics - and among any revolutionary movement one might add - is 
that the sense of belonging shared among family members, in a town or neighbourhood, and 
within a religious community, has had uncertain horizons and has become weak under 
frequent attacks. This explanation is to be preferred, Kedouri thinks, because its alternative 
conception (i.e. that nationalism was the revolt of the middle-classes), fails to account for the 
nationalist movements that arose outside Europe, as the middle class is a categorisation 
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which makes sense only in the particular history of Western Europe108. His argument does, 
in fact, imply that nationalism could be, like populism, a so-called thin-centered ideology. In 
any case, it implies that it, of its own accord, does not determine the political programme of 
a movement or party, and that it is a symptom of social discontent. Moreover, one may be 
tricked into believing to have somehow understood more about the nationalism or populism 
which one is studying by referring to the left and right categories, but in reality, Kedourie says, 
it does not help us move forward. Yet, the questions we as readers of Kedourie are confronted 
with are at least two. The first problem, which appeared in Anthony Smith’s considerations, 
is that in his sense of urgency, Kedourie may have, excessively, emphasized the influence 
of the elite on motivating the population to support nationalist ideals. In Smith’s view, 
concentrating on elite manipulation and instrumentalization only explains why the tool of 
imbuing nationalist pride and feeling in the population could be useful for different elites, but 
misses the motivations of the ordinary people who support nationalism. In other words, he 
criticises the interpretation that holds that nations are, fundamentally, rooted in the modern 
epoch and serve, foremost, an instrumental purpose. From this vantagepoint, he sets out to 
answer the question of why nationalist revival and xenophobia takes hold also, but not only, 
in stable and relatively affluent societies109. Breuilly’s criticism of instrumentalism is similar to 
this argument; that such an approach will not enable us to understand why nationalist ideas 
were, at times, so well received among the wider population.  Certainly, moving closer to 
such an understanding is a necessary effort when we wish to understand popular support for 
nationalism at times when nationalism demands almost unbearable sacrifices. The second, 
potential problem with Kedourie’s account is that it does not sufficiently clarify the grey area 
between nationalism as orchestrated by the elite and nationalism as a shared ideal form of 
state. For example, Kedourie mentions Napoleon as a forbearer of nationalism, but we should 
present a word of caution, as what Napoleon acted on, may not have been a nationalist ideal, 
but something closer to self-preservation. Is Kedourie then overlooking the difficulty in 
estrapolating the element of nationalist metaphysics from the drive for self-preservation? In 
other words, is it possible, building op Kedourie’s analysis, to make a distinction between 
nationalism as a metaphysical goal on the one hand, and nationalist politics on the other? 
Germany was forged, not by nationalists but by Bismarck who had Prussian interests at heart. 
Of the post-revolution generation that turned nationalist, Kedourie observes their 
restlessness, caused by the return to regular, dull life but also by a feeling of having missed 
out on the action. The restlessness, Kedourie continues, was also caused by the already 
mentioned exposure to new, enlightenment, ideas and ruptures of the social tissue. The older 
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generation, however, wanted to settle into the peaceful and harmonious life they had fought 
for110.  
Keeping in mind the purpose of the present study, it seems reasonable to attempt an 
application of Kedourie’s theory, not only to the post-colonial societies, but also to the 
nationalist revival movements in Western and Central Europe today.  As such, the rupture in 
the social tissue which these countries have experienced, i.e. the demise of Church and 
family, were indeed promoted by those who, today are in their last years at the helm of 
economic and political life, at the same time as European youth finds themselves in a 
precarious economic situation, especially when compared to their parents’ generation. The 
‘youth’ may justifiably feel unrooted and detached from any stable community, but the 
destruction of the social tissue has been reoccurring for a relatively long time, since the 
movements of the late 1860s. Can this really be the cause of the recurrence of nationalist 
ideologies? It is also interesting to ask the question why, in the nationalism of thence, the 
enemy were foreign states and cultural-imperialism, whereas today the foreign enemy is, 
much like post-WWI nationalism of the Nazis, aimed foremost at the enemy within. Surely 
this has to do with the lack of any external threat, or at least the difficulties in identifying the 
source of the external threat, due to its spontaneous, non-central organisation, its lack of 
official representation, and its lack of state status. We shall attempt the application of this 
theory to the Scandinavian nationalist-populist parties below. 
John Breuilly’s juxtaposes his own theory to the theories of Kedourie and Jacob Talmon 
in as much as he concerns himself with the political message of nationalism, rather than with 
who instrumentalises it. He defines the scope of nationalism as politics, in terms of political 
content, as making the following claims: 1) there exists a nation – a special group which is 
set apart from all other human beings; 2) political identity and loyalty are, first and foremost, 
with and to the nation; 3) the nation should have political autonomy, normally in the form of a 
sovereign state. This is a more engaging definition of the ideological aims of nationalism than 
we have seen above. The refinement is contained in the second component of the definition 
about the primacy of political identity and loyalty to the nation. We have seen that some 
theories of nation struggle to explain this aspect of nationhood. Breuilly’s explanation can, 
partially, be found in his distinction between the primordial image of the nation held by 
nationalists themselves on the one hand and the theorists who claim that all nations are 
primordial entities on the other. After all, the fact that one thinks some traits of one’s nation 
has existed for centuries does not mean one believes it to be primordial, or even that one 
holds that the same is true for other nations. Nevertheless, Breuilly writes that “it is the 
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discontinuities with modern national identity that I find most striking”. He then presents the 
invented myths proposition: “we know that in many cases nationalists have invented myths”. 
What is more, “it is clear that modern nationalism transforms such myths and also that it 
ignores those which cut across its own purposes”. Although he acknowledges that there must 
be something in the way of a shared experience for nationalism to be sustainable, Breuilly 
emphasizes that in many cases, the actual amount of history a claimed nation shares, might 
be very little, and that it is, most often, supported by a shared language and institutional 
promotion of a collective identity.111 Against the argument that nationalists are not the only 
forces to promote collective identity in a systematic way, which is held to be true of dynasties 
and churches, Breuilly claims this was done only in the face of competition from other such 
institutions. Here, his emphasis on the need to consider alternative histories. Sometimes, for 
example, nationalism has been strengthened over time in spite of an all but glorious national 
history. Although Breuilly allows all these influences on the idea of a nation, he also writes 
that it is only when a nation takes on the part of a political movement that it consolidates and 
becomes explicit: “the nationalist ‘imagining’ is changed in intellectual character through 
becoming part of the political process”. Through these processes, influenced by the 
aforementioned factors, and subject to manipulation, according to him, “nationalism has 
taken a bewildering variety of forms”. Breuilly cautions us to pay close attention to Gellner 
who adequately explains the origins of a standardised culture within a geographically limited 
system of institutions. Gellner, according to Breuilly, pays sufficient attention to the need for 
alternative identities necessitated by the advancement of industrialisation and urbanisation. 
In order to establish clearly at which level my main analysis moves, it is useful to look at the 
destinctions made by Breuilly when he argues in favour of his preference for studying 
nationalism, not as ideology or political doctrine on the one hand, nor as a matter of broadly 
shared sentiment on the other. Breuilly’s preference is, indeed, for the study of national 
movements, thus his starting point is one in which a nationalist program has been 
consolidated and is being acted upon. “A nationalist movement may ignore nationalist 
intellectuals and draw instead upon religious values, and it may achieve success more 
through elite contacts and relationships with governments than by mobilizing mass 
support”112. When studying Scandinavian national-populist parties, one realises that, much 
in the logic of this type of movements, although there have certainly been nationalist 
intellectuals, they lived a long time ago, and there is, so to speak, nothing new under the sun. 
That means that the policy inspiration of the parties must come from some other source. It 
will be interesting to try and answer the question of whether the contemporary parties draw 
more on religious values, mass support, or elite contacts or/and relationships with 
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governments. In the Scandinavian cases, it way very well be a case of all of these. This is a 
very useful schematization for us, since we wish to analyse the relationship between the 
movements in Scandinavia and the political doctrines of nationalism and populism. The 
question that remains is whether the same sort of schematization can be made for the 
relationship between political doctrines of populism and the populist movements in 
Scandinavia. Breuilly describes the process of modernity as one in which the ‘generic division 
of labour’, to borrow from Gellner’s concepts, changed from a ‘corporate division of labour’ 
into a ‘functional division of labour’. This change came about, Breuilly claims, because of the 
spread of enlightenment ideas and liberal economic ideas.  Here, Breuilly himself suffers from 
the flaw of the narrative approach which doesn’t leave enough space for alternative histories 
or for explaining the causes of this transformation. Breuilly admits that his approach makes 
much sense when applied to the first national movements, but adds that “once the modern, 
territorial and sovereign state had developed, there was an overwhelming tendency for the 
population of that state to identify with or against that state on national terms”. In effect, this 
constitutes a drastic narrowing of the possible alternative interpretations. Indeed, as he points 
out, nationalism seems to have become a safe realm of political argumentation, as it does 
not imply the speaker belong to any specific position on the left-right divide. Thus, as he adds, 
“merely speaking the language of nationalism can suit the interests of political movements 
that are not really national in any other respect”113.  
What type of populism was Fascism in general, and Nazism in particular? They were certainly 
very different to Russian populism, where it was the moral interests and self-realisation of 
each individual member of ‘the people’ that mattered. They were also different to American 
Agrarian populism, where it was the class-struggle for economic reforms that mattered. Was 
there a hint of populism in Bismarck’s Prussia? When Hitler arrived in Vienna, he supported 
Schönerer and the Pan-Germans, but he sympathised even more with Dr. Lueger’s 
understanding of the social question. Even if war had not broken out in 1914, the Germans – 
a minority of about thirty-five percent in the Austrian half of the monarchy – could not have 
held their own against the rising tide of Slav nationalism. Any attempt at the Germanisation 
of the non-Germans, at reducing their influence or rights, at making the Germans the sole 
ruling group was bound to end in failure. Somewhat more realistic, was the expectation of 
the break-up of the Habsburg monarchy which might allow its German parts to join the 
German Reich. But this would have meant that this Reich would lose its only reliable ally – a 
severe setback to the dreams of expansion and world power cherished in Pan-German 
circles114. According to the American historian Carlton Heyes the end of the eighteenth 
century marked what was expected to prosper as democratic nationalism into Jacobin 
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nationalism. On a parallel basis aristocratic nationalism took the shape of traditional 
nationalism, while nationalism which was neither democratic, nor aristocratic took a liberal 
turn. Jacobin nationalism, in Hayes interpretation, was based on Rousseau’s ideas, and 
developed by revolutionary leaders in order to safeguard the Revolution115. Relying on, and 
yet going beyond Michael Freeden’s argument that nationalism is best studied as a ‘thin-
centered ideology’, namely that it must rely on other ideologies to provide direction to its 
political programme, Hellström invites to join him in viewing nationalism not as an ideology at 
all, but as “discursive construct”, or a communication act aimed at strengthening the bond 
that each citizen feels with the nation. This can be accomplished with references to national 
origin, but it can also be done by appealing to civic virtues, and by heralding a certain national 
way of thinking in opposition to that of the Other, preferably the immigrants, which represents 
backwardness in cultural terms. The message is that immigration poses a threat to the nation, 
both economically and culturally. In order for these claims to have an effect on the dominant 
discourse on national identity and immigration and on related policies, the sender must 
construct stable ethos-positions from which they can make their voices heard in the public 
zone of acquiescence116. In other words, they need to first be accepted as a legitimate 
political player before they can bring their ideas to the forefront. Besides that the 
“backwardness in terms of cultural refinement” is clearly a matter of what one defines as 
cultural, it is unlikely that any of the Scandinavian countries could reasonable be considered 
a country of refined culture, especially when compared with immigrants from places like 
Persia. Of course, the country of origin of the immigrants has an impact on this point, and as 
many of the immigrants in Scandinavia are originally from such places as Afghanistan, Turkey 
etc., it may have some validity, but only when referring to specific national groups of 
immigrants.  
 
Conclusion  
 
In pre-war Russia, after the defeat at the hands of the Japanese, and the eruption of 
revolutionary disorders and strikes in large parts of Russia, the Czar, Nicholas II, declared 
his intentions to call a national assembly, a State Duma to be elected on the basis of a wide 
franchise, together with other concessions. The same year, a new party was founded, the 
Union of the Russian People (Soiuz Russkogo Naroda). It was formed, not with a strict party 
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structure, but in defence of the Czar, the Church and the fatherland, and of the autocracy 
against any attacks, representing the Russian people (narod) itself, argued Carsten. This 
combination of claiming to defend the oppressors in the name of the oppressed was justified 
by the fact that they saw a need for inclusion of the population in government council as well 
as for condeeding better conditions for peasants and workers. This middle wayassured some 
support from the lower middle classes, as well as the lower classes who tended to prioritise 
a minimal level of security above revolutionary aspirations. The party leaders belonged to the 
higher classes though. While its deputies sat in the third Duma - there were about fifty 
deputies of the extreme Right, more than ten percent of the total - they worked hard to 
discredit it and to keep it from doing any useful work. The first party leader, Dr. Dubrovin, 
made references, like the populists had done before him, to the importance of retaining the 
mir, which he viewed as a a tool for social equity and justice. He also declared that “business 
and financial enterprises only benefited Jews and foreigners and were classified as 
essentially un-Russian”117. Besides being anti-constitutional and anti-Liberal, the programme 
did not contain other clearly defined aims. Its protest frequently took violent form, and its 
violent wing, the so-called ‘yellow-shirts’, beat up political adversaries and Jews. These latter 
features were to be employed also by the Italian fascists and the German national-socialists. 
This party had picked features from the previous populist movement (i.e. the romanisation of 
the mir and the simple, rural life promoted by an elite. Only, this time around, it was not an 
intellectual elite, but the landowners who promoted the ‘old ways’. It had also adopted the 
anti-Semitism which, as we have seen, was probably promoted by the government and which 
had been the safety-valve that had prevented the toppling of Czarist regime. In this sense, 
the party’s violence was almost in the norm, and so was its ideological stance. In 1909, the 
party split. It continued in a moderate form, more closely connected to the Conservatives, 
and in a smaller, more radical group. After the presentation of nationalist ideas and ideas 
about what constitutes a nation, we have gained some understanding of the processes 
behind, and the content of, nationalism as an ideology. At the end of the day, it is not 
theoretical discussion but people’s perceptions about their nations and nationalism that 
matters. As Walker Connor put it, identity “does not draw its sustenance from facts but from 
perceptions”. Whatever historians may say, in popular perceptions nations are ‘eternal’118. 
However, we are still left with some unanswered questions: What is it that binds people more 
closely to the destiny of a nation than to the fate of, for example, political parties or social 
classes? Is it a phenomenon that requires a completely separate framework of 
understanding, or is it, as we shall try to treat it in the present volume, possible to place 
nationalism in the same analytical framework as other political doctrines? To answer the 
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question of what it is that binds people more closely to a nation than to, for instance, social 
class, we need to combine two observations. Özkirimli recalled that John Stuart Mill thought 
that the essence of nationality was a special sympathy among individuals, members of 
groups too large for the individuals to know all other members personally. This sympathy 
makes them more willing to cooperate and provides them with a desire to create a community 
under the same government, and that the government be performed by this community, or 
members of this community. He added that peoples without a national feeling of bondedness, 
especially through history, did not possess the requirements for successful representative 
government. Furthermore, Mill thought that lesser nations, that is, the ‘inferior’ or ‘more 
backward portion of the human race’, should be absorbed, with advantage to that nation, 
within the state of another nation. This then explains why people have a natural inclination to 
feel a bond to an entity the size of a nation, but it does not explain why some features, such 
as shared language, common history, shared culture, myths or religion are selected as the 
uniting feature any particular nation. This is where we need to employ the method of historical 
analysis which Foucault called ‘eventalisation’. Furthermore, in order to understand what links 
the individual to nationalism, Durkheim suggests it is patriotism, arising, for example out of 
national celebrations119. This introduces us to the question of manipulation of nationalist 
sentiment.  
There is reason to think, as we have seen, that the political and economic motivations 
of political elites greatly influence the perceived ties with a particular nation on the one hand, 
and the possible understandings of the content of these ties on the other. In respect of the 
latter, especially religious elites and historians have great influence thanks to the power of 
learning. Fichte’s notion that shared interests can be taught, possibly to the detriment of 
individual freedom of choice as most contemporary persons would understand this freedom, 
but to the great gain of civility and strife for improvement of humanity, has proven to be correct 
in many respects. Which contemporary historian does not remember the nationalist imagery 
of his/her own national history, or histories, with which they had to come to terms before 
attempting to approach objectivity? It may reasonably be argued that the distinction between 
nationalism as belonging either to the sphere of political ideology, and in the case of societies 
that have struggled for an independent nation-state also a political program, or to the sphere 
of emotions and cultural identity formation, proliferation, preservation and re-invention still 
needs to be resolved. This particular distinction is very similar to the distinction which we’ll 
have to define and sustain later on, between populism as an ideology, thus with a set political 
program, and as rhetoric, thus a way of presenting a political program in a manner which is 
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likely to convince the electorate and including a fairly fixed set of linguistic references and 
tactical manoeuvres. 
About the relationship between populism and nationalism, we may conclude, on the basis of 
this first historiographical step, that although early populists did not necessarily approve of 
the patriotic endeavours of, for example Bismarck, there are points on which the two 
movements communicate. A more explicit example of how populists disproved of nostalgic 
patriotism is what Mikhailovsky wrote upon returning from a visit to Kissingen in the summer 
of 1870, during the mobilisation for the Franco-Prussian War. He asked: does this ever-
recurring idea of the unity of Germany represent a progressive principle? The profound and 
original mind of Proudhon insisted that the unification of Germany and of Italy runs counter 
to the federative principle and is in essence retrogressive. Mikhailovsky, according to 
Billington, was particularly critical of Bismarck, described as “the first purely practical politician 
to appear on the European scene, recognizing no standard of values apart from the exercise 
of power”120. He thus accused Bismarck of calculated self-interest and a lack of consideration 
for the ideal of societal progress. With the ideas among those nationalists who shared this 
ideal, the populists would thus find common ground, but in a shared ideal, but also in their 
belief that the spontaneous organisational unit of local democratic forms, were, somehow, 
more genuinely an expression of the people (populists) or of the national character 
(nationalists). 
 
Fascism: nationalist and populist 
 
In the first part of his book, The Rise of Fascism, Francis Ludwig Carsten has 
investigated the early manifestations of what was later to become the fascist movements in 
Western Europe. Thus, he traces a general outline of nostalgic nationalism, combined with 
monarchism in pre-WWI France and a combination of liberalism and anti-Semitism in 
Germany, and especially Austria around the turn of the nineteenth-century. Those of his 
observations that may help us understand the kind of nationalist populism that is manifest in 
the contemporary Scandinavian parties, are the following. The general pre-WWI conditions 
in Europe were of peace and a slowly but surely increasing level of organisation among the 
working classes. Among the lower middle classes, however, a relatively strong threat of 
downwards mobility created a sense of insecurity and need for action. Especially the lower 
middle classes percieved their socio-economic position under threat and found an adversary 
in the Jewish community. According to Carsten, the targeted community could have been 
any other, such as Protestants or Czechs, any of these would have been on the increase. He 
                                                          
120 J. BILLINGTON, Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism, pp. 71-72. 
50 
 
mentions that several pre-war movements, also referred to as ‘the new right’, appealed not 
only to the (lower) middle classes but also to the lower classes, whom they tried to steer away 
from socialism and nationalism. Some did this by means of Protestant references, others by 
means of nationalism, in addition, many of these groups found anti-Semitism a fertile ground 
for drumming up support. The reciprocal inspiration among the new right in several countries 
was evident. For example, in France, the Action française’s aspirations to undertake actions 
similar to the March on Rome and fasci purges of Socialist offices and clubs were explicit 
from the outset. George Valois, in 1924, founded a movement of former military servicemen 
whose purpose it was to intimidate socialists. After the Franco-Prussian war, in 1898, the 
Comité d’Action française was founded by Maurice Pujo and Henri Vaugeois. The group’s 
purpose was to undermine parliamentarianism and individualism. Carsten interprets their 
main message as follows: France must become as strong as she had once been, must be 
‘remade into a state as organised at home, as powerful abroad, as she had been under the 
Ancien Régime’, before the revolution of 1789. Thus, clearly a nostalgic aim. Germany and 
Britain as symbols of capitalism - together with Jews, foreigners in France, Protestants, 
Switzerland, the freemasons and anti-clericals - were seen by another of the leading figures 
in the group, Charles Maurras, as the arch enemies of the Goddess-like France. He saw 
democracy as a weakening of the state. When comparing the Action française movement’s 
main ideological ideas, one can observe a combination of clear conservative protectionism, 
clericalism and anti-liberalism, together with the conviction that organised mob-gangs of 
supporters, upsetting public gatherings of whomever they perceived to be their ideological 
enemies. The movement’s supporters were mainly, but by no means exclusively to be found 
in the capital. The economic policy which the movement proposed as an alternative to 
capitalism was a “corporate order, in which labour was to be organised in guilds”. Carsten 
saw the main weakness of the Action française, in respect of the post-war fascist movements, 
its ideological orientation towards the past, rather than towards the present and the future121. 
In Italy, the recent unification had been more problematic than the unification of 
Germany, and now suffered from the complication of the strongly differentiated economies of 
the North and the South. In 1896, Prime Minister Francesco Crispi ordered the North-African 
expansion into Eritrea. The attempt at conquering the planned territory resulted in the fall of 
Crispi from power. His supporter, Enrico Corradini, however, founded Il Regno, which was 
nationalist, anti-parliamentarian, anti-democratic, anti-freemasonry and anti-socialist, in 
1903. It asserted the values of war and expansionist imperialism. At the 2nd congress of the 
Italian Nationalist Party, Associazione Nazionalista Italiana, it was pronounced that all 
universal ideas (pacifism, internationalism, egalitarianism) were incompatible with 
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nationalism. In the 1913 elections, however, only three nationalists were elected to the 
chamber. Carsten comments:  
 
there was a marked affinity of [Corradini’s] thought with that of the 
Socialists in his definition of Italy as a proletarian nation, engaged in 
a struggle against the ‘plutocratic’ nations of Europe. It was the class 
struggle elevated to the international plane122. 
 In this movement, it was thus proletarianism and anti-socialism that seemed to determine 
the use of the nationalist arguments to rally support. On the other side of the political divide, 
Benito Mussolini was developing another idea of nationalist politics. It is interesting to note 
that before WWI, Benito Mussolini was violently against the war in Libya and a convinced 
socialist internationalist and revolutionary, who rejected parliamentary procedure. According 
to Carsten, he resented the intellectuals who led the Socialist Party. He was even sentenced 
to five years of imprisonment (of which he only served a few months) for his anti-war agitation. 
Germany was seeing rapid modernisation and an increasingly poor urban working class. This 
gave rise to the Social Democratic Party. It grew quickly, but in 1877, it reached only 12 seats 
in parliament. The old elite was still in place under Bismarch, so there was no place for an 
Action française-type party. In 1879, the court preacher, Adolf Stoecker (Berlin) tried to set 
up a Christian-Social Workers’ Party, whose aim was to make the working classes embrace 
the Church and the existing state. After poor initial support, Stoecker introduced his anti-
Semite message in 1879, with increased success. He claimed that Jews constituted an 
ungodly power which was trying to transform themselves into the new aristocracy in Berlin. It 
was especially small traders, shopkeepers and craftsmen, but also some officers and 
burgers, who felt threatened by the new order and who supported the Christian-Social 
Worker’s Party. Stoecker’s Christian-Social Workers’ Party’s popularity declined towards the 
end of the century, as prosperity increased. In 1896, Stoecker was forced to resign from the 
party executive as a result of the agrarian turn the party was taking, with increased support 
by the Junkers123. The German expansionist and anti-semitist ideas of Paul Bötticher were 
presented in his Deutsche Schriften124. Among other things, he wrote that Jews must be 
either deprived of their religion or forced to leave central Europe. This was a plan to make 
national and state boundaries correspond, or in other words, he was envisioning a nation-
state defined by exclusionary, ethnic criteria. His extreme position led him to attack 
Bismarck’s foreign policy, parliament and the Reichstag and support instead a strong national 
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leader, with the Reichstag as advisory council. His ideas were later taken up by the National 
Socialists. In Hesse, where “many peasants were indebted to Jewish money-lenders”. In 
1890, a librarian of Marburg Uniservity, Otto Böckel, and four others became Reichstag 
deputies for Hesse, as members of an anti-semitic movement. The peak of the movement’s 
popularity was in 1898 (284,000 votes). However, after friction arose between Böckel and 
Hermann Ahlwardt, who besides attacking Jonkers and Jews, attacked high society just as 
hard. In Carsten’s interpretation, the general increase in prosperity towards the end of the 
century also contributed to the weakening of protest-movements such as this one. We can 
thus observe a support for the idea that it is especially during periods of crisis that national 
feelings consolidate into nationalism. With increased prosperity came a shift towards a more 
civil, yet not less fervid, political tendency; in the 1890’s, the Alldeutscher Verband (Pan-
German League) was founded. Its purpose was to promote germanism in the German-
speaking areas beyond the borders and to preserve germanism through promoting foreign 
expansion. Anti-semite policies were not part of the League’s programme, but its leader, 
Heinrich Claβ, in 1907, suggested Jew should be treated as foreigners. Not because of 
cultural differences, but because of their promotion of modern materialism. At the same time, 
he suggested that the constitution should be replaced, and an imperialist dictatorship be 
instated. The League managed to keep its possibilities open through maintaining good 
relations with several other important political parties and organisations. Thus pre-WWI 
German nationalism movements contained streams of racialism and the idea of a great 
destiny of the German Volk, and were accompanied by a veneration for war, blood, and soil, 
an Aryan mysticism, neo-paganism, and the rejection of Christianity. According to Carstens, 
the more rationally minded among Germans, the French and the Italians found this rather 
ridiculous125. 
In Austria and Bohemia, anti-semitism was increasing, an economic crisis embued, and 
the lower classes felt the pressure from foreign immigration.126 At the same time, the pressure 
for political recognition on the side of the non-German and non-Hungarian groups was 
increasing. There was a financial crash the same year that Georg Ritter van Schönerer 
entered the Reichsrat, in 1873. He was at first a progressive with a radical programme of 
nationalisation of the railways, universal and direct franchise, as well as the economic, and 
political, union with Germany. He gradually gradually expressed himself more and more in 
anti-semitic terms. In 1887, he depicted Jews as hostile to ‘the Aryan descent’ and to the 
                                                          
125 F.L. CARSTEN, The Rise of Fascism, cit., 26-29, 31. 
126 By 1910, what had been a small Jewish population, had increased to 175,000 persons and they were highly 
educated and controlled a large part of industry and trade. Already in 1890, 33,6% of students at Vienna University 
were Jews. See F.L. CARSTEN, The Rise of Fascism, cit., pp. 32-34. 
53 
 
Christian culture of the German nation127. It was thus not pagan mysticism that was initially 
at the forefront of Schönerer’s thought. Later on, however, his pagan tendencies only 
increased, and he encouraged people to give real Germanic names to their children, to leave 
the Roman Catholic Church, and to celebrate the commemorations of pre-Christian defeats 
of the Roman legions in 113 B.C. In the Reichsrat, Schönerer and his co-representatives, 
time and again obstructed the procedures and managed to get parliament prorogued on one 
occasion. In northern Bohemia, where a large influx of Czech workers had undercut German 
wages and living conditions, the new Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (German Workers’ Party) was 
founded in 1904. This new party, Carsten observes, was radical but not necessarily right-
wing. In describing itself, the party wrote that they were a freiheitliche nationale Partei (Liberal 
National Party) “which is fighting with all its strength against the reactionary tendencies, 
feudal, clerical and capitalist privileges as well as all foreign national influences”. This was a 
completely new type of nationalist ideology, a precursor for National-socialism, and may 
serve as additional evidence that nationalism is another, ‘thin’ ideology. In other words, it is 
a political shell that can (partially) be combined with different ideological ideas, and yet is 
able to preserve its integrity. Further evidence of this is the fact that many among the German 
trade union leaders connected to the Pan-Germanic League later became well-known 
National Socialists128. Within a month after the outbreak of World War I, Mussolini went from 
supporting the German and Austrian allies, to claiming that Italian socialism had from the 
outset tendentially had an anti-German and anti-Austrian flavour. As we have mentioned, 
Mussolini initially belonged among the Socialists and was an anti-war campaigner. He was 
also the editor of the socialist Avanti! but was later releaved of his duties because of his 
change of heart and sudden support of Italy’s expansioning attempts on the African continent. 
He then founded a new, pro-war journal, Il Popolo d’Italia. This resulted in his being expelled 
from the party altogether. In Carsten’s interpretation, he probably “sensed the nationalist 
mood prevailing in the country and was carried away by his thirst for action and his hatred of 
Austria, by a belief in war as a means to obtain revolutionary ends”. Thus Carsten clearly isn’t 
convinced about the sincerity of the nationalist aspects of Mussolini’s programme. He used 
Il Popolo d’Italia demand the suppression of the Socialist press and the persecution of anyone 
who was not doing his/her utmost for the war effort, or who undermined the spirit of 
resistance. He also demanded the establishment of a non-parliamentary government to lead 
the nation. In January 1919, Mussolini joined forces with the arditi who had performed raids 
on enemy positions in the war. They had become particularly susceptible to his cause after 
the Post-War Peace Treaty failed to acknowledge Italy’s efforts in the war. In Milan, a few 
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weeks after, Mussolini founded the Fasci di Combattimento, whose purpose it was to agitate 
and threaten so that the regime could be overthrown. However, it is unclear what Mussolini 
had planned as a next step at this point. What was clear, nevertheless, was the focus of the 
programme on policies that would support ex-service men. This implied an expansionist 
foreign policy, a progressive tax on capital and a record-high tax on war profits, universal 
franchise – also for women-, a paid national militia, minimum wage, nationalisations of 
industries, confiscation of all ecclesiastical property and industrial corporations. Their first 
victory was to attack the offices of Avanti! and the de facto invasion of Fiume in September 
1919, led by the soldier-poet, Gabriele D’Annunzio, also plaid into their hands. Many of the 
habits of D’Annunzio’s private army were also adopted by Fascists. For example, the 
followers of the latter would regularly gather in large crowds to hear him speak, would hold 
out their arm in a roman salute, and would shout Italia o morte! As the government lost its 
authority and several militias, both fascist and nationalist, began assaulting socialists in the 
streets, D’Annuncio made plans to march on Rome and the economic situation worsened, 
the facsi movement spread to the country-side. In the parliamentary elections of November 
1919, the Socialists gained 156 seats out of 508 – 104 seats more than in 1913. The Italian 
Socialist movement, although weakened by a failed lock-out, was far to the left of the Social 
Democratic or Labour parties in most of Europe and the middle classes’ fear for their 
existence was maybe exaggerated but very real. They felt abandoned to their own devises 
by a state that refused to interfere with the rioting and disorders, while big landowners and 
industrialists supported the fasci, who would protect them from the seizure of their land. 
Government sanction of these violent squads arrived on October 20th, 1920, when Bonomi 
(Minister of War) permitted that ex officers who joined the Fasci di Combattimento, were to 
receive four-fifths of their former pay. The number of fasci multiplied (800 by the end of 1920 
and 1000 by February 1921), as did their violent actions against the Socialists who did not 
know to muster organised defence. The fasci were not centrally controlled, and extreme 
instances of random executions occurred. In 1921, Mussolini himself had to resign his party 
offices when he wanted to steer the Fascists in a more moderate direction, seeking 
rapprochements with the Socialists. The local fasci did not agree to this change in direction 
and, effectually, took control of the party. In the end, Mussolini accepted the move within the 
party towards the nationalists. The profile of the movement had taken on the shape which 
was to characterise Italian fascism: a strong nationalist current, strong anti-socialist feeling, 
and distrust of the weak leadership of the parliamentarian system, which was unable to create 
consensus. An interesting occurrence was when, in 1922, the socialists organised a general 
strike and the fascists simply organised the running of the public services, which severely 
undermined the ability of the socialists to bring government to the negotiating table. On 
October 24th, 1922, a monster rally at Naples took place. Mussolini declared his intentions 
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for the fascist party “to become the state”. Later in the day he added: “either the government 
will be given to us or we shall descend upon Rome and take it. It is now a question of days, 
perhaps of hours”. Considerable uncertainly about the prospects that Mussolini thought 
achievable, but the fascists planned the March on Rome, although Mussolini was in intense 
negotiations to form a coalition government, with the support, in writing, from landowners, 
bankers and industrialists. On October 27th, the Fascists occupied provincial administrations 
and military barracks all over northern Italy, camping at a 20-30 miles distance from Rome. 
Mussolini accepted to come to Rome only when he was promised the function of Prime 
Minister in a coalition government. He became Prime Minister, Minister of Home Affairs and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in a coalition government which accepted all constitutional forms, 
including the oath to the constitution. An overwhelming vote of confidence was given to the 
government. Not even all the Socialist deputies voted against it. The fascist party had not yet 
become what it was to be. The new government asked for, and obtained, the right to issue 
decrees in the fields of taxation and government budget spending and economic 
reorganisation129. In reality then, the fascist disapproval of parliamentary government was 
intermitted when they gained enough potential electoral support to be an inescapable partner 
in a coalition government. A new electoral law in 1923 undermined representational 
democracy and was an anti-pluralist, ‘winner takes all’ system, where the largest part to reach 
a quarter of the votes was assigned two-thirds of the seats in parliament130. Even after the 
kidnapping and murder of Matteotti, orchestrated by Fascists connected with the Ministry of 
the Interior, the opposition limited itself to a parliamentary walk-out and demonstrations. 
Mussolini’s strongest opposition was thus to be found within the fascist party, where the so-
called ‘movement of the consuls’ opposed Mussolini’s ‘soft leadership’. Now the Fascist 
violence, although still targeting the political opposition, was aimed at forcing Mussolini’s 
hand. The result was the elimination of the freedom of the press, which caused even coalition 
party leaders to join the opposition and the Fascist party took over all government posts in 
January 1925. From then onwards, all opposition parties and hostile press were suppressed. 
The perception of the Italian fascists abroad was varied, but it is intersting to look at the 
arguments foreign observers used in favour of the fascist movement. For example, they 
emphasized the order the regime was imposing on the economic development of the country, 
the popularity of the ideological principles implemented by the fascists and the fact that a 
strong leader figure reminded of earlier monarchic periods131. When reading the words of 
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Mussolini to the people of England, one understands why the fascist movement was seen by 
many mainly as an anti-revolutionary and to some extent reactionary movement:  
Il fascismo Italiano non ha significato solamente una rivolta politica contro I Governi 
deboli e incapaci […] ma è stata una ribellione spiritual alle vecchie ideologie che 
corrompevano i sacri principi della Religione, della Patria e dalla famiglia132. 
In Germany, several movements, including the National Socialists, planned a ‘March on 
Berlin’ in 1923. The reference to the fascist March on Rome could hardly be clearer. General 
Ludendorff, was to be at the head of the March, to which ex military servicemen and 
nationalists flocked133. Later, during the Nazi period, Hermann Esser, Joseph Göbbels, and 
Adolf Hitler were all to maintain their admiration for what Mussolini had done in Italy134. The 
admiration was not reciprocated in the early days of National-socialism135.  
Spanish Francoism and Italian fascism shared some of their main features, such as 
their totalitarian and authoritarian nature, while their main differences were the Italian focus 
on corporatism and the Spanish focus on national syndicalism. Nevertheless, the positive 
propaganda of Francoism in Italy was taken over by the effort to underline the idea that 
fascism was compatible with Catholicism, whereas Francoism was not136. An interesting 
observation about the fascist revolution, which might be made about other, populist, 
movements was made in 1924 by Francisco Cambó. According to him, the masses who 
supported the revolution had not thought to inform themselves about the political programme 
of the fascists. They chose to support it mainly because it faught against communism and for 
the fatherland, as opposed to internationalism. He thinks this is a general tendency among 
the supporters of revolutions. It is better not to discuss the post-revolution reality beforhand, 
since people intuitively understand that doing so could undermine the unity of the 
revolutionaries137. This is a clever characterisation of what binds many supporters of populist 
parties together and may also be an explanation for why so many of these parties suffer 
irrepairable damage from spells in government. After all, when in government, the gaze must 
be, at least partially, aimed at what lies ahead and on construction, rather than towards 
destruction itself. This begs the question of why certain populist parties are more resilient to 
‘winning’ than others. Here we may think of the U-KIP, as examples of parties that do not 
manage to keep together their supportive backing after having gained power, unless they are 
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placed there purposefully to sit in opposition to something. This theory, however, does not 
provide tools for understanding why some other populist movements and parties do not loose 
their support when entering government coalitions.  
A representation of the ‘new democracy’ put in place by the fascist regimes was presented 
in 1942 by the director of the Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Alfonso Garcia Valdecasas:  
 
Anche se ‘il concetto di Stato totalitario risponde più propriamente alla teoria italiana 
che a qualsiasi altra […] oggi vengono designate con il nome di Stati totalitari tutti 
quelli che rappresentano nuove forme d’organizzazione diverse da quella 
parlamentare e che hanno addottato un atteggiamento polemico rispetto allo Stato 
liberale e democratica. 
 
To him, the Spanish state was a totalitarian instrument in the service of the Patria and the 
salvage of historical inheritance138. 
Some of this volatility in popular support was also present during the last months of 
Italian fascism. That public sentiment had turned thoroughly anti-fascist becomes clear when 
reading that already in February 1945, in the popular newspaper of the resistance, L’Unità, 
the following was said about the maintenance of diplomatic ties with Spain: it is a scandal 
“which the Italian population cannot tolerate and an offence to the memory of seven hundred 
Italian garibaldini fallen on Spanish ground in defense of the republic’ besides ‘an attack on 
the Spanish population which hates Franco’s regime and await with anziety the moment of 
liberation”139. What we may then observe about fascism is that the idea that such an ideology 
was needed, most likely, sprang from the discontent of the lower middle classes; especially 
the ex servicemen, who had seen their possibilitie of making a livelihood decrease 
significantly, but also land owners, who feared the alternative to fascism which, at the time, 
seemed to be socialism. Carsten implicitly makes a case for the decisive influence of the 
wishes of one man on the direction that fascism took: that of Mussolini himself. He was young, 
and inspired to action, which was curtailed by a weak government. He therefore decided to 
take matters in his own hands; allying himself with returned soldiers. Was the anti-socialism 
then a result of the new alliance, given that the fasci were nostalgic of a strong state, with 
expansionist ideals. In any case, Carsten does not analyse the ideological transformation of 
Mussolini further, but we may, from what we know, conclude that some opportunism may 
have guided Mussolini’s political strategy, at least until he managed to establish some internal 
uniformity within the movement. Hitler had also started his political life within the leftist 
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movement, before turning to nationalism. His break with socialist policy was, however, less 
convinced than that of Mussolini, and we get the idea that he was genuinely an anti-semite 
long before entering the political arena.  May we therefore conclude that he was less populist 
than Mussolini? In any case, Hitler managed to keep the national-socialist ideology under his 
control, while Mussolini was maybe more easily influenced by circumstances, pressure from 
inside the movement, and council given to him. Hitler, on the other hand, maintained his 
position as the father of national-socialism, also among his collaborators. 
Conclusion 
 
In Federico Finchelstein’s view, as suggests in his 2017 book, From Fascism to 
Populism in History, fascism and populism are intimately related. In fact, he suggests that 
fascism combines populism with some other political ideas, the most important of which is 
militarism, but including also “extreme right-wing nationalism, imperialism, and non-Marxist 
antiparliamentarian leftist tendencies of revolutionary syndicalism”140. However, it is clear that 
Finchelstein’s definition of populism is hollower than the understanding we have derived from 
looking at the first occurrences of populism. Indeed, we hold that fascism and national-
socialism were very different to Russian populism, although not imcomparable in every 
sense. More specifically, in Russian populism, it was the moral interests and self-realisation 
of each individual member of ‘the people’ that mattered, and in American Agrarian populism, 
it was the class-struggle for economic reforms that mattered. Does Finchelstein’s 
understanding of populism then significantly differ from that which we have constructed so 
far? Partially yes, but we find resonance in the compatibility between his definition and 
American Agrarian populism. Nevertheless, rather than fascism being a form of populism, it 
seems to belong to a similar type of ideology. Here we do not mean that a similarity in content 
is necessarily significant, but rather that they are both, in our view, ‘thin-centered ideologies’ 
that, when combined with ideological content from the more traditional left – or right-wing, or 
with a combination of policies from both ends of the spectrum, become political programmes 
with high potential and appeal, especially during times of (percieved) crisis.  Thus, what we 
have been able to observe is that the theory that nationalism arises in times of crises where, 
typically the lower middle classes, or the lower classes, feel the pressure of economic decline 
in combination with factors such as immigration, seems to hold the first test against historical 
cases. In this context, an interesting parallel may be drawn between the unsettled social 
reality of the post-revolution world on the one hand, and the post super-power Europe of 
today. Are parts of the European populations experiencing similar uncertainties and feelings 
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of alienation in respect of the world order and lack of social ties set up by their predecessors? 
If yes, does this mean that these feelings of alienation may result in a new-found nationalist 
fervour? And, finally, to what extent would a nationalism resulting from these uncertain times 
be similar to the nationalism that arose with the romantics? 
Another scholar who seems to bring populism and nationalism together is Sir Isaiah 
Berlin. Populism, according to him, has a notion of an intergrated and cohesive society, a 
disinterest for political institutions and a superstitional belief in the society. It strives towards 
a previous condition which is believed to have existed before the percieved crisis, it strives 
to revive traditional norms and values, and it refers to the ‘will of the people’. This definition 
could be a definition both of populism and of nationalism, with the expection that nationalism 
specifically strives to maintain, or create, a nation-state. 
  
Populism as Ideology or Style 
 
The ideals of modern political movements that are considered populist differ 
significantly from the ideals of the first populist movements. Although they share certain 
features, such as a reference to the moral superiority of a simple life and the ability of populist 
leaders to interpret what the people really want, the new feature, that populist leaders claim 
to a a beacon of ‘the people’, was not present among neither the narodniki, although some 
claim that the parts of the 1860 generation of Russian populists partook in such an 
interpretation. Even if some did, it was out of frustration with the ingratitude shown towards 
the populists by the rural population. Taggart’s understanding of ‘the heartland’ may help us 
understand what is meant by ‘the people’ in contemporary populist movements. ‘The 
heartland’ is a place in which, in the populist imagination, a virtuous and unified population 
resides. Mudde explains: 
 The concept of the heartland helps to emphasize that the people in 
the populist propaganda are neither real nor all-inclusive, but are in 
fact a mythical and constructed sub-set of the whole population. In 
other words, the people of the populists are an ‘imagined community’, 
much like the nation of the nationalists. At the same time, the notion 
of the heartland does not overcome the main problem of the people, 
its vagueness141. 
                                                          
141 C. MUDDE, The populist Zeitgeist, cit., pp. 545-546. 
60 
 
We follow Mudde in observing that populists argue that the political elite attempts to corrupt 
the members of their community and, through their use of rhetoric and propaganda, seek to 
create artificial cleavages in the naturally homogenous will of the people. They do this to 
further their own, personal aims. This, much like Fichte where the nation was concerned, is 
in the tradition of Rousseau. In fact, some populist movements believe, or at least claim to 
believe, that they, if given political power, would be able to diverge from this corruptive 
practice, other populists, instead, blame the political party system. According to Mudde, 
populism is a discourse about the relationship between the elite and the people, but this still 
leaves the question of what populism actually is: an ideology, a syndrome, a political 
movement or a political style? Mudde considers it to be ideology which sees society as 
fundamentally split in to two homogenous but opposing groups, ‘the pure people’ on one side, 
and ‘the corrupt elite’ on the other, and which argues that politics should be an expression of 
the general will. He further pointed out that populism, according to this definition, has in fact 
two opposites: elitism and pluralism142. A definition which incorporates the new features of 
contemporary populist movements, is that presented by Paul Taggart. His is a definition in 
themes, and the themes that define populism are 1) distrust of representative politics; 2) a 
shared idea that a ‘heatland’ exists within the society in question; 3) an empty ideology, 
independent of a moral compass; 4) a percieved need to react in a situation of crisis; 5) an 
adjustment to the ideological ‘colours’ of the surroundings; 6) the interests of the people is 
perceived to be contrary to the interests of the elite broadly understood; 7) a claim on the 
side of populist leaders to be able to interpret what the people really want and, effectfully, 
becoming a beacon for the popular will. In terms of an explanation for how they determine 
what the people want, the populist leader will offer explanations along the line of ‘I am an 
average person’ or ‘I have spoken to many, real people, all around the country about this 
issue’. Furthermore, Kristoffer Löfgren explains, “when populists construct a picture of their 
‘heartland’, they build it on the idealised picture of the wisdom of the people, or the common 
sense of the people”143.  To this definition we may add that populists tendentially refer to the 
opinion of the people as a uniform and coherent opinion.  
The question of why populist parties are so popular in politics today is answered by Mudde. 
He identifies two main factors that have contributed to the increased popularity: increased 
corruption in politics and the increased distance between the electorate and the political elite. 
Whether it is actually true that the frequency of political corruption has heightened or not, 
people are in any case more exposed to scandalous news about it than they used to be. 
Furthermore, conspiracy theories thrive on instant communication media. As signs of the 
increased distance between the people and politics, Klaus van Beyme has mentioned the 
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following tendencies: 1) the public financing of parties; 2) monopolization of political activities; 
3) the co-operation of government and opposition. As Mudde mentions, it is especially the 
latter tendency which has been mentioned by populists and investigated by scholars. 
Nevertheless, he goes on to argue that the perception among the majority of the electorate 
(due to increased level of education) is that being a politician takes no special skills or 
knowledge and that, therefore, they could probably do a better job themselves. Although this 
is certainly true of a significant part of the electorate, it seems at first glance to contrast with 
Mudde’s claim that the perceived distance between the people on the one hand and the 
political elite on the other has increased. Mudde, nevertheless, claims that it is a matter of 
the perceived presence of such tendencies, rather than the actually proven presence of them, 
which determines the popularity of populist parties144. Mudde assigns responsibility for the 
perceived presence of these phenomena to the media which has become increasingly 
receptive to sensationalist news coverage. With television and internet, populists can find a 
direct outlet to the people, unmediated by journalists. Furthermore, Mudde mentions that 
post-industrial society, and the end of the cold war, has created space for less ideological 
parties, such as single-issue parties, and has meant more self-critical assessments of 
existing democracies. At the same time, Mudde mentions that globalization has presented 
itself as a problematic limitation to the power of established political parties145. An additional 
factor, which has contributed to the recent popularity of populist movements, is the fact that 
just because people appreciate democracy and the right to participate actively in politics, it 
doesn’t mean that actually feel compelled to participate. Therefore, having someone at the 
helm who seems to be able to, more or less, understand the populations needs, without even 
having to ask people to declare their opinion, is for many people the ideal. Thus, drawing on 
arguments presented by Robert Dahl, Mudde conludes that even though a large portion of 
people want to be heard in the case of fundamental decisions, first and foremost they want 
leadership. They want politicians who know what to do, how to lead, and who make their 
wishes come true. Mudde then handles another ‘misconception’, according to him, about 
populist voters, namely the view that they resent the elite because they are not like them. He 
thinks, instead that supporters of populist movements prioritize that the problems of ‘the 
common man’ should be solved, according to their own values, which are usually taken to be 
the values referable to common sense, and they accept that this will have to be done by a 
remarkable leader146. Although he emphasizes that this does not mean that all populist 
parties are led by charismatic leaders. Populism is usually treated by scholars either as a 
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pathology, or symptom, of democracy, or as part of a remedy against such a health 
condition147. Some scholars have even called it the shadow of modern democratic practices. 
As Revelli writes, in any case it is the product of a representational deficit148. Although 
cumbersome, the conciliation of this interpretation with the interpretation by Robert Dahl, that 
many do not wish to participate actively in representational democracy, is possible. In fact, 
we could claim that the two interpretations are even complimentary if we accept a premise. 
This premise is that supporters of populism may have an ideal level of political participation 
in mind which, substantially, exceeds their own willingness to participate. Intuitively, such a 
premise does not seem unreasonable. This also supports Mudde’s interpretation that 
populism, is not an attack on representative democracy as such, but rather on liberal 
democracy and constitutional democracy, including principles of diversity and incusiveness, 
as well as the independence of key state institutions149. Jan-Werner Müller, in what has been 
called a “sweeping critique of populism” confronts the reader with, on the one hand, the 
inevitability of populism as democracy’s ‘shadow’ and, on the other hand, the observations 
that 1) populism does not have a particular political colour and, as such, may belong at either 
end of the classical political divide between left and right-wing party politics, and that 2) the 
determinating factor is not the policies it tries to implement, but rather the underlying anti-
pluralism is what, to Müller, defines a political party, or movement, as belonging to the populist 
category150. It is, in any case, an interesting perspective that the premises for the 
development and fruition, not to mention proliferation, of anti-(political) establishment 
movements and parties in many parts of the world, is the expansion of the political sphere 
over the last several decades. The fact that national governments, as well as opposition 
parties, have all claimed to have science on their side, together with the idea that world-peace 
was within reach, promoted by the setting up and empowerment of international and 
coordinative organisations, has led to a massive disappointment among large parts of the 
western population. After the cold war, we were promised a move away from an excessive 
focus on party- or bloc-politics, where the aim was to promote one’s own ideology and ideal 
society, and towards a society of scientific advancement and economic prosperity. 
Scandinavia was the crowning glory in as much as several political parties, and even entire 
political systems, in this region strove for political inclusion (as the low cut-offs for 
parliamentary representation, at only 2% of the votes indicates) and consensus seeking, thus 
effectively eliminating true political conflict for several decades. As new security threats and 
economic crisis showed their ugly face on the one hand, and national politics seemed unable, 
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or unwilling, to effectively deal with these threats, the populations lost patience with their 
leaders, thinking either that they could do a better job themselves, or that a new political elite 
with different visions of politics were needed. Geoff Mulgan, possibly with prescriptive 
outcome, points out many of these tendencies151. To another group of scholars, populism 
represents only a ‘tactical device’ or a ‘style of communication’152. After all, a certain general 
terminology and way of speaking about the people is employed by populists. They often 
speak about ‘the people’ and ‘the citizen’, but they also use specific, commonly occurring 
characteristics of individuals to represent much larger portions of the electorate. For example, 
‘nurse Cat’ could be employed to signify the anything from the average health sector 
employee, anyone working in shifts, a typical single-mother, or anyone with a higher 
vocational education level, depending on the context. Van de Raadt et al. also mention that 
populists, where they make appeals to independence, may also employ ethnic distinctions, 
linguistic traits, and/or regional references. This, they cleaim, is what the Vlaams Blok would 
do. They would represent the Flemish population as victims of the establishment and their 
self-interested politics. They continue:  
 
We thus consider statements in party programmes populist if ʻthe 
peopleʼ are understood as a monolithic entity without internal 
cleavages, and if references reflect an understanding of the people 
as ʻcommon and ordinaryʼ, in need of protection against the 
establishment153. 
 However, approaching populism as mere tactics, or political style, is problematic. It is 
recalled that according to Taggart, often the populist style is confused with a style that seeks 
to be popular. This tactic of appealing to a broad electoral clientele is closely associated, 
either specifically, to the ʻcatch-all peopleʼs partyʼ which is not necessarily populist or, 
generally, to most political parties who try to appeal to new, potential voters, by using popular 
appeal. In turn, such a broad understanding of populism – as political leaders saying what is 
popular, or what the leaders of the movements think people wish to hear- opens our discourse 
to the distinct possibility that all political parties are, at least partially populist. The concept of 
populism is thus emptied of significance or, at best, is nothing more than political campaigning 
techniques. However, concluding, as Jasper de Raadt et al. have done, that by understand 
populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology’, or as a hollow ideology, which is flexible enough to be 
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promoted in combination with any progressive, reactionary, autocratic, leftist or rightist policy, 
we deny populism its substance and, effectfully reduce it to a tool. Moreover, Shils and 
Kitsching have argued that populism is essentially oppositionalist. Van de Raadt et al., on the 
other hand, conclude that populism is an ideology. They base their conclusion on the 
following minimal requirements for defining an ideology. Ideologies present ideas about the 
present order, about an ideal-typical situation, and about ways to move from the current to 
the desired situation. They go on to argue which content-related arguments, used in populist 
policy, qualify to support their claim that populism is an ideology: populist parties develop a 
unique set of arguments about the malfunctioning of representative democracy and the ruling 
class154. Thus the idea they present about the present order is that it does not correctly 
represent the people. The ideal-typical situation they present is one in which there is close 
communication between the people and their representatives, as well as correspondence 
between the will of the people and the political establishment. What is particular about the 
populist understanding of the people’s will is that they take for granted that it actually exists, 
that it is uniform and shared among a large majority, as well as that there exists a reliable 
way for a new, populist, establishment to discover precisely what it is. Moreover, populism, 
at least as formulated by contemporary movements in Europe, does not suggest any 
coherent and comprehensive alternative economic organisation of society. We therefore 
maintain that there is good reason to doubt both of these assumptions.  As far as ways of 
moving from the actual to the ideal situation is concerned, some populist movements suggest 
the implementation of more direct democratic tools, such as online surveys (Sweizerische 
Volkspartei, SVP) or referenda and popular consultations (Lijst Pim Fortuyn and Movimento 
Cinque Stelle). Indeed, some definitions of populism add, besides the appeal to the people 
and anti-establishment aims, also a pro-direct democracy conception of the ideal political 
system. However, by including the latter, ‘pro-direct democracy stance’, among the three 
main dimensions, common to populism as an ideology, they run the risk of excluding those 
parties, or movements, whose voters are against the political establishment and the 
democratic order as it stands now, but who, nevertheless, seek to have their interests better 
represented; possibly through actions on the part of political leaders who seek to know more 
about them, rather than through their own political participation through the tools of direct 
democracy. As Carlos de la Torre shows, in regards to Latin American populism, these 
movements exist, and they are genuinely not seeking to participate but merely to be 
represented by strong leaders who know their needs, fears, problems and concerns155. 
Mudde about distinctive leader-figures within the parties. While charismatic leadership and 
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direct communication between the leader and ‘the people’ are common among populists, 
these features facilitate rather than define populism. Indeed, the current success of populist 
actors cannot be separated from the general trend towards strong party leaders and more 
direct communication between party leadership and party supporters, which has developed 
over the past decades. Following this logic, it is evident that one can successfully check that 
populism as an ideology presents something in the way of meeting each of the three 
requirements of an ideology, as presented by van de Raadt, Hollanders, e Krouwel. However, 
also Muddes observation that the ideological content of populism, when seen apart from other 
ideologies that often accompany it, it cannot muster, on its own, a spectrum of ideological 
refinement and political programme comparable to the classical ideologies of socialism, 
liberalism and conservatism. This is why we call it a ‘thin-centered ideology’. Furthermore, 
we borrow from Mudde when we claim that thin-centred ideologies (yes, populism is not alone 
in this category), can be combined with other -thin or full- ideologies, including communism, 
nationalism or socialism.  According to Mudde, populism makes its supporters think of those 
with different priorities, or values, as evil. Compromise is thus impossible, as it ‘corrupts’ the 
purity156. Although one may not agree with the view that anti-elitism is the only distinguishing 
factor of populism, Mudde’s characterisation of populism’s anti-elitism and his concept of it 
being a ‘thin-centered ideology’, does hit a cord with our definition of national-populist 
ideology. However, when we look at the Scandinavian cases in particular, we may also 
conclude that populist parties are sometimes willing to reach compromises, especially when 
the party has become well-established and/or when it has had experience as a supportive 
party to the government, whether part of the governing coalition or as a coalition partner. 
Although we embrace this part of Cas Mudde’s awareness, it seems he is challenged by 
trouble with remembering to implement it.  
Indeed, when Cas Mudde refers to populism, as being used by mainstream parties both 
in opposition and in government, what he refers to is rather a rhetorical tool than a ‘thin-
centered ideology’. It seems, indeed to be a reference to occasions in which opportunism 
leads political leaders to draw on anti-elitist rhetoric. The unpersuasiveness of the argument 
comes mainly from the fact that the cases from which Mudde draws his examples are 
exclusively oratory and are not, at least by him, connected to actual policy goals157. In a 2015 
article in The Guardian, Mudde’s tune had changed somewhat. Here he pointed out that 
defined populism in the following terms: the main difference between leftwing and rightwing 
populism “is not whether they exclude, but whom they exclude, which is largely determined 
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by their accompanying ideology (eg nationalism or socialism)”158. And here he especially 
warns against populists with a majority in government, such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary and 
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. He further eplains that the two problems with populism are that 
it “denies the existence of divisions of interests and opinions within “the people” and rejects 
the legitimacy of political opponents,” since they speak on behalf of a unitary ‘people’, anyone 
who holds a different opinion, or who questions the populist position, must necessarily be 
acting in the interest of particular groups, usually the elite. In addition, although populists 
speak for the ‘oppressed people’, they do not wish to emancipate them by improving their 
way of life. They had rather condone and promote their present lifestyle. There is thus very 
little connecting them to early Russian populism in Mudde’s description of contemporary 
populisms159. He furthermore points out that it is not the populist politicians themselves that 
are reluctantly political, but that it is rather their ‘Heartland’ which is so. A possibly suitable 
concluding remark to this section is one made by Matteo Trufelli, when writing about the 
prescriptive effect of some scholars’ starting-points for their definitions of the anti-political 
establishment movements or parties: “The variety of interpretations suggested by different 
scholars, intellectuals and politicians who have measured themselves against a phenomenon 
with such undefined contours as ‘anti-politics’, radica itself foremost by the diversity among 
the ideas of the political from which they depart. A point of departure which inevitably brings 
in not only descriptive– but also prescriptive argumentation160. Moreover, it really makes little 
sense to be keep busy trying to distinguish whether the nature of populism is more 
ideological, or more of a rhetorical style when it is accepted just how many different 
movements and parties actually act - and function - as populist, and their reciprocal 
incompatibility. Indeed, maybe we must accept that it is both. The incompatibility is significant 
at first glance at a geographical scale, with the Narodniki and the People’s Party at opposite 
sides of the earth, on a historical scale, with the main streams of populist thought (Narodniki; 
American People’s Party; Latin American populisms, and the many present streams of 
populism in Europe), as well as an ideological scale, where some populist parties or 
movements belong at either end of the left-right spectrum. As an utmost relevant example, 
we have the transformation of the Danish People’s Party, from a libertarian party, to the 
strongest defender of the social welfare model among the Danish national parties161. 
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National-, Neo-, or Right-wing? Defining the Populist Party Families Today  
 
Before initiating our main analysis, it is necessary to clarify the meanings, and 
consequently the choice of the central concepts of the analysis. Thus, we speak of national-
populism, rather than right-wing populism. Since this is by no means an inconsequential 
choice, and since it, to some extent, determines the cases relevant to this study, we should 
like to take the space to explain it more exhaustively. Let us linger for a moment at the choice 
of ‘national-populism’ as the term with which to delineate this study. We have seen that 
contemporary populism in itself may be defined as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ because, 
although its main political principle is anti-liberal in its anti-pluralism and conservatism, it 
nevertheless needs to be flanked by other policies in order for it to develop a full political 
programme. As discussed, these policies may belong to either the traditional left, such as the 
Russian narodniki, or the traditional right, or any combination thereof, as is the case with the 
Agrarian Populist parties.  
The reader may very well be asking themselves why ‘right-wing populist’ is not the term we 
will be using to define the concept at the centre of this study. To answer this question, we 
must look at the difference between this concept and the chosen concept, national-populist. 
To this purpose, we propose to pursue two levels of analysis: that of the literal and historical 
meanings of the two concepts on the one hand, and that of the use of the two concepts in 
the contemporary debate about new political phenomena. It is our hypothesis that the current 
use of the two concepts bears little resemblance to the literal and historical meanings. In 
addition, we have noted that nationalism, because it may also base its economic and/or social 
policies on either traditional left-wing or right-wing policies; or a combination thereof, is also 
such a ‘thin-centered ideology’. Will the choice of ‘nationalist-populism’ not also result in a 
‘thinly’ defined ideology? We claim that, although it is not as refined and full-bodied as some 
other ideologies, and although it is more inclusive than the term ‘right-wing populism’, it still 
can give us a fairly clear idea of which types of political programmes might be considered 
national-populist. We thus sustain that although populism may be considered separately as 
a political style and ideology, national-populism belongs to a clearly-enough defined ideology 
to be workable as a basis for this study. It is precisely because these parties do not wish to 
be associated exclusively to either leftwing or rightwing politics, that the parties, or 
movements, in question opt for a populist imagery. Nevertheless, we need to ask ourselves 
whether it is the choice of political audience that makes it impossible to fit either side 
completely. Is it then the case that these parts of the population are intrinsically ambiguous 
in terms of left-right orientation? This, if we assume pursuing policies that belong to either 
end of the right-left spectrum simultaneously, means a lack of logical consistency, or 
stubbornness in not accepting the principle of logic. The willingness to accept logical 
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inconsistency then seems to be a political companion to the populist appeal, urging such 
parties to adopt fusionist political agendas, combining typically left- and right-wing policies, 
and eventually forcing them into some form of populist mold/modality. Indeed, populist parties 
in government have often been the fatal, destabilizing factor in their coalitions; adopting 
behaviour which has been irresponsible and, indeed, destabilizing. We may observe that 
those parties and movements that are currently identified as right-wing populist often, but not 
always, adhere to a nationalistic worldview, while those that are called national-populist are 
often more extreme in their nationalistic proposals. Furthermore, the national-populist label 
is used much more sparingly in the public debate than its right-wing cousin; and while this is 
maybe not very surprising finding because of the historical connotations, popularly -and 
almost by reflex- linked, especially in Europe and North-America, to concepts of national-
socialism. It, nevertheless, offers an insight into the reasons for the cautious political and 
journalistic reactions to the emergence of the new national-populist parties in Europe in 
general, and in Scandinavia in particular. Some populist movements, such as the Green 
Parties for example, fall outside the definition of a national-populist party, but within the 
definition of populism. Furthermore, the populist phenomenon is provoked by social crisis 
and differently from other protest movements, the mobilisation is not ‘spontaneous’, or 
bottom-up, but rather top-down, with the initiative necessarily coming from a populist leader. 
Populist parties, therefore are never grass-root movements. Cas Mudde used the term 
‘Extreme Right’, although he claimed that it was different from fascism because the populist 
radical Right is not antidemocratic. It embraces popular sovereignty and majority rule, but it 
rejects both cultural pluralism and minority rights. In other words, “its advocates do not want 
to overthrow democracy, they want to weaken liberal checks on pure majoritarian rule”162. 
The question is whether they would really support this principle of political organisation if they 
happened to think the majority was significantly different from themselves. The answer is a 
partial yes. After all, their ‘mission’ is not to be the people, but to implement the will of the 
people, as they understand it. Although Mudde’s use of the term ‘exterme right’ is closely 
related to our preferred term, ‘national-populist’, his takes account of the situation in the 
Americas. Indeed, in his “The Populist Zeitgeist”, he rejected the normal pathology thesis and 
argued instead that “populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western 
democracies.” He points out that populism is no longer reserved for the extreme right, nor is 
it reserved for parties in opposition.163 We must, however, remember that Mudde uses the 
term ‘radical right parties’, rather than ‘national-populist parties’. The consequence is that he 
loses the historical reference of the phenomenon. After all, it is relatively easy to understand 
the phenomenon of the radical right as an exclusively contemporary phenomenon, whereas 
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the national-populist movement carries within it part of the history of both the terms of which 
it is constructed. 
 
Contemporary Party Families  
 
Many contemporary scholars have written about national-populism, extreme right-wing 
parties, anti-politics parties, and other definitions of related phenomena. For example, Guy 
Hermet interprets modern European populism as an originally Scandinavian invention. 
Presently, it is useful to make a short inventory of some of the very different contemporary 
populist movements. The Latin-American political movements and, later on, - parties that 
have fashioned themselves as populist, do not belong to a uniform type of populism, although 
they share some core features.  
 
Peronism  
 
Latin American national and regional histories are filled with violent, political conflict. It 
is important to understand that the region has witnessed the most convinced Marxists, as 
well as the most expreme supporters of national-socialism, not to mention dictators and other, 
authoritarian leaders. It is inevitable that this history influences the increasingly popular 
perception of populist policy as a stabilizing factor in the region. Here we will quickly 
summarise some of this history. In many countries in Latin- and South America, populist 
movements have enjoyed some, although often short-lived, popularity. In Colombia, the 
lawyer, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who has been considered an “epitome of populism and 
demagogy”, broke away from the Liberal party and formed his socialist Unión Nacional 
Izquierdista Revolucionaria. The movement was to last until 1946. In Venezuela, Rómulo 
Betancourt’s (1908-81) Acción Democrática came to power in 1945 following the revolt of 
officers. The movement clashed with all the establishment and it ended that Betancourt had 
to go into exile for a second time164. In Brazil, where the working class was weakened by the 
apparently limitless supply of labour, the establishment of Vargas’ (1882-1945) Estado Novo 
in 1937 seemed to nurish the intelligentsia’s faith in ‘authoritarian democracy’. Indeed, 
Francisco José Oliveira Vianna believed the population of Brazil unable to handle, and 
therefore, immediately benefit from, liberal democracy, which, to him, seemed to work only 
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in countries with a tradition of public opinion. He discarded the idea of a fascist single-party 
system, which would soon degenerate into oligarchy, and, after WWII, he rejected 
totalitarianism but retained his belief in corporatism, which he forecast would become 
dissociated from fascism, and pointed to the experience of such countries as Sweden, 
France, Australia and Argentina, where what we would call today neo-corporatism was being 
applied as a tool of social and economic planning. Similarly, Antonio José Avezedo do Amaral 
showed extensive similarity to European fascist thought, although he criticised German 
fascism for focusing too much on ‘plebeian elements’ and Italian fascism for being weak. He 
envisioned a new authoritarianism, which was to be legitimated by genuine consensus, which 
he hoped would be finally established in Brazil by Vargas’ Estado Novo constitution165. 
Indeed, he made an effort to dissociate corporatism and fascism in people’s minds. He 
wanted Brasil to establish corporatism from the bottom-up, and not top-down as had been 
done in Italy. He believed that such an achievement would be a democratic alternative to the 
liberal democratic order. In 1935, an attempt was made by Vargas at changing the Estado 
Novo regime into a populist regime (queremismo)166. Almost every country in Latin America 
has experienced populist politics. Internationally, the most widely commented populist leader 
in Latin America, nowadays, is Chavez, but another, historical examples is that of Peronism 
in Argentina. In some cases, the populist movements stayed just that; movements, typically 
present in rural areas. In other cases, the inspiration was clearly from within the political 
establishment and, although support was popular, the manoeuvrings followed a clearly 
political pattern. Yet other populist parties and movements have transformed over time and/or 
have persisted over time and are still a significant feature of the political system. It would be 
imprudent to try and fit all of the populist realities in Latin America into one common history, 
not to say type. However, Peronism is a well-known example of Latin American populism, 
and will let us illustrate some of the features populism has had on this continent. Peronism 
was basically formed thanks to the strong support of trade unions. Indeed, Juan Carlos Torre 
writes that what gave Peronism its singular quality was the coexistence of a plebiscitarian 
leadership and a trade union organisation within the same political movement167. Trade 
unions in Argentina had been politically neutral until 1936. Afterwards, most unions were 
taken over by socialists. In Argentina, by 1943, there was a great fear among the dominant 
classes and the military that social unrest could be unleashed in the conditions of the post-
war period. Juan Domingo Peròn was to introduce what, following Di Tella, we may call 
‘Developmental Fascism’. He, then the Labour Secretary, admired Mussolini, while he 
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antagonized the Left and the Liberal intelligentsia. On 17th of October 1945, “crowds 
thronging into the city with no formal leadership”. Peròn was the preferable alternative to a 
return to Conservative rule for the less ideological unionists, the FORJA group (nationalist 
and radical), and some Trotskyists. His comunidad organizada’s idea would imply 
corporatism to spur pluralist social practices, undiscussed leadership, and a strong, planning 
state, including the nationalisation of public services. The latter element would fail mainly 
because the technologically qualified community was against Peronism in general, and 
against the nationalisation of these services in particular. The idea that Peronism was fascist 
has been coupled with the idea expounded by the sociologist Gino Germani that Peronism 
was a form of national populism, “capable of incorporating the lower strata, contrasting with 
fascism in the type of support it got, and in being much less repressive”168. As the 1960s 
advanced, large numbers of the younger generation, both in political and academic circles, 
reconsidered their earlier opposition, becoming to a greater or lesser extent fascinated with 
the experience of populism, which they started seeing as a necessary evil, and soon an 
indispensable component of progressive Latin American politics. Perón’s seizure of power in 
Argentina was unexpected and seems to have been the result of several processes and 
developments. Despite that the choice for a populist strategy was initially a strategic choice 
made by Peron and a few other confidants of the military, it ended up gaining the upper hand 
and becoming unavoidably linked to the political, and personal, fate of Perón. 
With the imminent Allied victory, in 1945, the regime declared war against Germany 
and Japan, and called for democratic elections in 1946. However, the opposition organised 
a march on the regime, to which the regime reacted with oppressive measures. The 
opposition nevertheless gained control of the Campo de Mayo and forced Perón to resign. In 
the end, the unions brought Perón back to power, after he promised to concede institutional 
rights to the unions and raise wages and salaries. The latter happened on the 10th of October. 
On the 12th, the opposition wanted to send the military to their barracks and transfer power 
to the Supreme Court, but General Carlos Avalos, who was in charge of army politics, wishes 
to retain power and stop Perón. The latter was imprisoned on the island of Martín García. 
The result was that on the 15th of October 1945, a general strike was confirmed for the 
following day. Early on the 17th of October, people took to the streets and arrved, unhindered 
by the police, to the Plaza de Mayo, in front of the main government offices. Avalos then 
decided to negotiate with Perón’s supporters about his release. Perón’s conditions for saving 
what has been called the June 1943 revolution (i.e. military government), was that his main 
adversaries within the army administration (i.e. General Avalos and the Navy Minister) resign 
and that a new cabinet with men who were loyal to him be instated until the 1946 elections169. 
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When we speak of Latin American populism, it is necessary to mention also a very 
different group of phenomena that have been called populist movements, the violent 
revolutionary groupings roaming the mountains. These, while reflecting a real concern for the 
well-being of the majority of the rural population, are concerned chiefly with local leadership 
rivalries. Each local boss has at his disposal one of these groups, and since each locality 
under attack must defend itself (lack of centralised control), each locality must create such a 
grouping and will, predictably, support its own, claiming it is acting in the interest of the 
‘people’ of the area. It is difficult to see a link between such a system of sectarian conflicts 
and the idea of populism that has become known to most contemporary Europeans. Carlos 
de la Torre - summing up ideas of Weyland, Madrid, Hunter, Cameron, Hershberg, Levitsky 
and Roberts – maintain that the normal pathology theory of populism applies to the radical 
populism of Hugo Chávez’, Evo Morales’, and Rafael Correa’s regimes. He summarises the 
main features of these regimes: 
These governments, on the one hand, are undermining the 
institutions that guarantee contestation, pluralism, and civil liberties. 
Power is concentrated in the executive, reducing the authority of 
counterbalancing powers. These regimes selectively deny the civil 
and political liberties of the opposition and of the privately-owned 
media to express alternative points of view170. 
The policies of Latin American populism in power thus correspond largely with what we would 
expect from populism in power. However, this contradicts the theory that populists in power 
will significanylt change their tactics, in order to give the voters an image of their regime as a 
stable and responsible regime. Moreover, these regimes have been successful in doing what 
they declare dwas their objective: the inclusion and participation of the previously 
dieempowered. As predicted by theory, this has been done at the expense of pluralism. The 
regimes have been promoting, as would be expected, forms of direct democracy, and have 
used populist rhetoric that pits the virtuous people against, especially the economic elites. In 
addition, in Latin America, the populist leaders claim to speak on behalf of ‘the people’, with 
the difference that in this region, their movements are not the only movements caiming this 
priviledge. Organizations of the subaltern and of the oppressed also claim to be the voice of 
the people. Their interpretations of who are the people, and what are their interests might 
clash with how the populist leaders imagine the people171. There is in this sense a special 
clash between populists in power and grass-root subaltern groups who also claim to be the 
‘voice of the people’.  
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In Venezuela, Chávez’s regime has been implementing a programme of Twenty-First 
Century Socialism. The regime has made frequent reference to the transcendence of 
representative liberal democracy in favour of the daily exercise of direct democracy. This is 
thus a case where the thin-centered ideology of populism has been combined with socialist 
policies. The attempt to implement local democratic institutions, right down to the street level, 
tells us that the ideas about what constitutes a good society to Chávez in Argentina is very 
similar to what constituted a good society to the Narodniki in pre-revolution Russia, yet the 
local democratic institutions depended on the unilateral and centralized decisions of president 
Chávez to determine the amount of money to be distributed and how to spend it. This is a 
sign of a more authoritarian system which, it is therefore confirmed, is not in contradiction 
with a populist ideology, at least at the level of practice. Chávez uses populist discourse and 
favours leftist nationalism, with a high level of militarisation172. The main difference with 
Morales regime in Bolivia is the latter’s instrumantalisation of peasant organizations and - 
unions. President Morales follows the practices of communal democracy when he elaborates 
policies with social movement organizations. For the government this is a democracy of social 
movements. For critics, the regime uses followers to intimidate the opposition through mass 
rallies and other forms of collective action. Nevertheless, his attempts to speak on behalf of 
the population are not always well received, and organised opposition groups have on 
occasion been successful in negotiating with the regime. ‘The people’ to Morales, are the 
indigenous, peasant population, and the regime relies heavily on mechanisms of social 
control to compact the ‘people’s will’. Morales’ party, the MAS, sees events of collective 
mobilization as a manifestation of popular sovereignty. This policy, in a very definite manner, 
leaves little room for peaceful objection. In Ecuador, Correa runs a regime in which the key-
word is ‘national interest’ rather than ‘will of the people’ and participation under Correa is 
mainly reduced to voting in elections. After the people vote, the role of the leader is to design 
policies on behalf of the poor but without seeking their engagement. Correa is thus fashioning 
himself as a sort of ‘father’ to the people. In true populist fashion, all organised interest groups 
have been depicted as sectionist and disruptive to the unity of the people. Moreover, the 
regime regularly makes references to indigenous culture as the national culture of Ecuador, 
and the traditional values are permeating the objectives of the public sector173. Correa’s 
regime is in continuous conflict with indigenous and other collective organisations whose right 
to voice their opinions is seriously curtailed by policy and rhetoric. The claim is that 1) these 
organisations represent only the personal interests of their leaders and that 2) these leaders 
live a privileged lifestyle and are thus out-of-touch with the real needs of those whom they 
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represent. What we see in Equador is a regime run on practices that are more similar to 
fascist political practices than to populist ones. It is rightiousness combined with paranoia. 
What, according to de la Torre, is happening in these three Latin American societies is that 
civil society and civil liberties are under threat. At the same time, however, new social classes 
among the poorest parts of the populations are experiencing an unprecedented surge in 
political participation and experience a chance to push for their interest.  
When Peròn initially came to power in 1943, as leader of a pro-fascist officer group, 
measures were initially taken by the army against union leaders. However, a small circle 
around Perón secretly held meetings with union leaders and on 27th of October 1943, Perón 
became head of the Departamento de Trabajo, which changed name to Secretaría de 
Trabajo y Previsión Social. Perón’s attempts at approaching entrepreneurs in order to involve 
them in his new scheme failed. Mainly, as Torre points out, because the main threat to their 
existence was the mobilization of the workers initiated by Perón himself174. In spite of Perón 
believing the unions should be exclusively professional bodies because he wanted also the 
support of the radical and conservative dissident groups, his rise to power, and his release 
from imprisonment, rested mainly on their political engagement. The influence of the 
experience of Peronism on domestic politics in other Latin American countries was 
considerable. Attempts at imitation Peronism were undertaken by Chilean Socialists, by 
Manuel Odría in Peru (1948-56) and General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla with the socialist 
intellectual, Antonio García, in Colombia (1953-57). This was happening at the same time as 
the use of the word ‘Peronist’ was proliferating in contexts that were quite far from what Perón 
himself had in mind. For example, in 1966 – 1968 there was a reproachment between 
Guevarism and so-called revolutionary Peronism in the organisation of some small guerrilla 
pockets inside Argentina175. Guillermo O’Donnell observed that in severely underdeveloped 
conditions, under the conditions of dependent capitalism, he made a specific reference to the 
more industrialised countries in Latin America as examples of these conditions, an 
authoritarian reaction to the precarious situation of the population was to be expected. This 
was, he argued, because  
 
if the working class were free to organize it would turn revolutionary, 
not reformist as in the more prosperous parts of the world. Thus, an 
authoritarian reaction was highly likely, establishing a repressive 
regime which, however, was also bent on rapid economic growth176. 
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 In this sense then, it was most likely that the economies in these countries, under repressive 
authoritarian regimes would remain dependent, but would become nationalised, rather than 
capitalist. This analysis seems to have been true, at least for the period covered so far. 
Populism in the periphery, according to Torcuato S. Di Tella, shows the following traits:  
 
(i) a mass support among a working class and/or peasantry which 
has a high social mobilization (breakup of traditional loyalties) but a 
low level of autonomous organization; (ii) a leadership drawn from 
anti- status quo elites in the middle or upper echelons of the social 
pyramid, often of a status-incongruent, downwardly mobile, or 
insecure position; (iii) a charismatic, caudillista-type leadership, to 
replace the weakness of autonomous organisation177. 
 
He thus includes everything from right-wing nationalism to Leninism in Cuba. – Includes all 
levels of moderation, from violent and/or revolutionist to reformist. His definition is, in other 
words, an organisational definition. The first claim makes it impossible for a political 
movement to start out as populist. After all, and it seems rather banal to state this, a 
movement does not usually start out already enjoying a large following and widespread 
support. Furthermore, one may claim that such initial popularity is usually reserved for single-
issue parties or movements. One may draw the attention to the fact that many of the populist 
parties started out as single-issue parties, which is true, but what then is the difference 
between the single-issue parties in the green camp, protest parties and the populist parties 
we are trying to pinpoint? The answer may very well lie in the combination of nationalist and 
populist traits. Mudde and Kaltwasser sustain that there is an important similarity between 
Peronism and Vargas regime on the one hand, and Russian and American populism on the 
other. They write that in Latin America, from the 1930s onwards, leaders such as Juan 
Domingo Perón in Argentina, Getulio Vargas in Brazil and others, “were actually part of a 
new generation of politicians, who by appealing to ‘the people’ rather than to the ‘working 
class’ were able to build multi-class coalitions and mobilize lower-class groups178. A way of 
integrating this argument with the argument made by Di Tella, is to observe that the feature 
of appealing to the rural population was certainly shared by all these movements, and that 
the Russian Narodniki referred to the decision-making customs and traditional societal 
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organisation among the rural population, rather than to the population itself. Furthermore, the 
rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in Western Europe has had the effect that present-
day populist movements must have a much broader electoral base than merely peasants. 
Following this logic, one may observe that in certain federal states in the US, as well as pre-
revolution Russia, the peasant population in effect made up the majority of the population, 
irrespectively of whether they had the right to vote or not. In Latin America, from the 1930s 
onwards, industrialisation and labour-migration and/or -immigration had already reduced the 
proportionate importance of the peasantry, and therefore, the leaders of the populist 
movements, although relying heavily on the support of the indigenous and rural population, 
also had to acquire the support of the professional representations, such as the workers’ 
unions. This was nothing new, in the sense that already the Russian populists had tried to 
engage the industrial workers; and with some success. Contrarily, and in an interpretative 
direction which is much more compatible with particularism, Di Tella, in a 1997 compilation 
of articles, sees the presence of populist parties as a typical trait of the political structure in 
Latin America, and its main difference with the Western European pattern. To the question 
why these parties are not simply called Socialist, we may answer that they do not all share 
Socialist ideologies. To the question why they are not called labour, we may, similarly answer, 
that many of these parties, just like many of the European workers’ parties, are supported by 
other groups as well179. The problem with this answer is the lack of consideration for the fact 
that exactly the same lack of autonomous organisation exists among the supporters of 
populist parties in Europe, where a supposed lack of development can be sustained with 
much more difficulty, or not at all. Although trade unionism is strong in some Western 
European countries, at least in terms of membership numbers, they sway little power over 
political organisations. Di Tella makes a reference to three considerations in the explanation 
of the change from social democratic to national-populist patterns of organisation of the 
working class in Argentina: (1) the change in nature of trade unionism from voluntary 
associationism to inclusive form of corporatism, leading to a mobilizational form of 
caudillismo, (2) the increased social mobility of the working class and ongoing urbanisation, 
and (3) the important conflict at the level of the upper and middle classes, creating a minority 
which feels insecure and threatened180. Foreign political decisions have also had a 
stimulating effect on the creation of diverse national-populist movements in Latin America. 
For example, the Organisation of American States dealt with the anti-democratic practices of 
Fujimori and Chávez, but said nothing about G.W. Bush’s anti-terrorist measures. The result 
in Latin America was that “… many populists have made their struggle against the clearly 
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self-serving US interference in the region a key part of their populist struggle of Americanismo 
181.   
Summarily, although there are some differences between the Latin American 
formulations of populism and the Western European formulations, there is at least as much 
variation among the different national (or regional) and historical formulations within the South 
American continent as there is among the different European formulations. Even though the 
policies pursued by many of the populist movements in Latin America clearly reflect one 
version of the essence of populist ideology, namely anti-pluralism and anti-elitism, they are 
nevertheless far removed from what most populist parties in Scandinavia would like to 
pursue. Especially the emphasis placed on the leader of the Latin American movements as 
a sort of ‘father-figure’, although he/she is cast more as a father to ‘the people’, than as a 
father to the nation, is much stronger than the one placed on the leaders of, for example, the 
Scandinavian movements. With our presumption that populism is a thin-cored ideology, we 
discover that rather than a difference in type of populist ideology, the variation is determined 
by other, often pre-existing, conditions that are rooted in the self-perception of the particular 
part of the population towards which the populists turn their attention. So, for example, fascist 
sympathies among key political players have been of longer duration within some of the Latin 
American populist movements than within the European movements. It seems to imply that 
the more stable democracies, in combination with the close-up experience of the defeat of 
European fascism in WWII, have been the conditions for the high propensity to distance ones 
movement from fascist ideology and any ideas remotely connected to fascism. Surely, none 
of the populist leaders in South America today would directly refer to their own policies in 
those terms, their predecessors occasionally did so in the past. While it remains true that 
European populist parties strongly reject the idea that they partially endorse fascist ideology, 
their policies are, undeniably fuelled from the same source. So why is this kind of hateful and 
exclusionary rhetoric and policies making a comeback in European politics? 
 
Belgian Separatists: Vlaams Belang  
 
We will now have a brief look at the separatist Vlaams Belang. In the case of Belgium, 
there is a presence of several types of populist parties. Indeed, the Vlaams Belang is 
traditionally a party with a strong nativism. When it was still acting under the name of Vlaams 
Block (before 2004), its declared three ideological pillars were conservatism, secessionist 
nationalism and solidarism. In the early 1980s the party embraced nativism and populism. Its 
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vision of ‘the Flemish people’, in its written party magazines, programmes and propaganda 
(2003 and 2004), is of a homogenous, morally just, possessive of common sense, honest, 
and industrial mass of people, and thus makes it clear that the populism of the party is strong. 
This is emphasized by the fact that, in the same party writings, one finds an image of a moral 
struggle between the Flemish people on the one hand, and 1) the francophone people in 
Brussels and Wallonia, 2) the asylum seekers and immigrants that have come to Flanders, 
and 3) the political elite, both on the Flemish and the Walloon side of the language barrier. 
The political elites, in the view of VB, are to be found at the sub-national, national and 
supranational levels and are portrayed as arrogant, corrupt, egoistic, incompetent, 
irresponsible, unreliable, criminal, cunning, and politically fraudulent. Indeed, the party 
describes established politicians as ‘bandits and swindlers’ and view the Flemish politicians 
as weak and submissive, whethereas they see the Walloon politicians as cunning and 
determined. They are, according to de Lange and Akkerman, more critical of left-wing 
politicians than of politicians from the right. The reforms suggested by the VB are institutional 
and include the abolition of provinces and senate, the election of mayors and OCMW council 
members as well as binding referenda. Furthermore, the party claims to be in favour of the 
trias politica - especially the division between judicial and executive powers-, representative 
parliamentary democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law182. However, as de Lange and 
Akkerman have shown, it is likely that the regard for liberal democracy and fundamental rights 
are only propagandistic tools, since many of their policy proposals go against these 
fundamental rights. What become evident by reading de Lange and Akkerman’s account of 
the Vlaams Belang, is that some main-stream parties, such as VLD and the SP have had to 
become more responsive to their voters’ preferences, more populist, or have moved towards 
the political right as a response to the campaigns run by the VB. It is also the case that the 
VB have been successful in bringing new issues to the political agenda, such as immigration 
and integration as well as law and order issues. They were less successful in gaining issue -
ownership over European integration issues. Finally, de Lange and Akkerman mention, as 
has often been done, especially in the Belgian case, that in Belgium, a true cordon sanitaire 
has been in place around the VB for decades. This unwritten agreement among main-stream 
parties to keep populist parties in general, and VB in particular, out of government has been 
a succsful tactic to limit the direct influence of populist parties on national policy-making, but 
has also worked in favour of further legitimizing the populist attack on liberal democracies. In 
terms of party organisation, the VB is strongest in and around Antwerp. It has 25,000 
members in a period when party membership is steadily decreasing, its members have 
tendentially never been politically active before joining the VB, as it campaigns in 
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neighbourhoods where the main-stream parties do not, or where they are no longer active. 
Moreover, the party runs a community centre in Antwerp where supporters can come to meet 
party officials. In addition, the VB organises many popular events, such as community 
barbeques and music festivals, not to mention party congresses that have a particularly low-
cultural appeal, as opposed to the high-culture of the establishment183. 
 
Le Pen and French nationalism 
 
Revolutionary France was different from the France that emerged after the revolution, 
when universalism was replaced by particularism and nationalism. Pierre Birnbaum argues 
that, unlike the loosely governed Prussian state, the centrally administered post-revolution 
France, was able to contain tendencies towards the mobilisation of identity and divisionism. 
Fundamentally, Birnbaum stresses the important distinction between holistic particularism 
and universalism as being what probes the ground for violent nationalism. Indeed, he refers 
to Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu when he writes that the doctrine of roots (doctrines de haine), 
allowed by nationalism has left space for Franco-French wars (guerres franco-françaises). 
Violent internal confrontations, pitting those who were engaged in the name of a culture 
proper to French identity, which they believe has been cemented by its long history of 
Catholicism against those who lean towards the universalist principles implemented at the 
time of the Revolution184.   Thus, the time of universalism had finished and was replaced by 
efforts to strengthen the national identity and unity. This was the environment where things 
like the Dreyfus affair could happen. During times of conflict, national identity is usually 
strengthened, as was the case in France during both World War I and II. France saw recurring 
‘internal’ conflicts based on nationality, such as the complications around de-colonisation, 
and in 1972, around the same time as many other populist parties in Europe, the French 
Front National (FN) was founded. The FN was initially a coalition of several, far right, groups, 
brought together by Jean-Marie Le Pen. The internal deivergence found its expression in 
internal divisions and conflicts. Its success began in 1983, when it won a local election in 
Dreux. Three years later, in 1986, it experiences explosive growth and obtained almost 10 
percent of the vote in the national elections, which gained the party thirty-five seats in the 
National Assembly. It continued to sway significant political influence in France over the next 
decades. Nevertheless, like in Belgium, a cordon sanitaire was constructed around the party, 
and it was never invited to be part of a governing coalition. Marie Le Pen has taken 
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considerable distance from those supporters of her father who were openly racist and/or neo-
nazi. This she has done at the risk of splitting the party irreparably. Her strategy seems to 
have enjoyed some success, as the party is now considered much more mainstream than 
before, and many who previously voted for the Left-wing, now would no longer feel 
uncomfortable honing up to the fact that they have voted for Le Pen at the Presidential 
elections in 2017. 
 
The Canadian Reform Party 
 
Canada, with the Reform Party of Canada’s successes in the 1990s, has seen the 
rise of a populist right-wing party with different characteristic to the US agrarian populist 
parties. David Laycock argues that the identities of both people and elite in Reform Party of 
Canada discourse were strikingly at odds with those understood in much of North American 
populist history and appeal has been vital to the Reform Party’s distinctive role in Canadian 
politics185. 
Laycock mentions the following reasons behind the sudden success of the Reform Party, 
especially in Western Canadian states. Western Canada has a long tradition of populist 
politics with strong western provincial leaders or national party leaders as spokesmen. The 
Progressive Conservative government had neglected western economy to the benefit of 
Ontario and Quebec. It also failed to satisfy right-wing conservatives’ desires for major tax 
and social spending cuts and for traditionalist approaches to social issues. Overall, the 
Reform Party of Canada won prestige after the rejection of the Charlottetown constitutional 
Accord in the 1992 referendum. During its campaign, the party argued that the agreement 
had been reached by members of the unaccountable political establishment behind closed 
doors. It was fundamentally against the conditions of the agreement on the grounds that it 
would have increased minority rights and increased consideration for special interests. The 
party specifically referred to native peoples, Quebec nationalists and feminists. The Reform 
Party instead portrayed itself as the voice of ‘the people’, that is, of the people that had not 
benefited from the social programmes or from the intrusive state presence because they were 
hard working, law abiding, and overtaxed, and because they were not members of the special 
interests. In other words, in perfect accordance with the most current definition of 
contemporary populism, the party is the voice of the silent and pure majority which is not 
being politically represented and which, therefore, has been exploited by the political 
establishment (and the cultural elites?) that protects the rights only of the special interest 
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groups. Laycock describes the dichotomy as presented by this party in the following way: 
“direct democracy/small state/pure people” versus “representative democracy/strong 
state/corrupt elite”. In terms of the extra-populist components of the party, they were 
essentially a typical post-1980 new-right party, proposing the decentralisation of power, tax 
cuts, ‘workfare, not welfare’, privatisations, no support for multi-cultural groups, less support 
for ‘welfare mothers’, harsher treatment of criminals, and elimination of pay equity 
programmes186. Thus, as case of the thin-cenetered ideology of populism combined with neo-
liberal economic ideas. Furthermore, they pushed for the employment of direct democracy 
on issues such as abortion, capital punishment, and gay rights, as well as (and this is a 
particular point which I haven’t come across elsewhere) provisions for the possible ‘recall’ of 
MPs. When the Reform Party entered an alliance with the other Conservative parties in 2000, 
and merged with Progressive Conservative parties in 2003/4, it took, according to Laycock, 
the former Reform Party away from both regionalism and populism. It eventually changed 
name to simply Conservative Party. However, I don’t quite agree that it moved them so far 
away from populism. Possibly, it rather took them away from their radicalism. After all, anti-
elitism persists in the Conservative Party. In 2004, the party leader, Stephen Harper, asked 
CP members – and the broader public – to imagine a ‘country of freedom and rights for 
ordinary people, taxpayers and families, not just for criminals, political elites and special 
interests. Even after 2006, when the Conservative Party was in government, “it continued to 
campaign against its own bureaucracy as one of the ‘special interests’ aligned against the 
people”. This, as we shall see, is one of the main points on which the Reform Party differs 
from Scandinavian types of populism. Indeed, most Scandinavian populist parties have not 
gone quite so far in their contempt for representative democracy (yet). The negative impact 
of the Conservative government, according to Laycock, has been that it has demonstrated 
its contempt for Parliament and minimized government accountability in a variety of ways. He 
further emphasizes the opportunism of the Conservative Party leadership: Indeed, now that 
the Conservative Party is the best organized, best financed, and most strategically adept of 
the national parties, and is running the least transparent and most tightly controlled 
administration in Canadian history, Manning’s interest in direct democracy has been set 
aside187. Thus, the Canadian Reform Party embodied most of the characteristics common to 
national-populist parties: a nationalist ideology, combined with anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. 
It even incorporated the populist rhetoric and criticism of the established representative 
political system. However, once the New Conservative Party had been formed, the former 
Reform Party leadership diverged from many of these points. These fundamental changes 
within populist parties is something we shall see again when discussing the Scandinavian 
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cases, and it supports the sense that populism is very often used as a tool to gain political 
influence, and then abandoned when it would isolate the party politically. In the case of the 
Vlaams Belang, a change of the national-populist line has not happened as a result of the 
risk of political isolation. Both Vlaams Belang and the Reform Party operated in a multi-
national setting, so this difference merits a closer study. Although the popularity of national 
populist parties in Western Europe has been steadily increasing ever since the European 
economic crisis and especially ever since the so-called refugee crisis became a real 
European-level concern, the last year has shown a more widespread acceptance of the idea 
that this type of party participate in government, whether in Europe or in America. A concern 
remains, which is the consideration that this tendency may rest more on the popular wish for 
political protest against the political system as it is in place, than on an actual preference for 
the political programs proposed by these parties. Although, if we accept to consider this 
possible explanation for their successes, we also introduce the danger of taking upon 
ourselves the assumption that the populations in many Western European countries are 
fundamentally ignorant of the political programs of these parties, or that they are simply 
irresponsible voters. This is a dangerous assumption, especially in an epoch in which civic 
education has been emphasized in schools. What remains to be seen is the impact in 
Scandinavia of the substantial increase in popularity of national populist parties in other 
Western European countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom. Will it help to 
consolidate the populist presence in Scandinavian politics, or will the even more radicalised 
national populism serve as a dissuasive factor? 
 
Conclusion 
 
Upon comparing theoretical studies of populism, the core of what makes a certain 
political program populist remains elusive. Some scholars point to the fact that the group of 
right-wing populist parties share immigration-sceptical attitudes, while others emphasize the 
wide extent to which populist methods and messages have been adopted by the mainstream 
parties – whether in opposition or in government-, others still emphasize that what unites 
populist parties on a global scale is their anti-elitism and scepticism of liberal democracy. It 
has even been suggested that the factor which connects populist parties is their tendency to 
have charismatic leaders who use politically incorrect statements to create sensationalism 
and/or a sense of threat or danger. When looking instead at some historical understandings 
of populism, we see that there is little connection between why the Russian populists were 
given that name, and the reason contemporary Western-European parties and movements 
are called populist. Besides the fact that the social, occupational and educational 
characteristics of the populations in question are very different, the very understanding of 
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what part of the population constitutes ‘the people’ which the parties or movements claim to 
represent has changed fundamentally since those days. In addition, the political goals of the 
Russian populists – although diverse within the wider movement – included the emancipation 
of ‘the people’. Is this more similar to the populist vein within the Green movements, or are 
their references to a completely different kind of emancipation? The Russian populists were 
tendentially pluralists, although they also reserved the most prominent economic and societal 
role to the peasants. Later, after the 1860s movement had been broken, the Russian 
populists began to aim at involving the urban working class, although with the same strategy 
as they used earlier. In the towns, among the workers, there was a stronger wish for quick 
reforms and terrorism as a populist tool picked up momentum for a while, before also this 
movement disintergrated and parts of it joined the Revolutionaries. Also the term ‘anti political 
establishment’ parties, or movements, is related to the phenomenon we are currently 
investigating. Indeed, the two kinds of political parties actually share one of their core-
ideological points which is that the current democratic order has failed and must be replaced 
by something radically different. And yet, as Matteo Truffelli has pointed out, it is exactly 
because of the progressive growth in the importance of anti-politics that many of the studies 
that have tried to isolate its characteristics and political- and cultural purposes, have ended 
up acting, or in any case concentrating the attention, almost exclusively, on elements of crisis 
that seem to characterise society and politics in contemporary democracies188.  Truffelli 
continues to connect this with the decline of bloc politics as we have know it from 
Westminister, but also from the Scandinavian countries in the three decades following World 
War II. The idea that there is a non-ideological core to the political programmes of the new 
populist parties has many adherents, some of whom are convinced that populism is merely 
a matter of rhetoric and of organising a political party for personal gain. Others adhere only 
partially to such a claim. Because, even if the core value, commonly shared among populist 
parties, is one of anti-political establishment, this has implications that define ideology. Who 
would claim that anarchism was not a type of political programme, even if that is not how 
anarchists would have liked to present themselves. The distance between a political 
programme and ideology is trial and error combined with negotiations. Furthermore, a 
possible distinction can be made between ideologies that lend themselves well to a 
negotiation- or discussion-based, democratic system of party politics, and those that do not. 
In the prior category, we would find the traditional five parties, although already the Royalist 
and the Communist ideologies sit more uneasily within this system than do the Liberal and 
the Social Democratic parties. Indeed, it may be claimed that Royalist and Communist 
parties, because their main objective is to fundamentally change the political organisation of 
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a country, are already performing a violence on their ideological basis in order to participate 
in modern party-based democratic processes. In other words, there have been anti-party 
parties throughout the history of parliamentary democracy, but what distinguishes these new 
populist parties is the fact that they have not (yet) opted for participating in political 
compromise, at least not at the level fo their own policy-aims and rhetoric. It may be argued 
that those of the new populist parties who have participated in government has compromised 
the principle of non-participation in established politics, but if one investigates further, one 
discovers that, while in government, they have always pursued policies in accordance with 
their fundamental principles, although the governmet decisions have usually fallen short of 
their real objective. While in government, these parties have also distinguished themselves 
by their willingness to go against the wider cabinet, with the result that they have often been 
the cause of the resignation of the government189.  
Premises are that we accept that the phenomenon may be best described as a 
particular form of national-populism; Particular in the sense that it is different from some other 
particular forms (maybe the main reason it is different is because of the fact that it has not 
had success in power yet – which distinguishes it very clearly from the present-day populism 
in South America and Nazism, and at the same time not so particular as to not include 
important ‘internal’ variations. Truffelli also discusses the fact that anti-politics, over the last 
three to four decades has become ever more central to political processes. It is faced with 
this fact that Geoffrey Mulgan, among others, has spoken of an anti-political age, which is a 
time marked by the unstoppable tendency of citizens to abandone the structure of modern 
politics that has become “irreparable damaged by social, economic and cultural 
transformations”190. One possible solution to the difficulties of avoiding this sort of prescriptive 
analysis, which doesn’t apply only to anti-political parties, but also to the type of populist 
parties we encounter in Scandinavia, is to follow Giovanni Sartori’s principle of so-called 
minimal definitions. Mudde and Kaltwasser, for their 2012 edited volume on Populism in 
Europa and the Americas, chose to follow this method, and in applying this principle to 
populism, they progressed in the following way. One of the crucial tasks was to separate 
populism from features that might regularly occur together with it, but are not part of it. For 
example, populist radical right parties in Europe share a core ideology of nativism, 
authoritarianism, and populism. All three features have a strained relationship with liberal 
democracy, but we are only interested in the effect of populism, even though, admittedly, the 
effects are not always easy to disentangle in reality. In a similar vein, scholars have 
convincingly demonstrated that populism in Latin America is compatible with both 
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neoliberalism and state-centred development. In fact, even contemporary Europe hosts both 
left-wing and right-wing populist parties191. They also observe that populism is different from 
clientelism. As Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson have recently pointed out, clientelism 
involves a whole organisational structure (mostly of informal character) in charge of both 
monitoring voter behaviour and delivering the expected goods to the clientele. One would 
have to take for granted that clientilists actually deliver on their promises, and that their 
promises demand the action or approval of third persons. We would like to conclude, as 
Mudde and Kaltwasser have done, that the best way forward towards a useful definition of 
populism is to follow a Sartorian theory of definitions, which distinguishes between intension, 
which is the better, more specifically defined, and extension, which is applicable to more 
cases. In Sartori, we also find the concept of ‘radial categorisation, which relies on 
Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance. Radial categories derive from a pool of features 
that, although not present in every case, are present to such a degree as to be significant. 
Next to the radial categorisation, Sartori also considers ‘classical categorisation’, which is the 
idea that all members of a specific group should share all defining variables. This is what is 
commonly known as the lowest common denominator and has the consequence of narrowing 
significantly the range of cases. Following the latter strategy, Mudde and Kaltwasser recalled 
that Margaret Canovan indicated that all forms of populism, without exception, involve some 
kind of exaltation of and appeal to ‘the people’, and all are in one sense or another anti-
elitist192. However, since Mudde and Kaltwasser themselves applied the criteria that a 
definition should rely on a defining feature, or combination of features exclusive to populism, 
also this element should be excluded as the basis of the definition, since not only populist 
movements are against the political power of a minority or several minorities. Unless, of 
course, what we wish to gain is a catch-all category encompassing so many phemonena as 
to include any political movement that shares this feature. Is that what they want? Although 
he runs a risk in assuming that Dutch domestic dynamics are mirrored elsewhere, Cuperus, 
nevertheless analyses a shared development in several of the welfare strongholds of Europe; 
several Scandinavian countries included. The disruptive effects of globalisation and the 
retrenchment of welfare states have been accompanied by fundamental changes in the party 
systems. The older mass parties that have ruled most of the region since the end of the 
Second World War – the Christian or Conservative Democrats and the Social Democrats – 
have lost members, voters, élan, and a monopoly on ideas193. The solution to the problem of 
Radical Right Parties in Europe, as Mudde suggests, is for the other, established, political 
parties, especially the social democratic parties that have lost many of their votes to the new 
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radical right parties, return to their ideologies and withdraw from the opportunistic path 
towards the middle which they have taken merely in order to reach executive power. Most 
social democratic parties have ‘forgotten’ about the workers and therefore do not address the 
immigrant question from an economic point-of-view, but rather from a cultural point-of-view 
which can either take a form similar to that of the Green parties, or to that of the conservative 
parties194. 
 
Part II: Contemporary National-populism in Scandinavia 
 
Many aspects of public, and private, life in Scandinavia, have laid the ground for the 
current political situation in the region. Scandinavia is a region, consisting of several different 
countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Iceland), but nevertheless with a strong sense of 
regional identity. This did not come about on its own, especially since history has not exactly 
consolidated the idea of Scandinavia of one mind, with international conflict more often than 
not, seeing Scandinavian countries on both of the opposing sides. Today, however, the 
domestic political landscapes in each of the countries share many similarities. One of these 
similarities has been a simultaneous occurrence of populist parties in several of the 
Scandinavian countries. 
In the Scandinavian countries, there has been a strong folkish tradition. The fact that in the 
1930s Germany, the words ‘Volk’ and ‘völkisch’ were used both by those who supported and 
those who opposed the fascists, is reflected in the words’ current use in Scandinavia. This 
was emphasized by the many pre-World War I social projects developed, mainly in Germany, 
but also elsewhere, and implemented in Scandinavia; such as the 
Danish/Swedish/Norwegian Folk, Folkeskolen, Folkehjemmet, Folkekarakter etc. The use of 
these terms was certainly promoted by the state. In the specific Scandinavian use of the 
terms ‘Folk’ and ‘Folkelig’ the connotation is not only a reference to the nation, the popular, 
the national, or simply the people. It is also, according to Guy Hermet, a reference to a 
mindset, a set of ideas and political tendencies195. This diverse use of the terms may indicate 
to the reader the extent to which ‘banal nationalism’ has infiltrated life in Scandinavia. In 
Norway, national dresses are worn every year for the midsummer feast and in Denmark, no 
party table is set without the presence of miniature national flags (Dannebrog) and no New 
Years Eve is passed without the compulsory Queens address and singing of nationalist 
songs. It is thus maybe not so surprising that populism in this part of Western Europe should 
be of the national-populist type. However, we shall try to deconstruct some of the historical 
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facts and popular ideas that have contributed to the emergence and transformation of the 
populist parties in Sandinavia, as well as identify the ideological influences that have shaped 
them. 
 
The ‘Saga’ of a Scandinavian Model  
 
The three Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, all became 
parliamentary democracies in the short period between 1884 and 1917, with the meaningful 
exception of Iceland, which had a kind of parliament in place alredy in the Middle Ages. The 
introduction of parliamentary democracy also meant the institutionalisation of political parties, 
which in Scandinavia, as in most other Central and western European countries, included a 
liberal party, a conservative party, and an agrarian party. In Scandinavia, however, we also 
find the peculiar construction called the Nordic Council. Norden (the Nordics) is a term used 
to signify five norther-European countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 
It is understood that the two countries under Danish control, the Faroe Islands and Greenland 
are included in this group. ‘Scandinavia’, instead is a term used to signify only ‘Scandia’, 
which is the Latin term for the three of those countries that had formed states in the middle 
ages; that is Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The three Home Rule territories within the 
Nordic region are Landsting in Greenland, the Lagting on the Faeroe Islands, both of which 
belong to the Kingdom of Denmark, and the Landsting on the Åland Islands, which is a self-
governing province of the Republic of Finland. In fact, modern Finland was under Swedish 
rule until 1809 after which it was under Russian control until the declaration of its 
independence in 1917. Iceland, on the other hand stayed under Danish rule until 1944. 
Besides this, Norway was ruled by Denmark between 1385 and 1814, when it was conquered 
by Sweden. Norway finally gained its independence in 1905. Both these terms are used in 
politically relevant ways today; especially by the native population of the relevant countries. 
Firstly, a special solidarity and striving for reciprocal aid and reliance for growth has been 
encouraged in those famous post-WWII days, when a bright future seemed to hinge 
exclusively on Europe’s ability to create an all-encompassing balance of power. In those 
days, and to some extent still relevant up until the height of the Credit Crisis a decade ago, 
is the fact that everyone at the time seemed to think that economic prosperity from 
international trade, and peace and stability were intertwined and reciprocally reinforcing 
factors. In line with this ‘faith’, a local initiative was taken in the Nordic region, to set up a 
regional council, the Nordic Council. The Council was instituted in 1952 and has helped lay 
the basis, for example, for a harmonised and free internal labour market. The idea that there 
is a special bond between the Nordic countries is fed to the citizens of these countries through 
what one might, paralleling the reasoning behind Michael Billig’s concept of ‘banal 
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nationalism’, rightly call ‘banal regionalism’. When students seek international experiences, 
they see their economic support upped if they choose to go to a fellow-Nordic country, or 
when filling in their tax-forms, citizens who have income from abroad see that there is a 
separate, simpler procedure for those who have business within the Nordic region. Although 
the power over the imagination that the concept of the Nordics as a virtuous corner at the 
outskirts of Europe once wielded over the minds of the region’s inhabitants has declined over 
the last couple of decades, and although it never received much external consideration, the 
Nordic Council is still an important organ internally in the region. This is where large-scale 
coordination of policies, but also the framing of the internal image of the ‘Nordic region’ take 
place. Scandinavian countries are know for a few things, but most prominently for what has 
been called the ‘Scandinavian model’. This term refers to different things, depending on what 
aspect of society one focuses. The most general use refers to the system of social welfare 
set up in these countries. Furthermore, the Scandinavian model implies a system of low-
intensity political conflict, because of a consensus-seeking political culture. The history of the 
introduction of the element of combination between political competition among parties and 
political cooperation at the level of government, was introduced in Denmark by an agreement 
among the leftist parties and the greens called Kanslergadeforliget, in Norway by the 
Kriseforliket in 1935, and in Sweden by Kohandeln in 1933. In Finland, something very similar 
was agreed in the ‘Puntamulta’ in 1937. Besides the political parties, also the main labour 
and employer organisations were represented during the negotiations. The scope and effect 
of these agreements were to integrate a universal welfare state with an efficient capitalist 
economy. The agreement of the left and the labour unions was achieved in exchange of a 
promise of social security to all members of society on such a scale that the purpose was to 
redistribute, in an equative fashion, the income of the state. The agreement of the right-wing 
and the employer organisations was achieved in exchange of a promise to keep wages low 
and protect the free functioning of the market economy. This culture of consensus-seeking 
has also translated itself into political procedures that discourage conflicts. The tendency 
towards political compromise can thus be seen in the large number of Parliamentary 
commissions - where ample representation of all interest groups is consulted -, wide public 
inquests and other cooperative practices. In Finland, the tendency towards corporationism 
exhibits itself in a different way, through the tendency towards wide, majority government 
coalitions that include parties from both the political left and -right. This was, historically, 
necessitated by the fact that until 1992 one third of the MPs in the Finnish Edescunta (67 out 
of 200) could postpone the passing of an act already approved by Parliament until the time 
they assembled again, the year after196. Furthermore, a two-thirds majority was needed to 
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approve tax decisions. However, after 1992, the situation changed. The constitutions in the 
three Scandinavian countries differ significantly, mostly because of the age of each 
Constitution. The oldest constitution is the Norwegian, from 1814, which has no mention of 
the principle of parliamentarism. The Danish Constitution, from 1953, has a plebiscean base, 
as it requires a binding referendum for constitutional changes, whereas the Norwegian 
Foundational Law requires a two-third majority in the Stortinget. Finally, the Swedish 
Foundational Law, from 1974, prescribes a procedure similar to the Finnish Constitution in 
order to effectuate Constitutional change, with two majority votes in the Riksdag with 
intermediate elections, thus significantly slowing down the process. In spite of the fact that 
the Nordic countries are believed to be very similar in terms of their political and social life, 
there are several important differences. For example, Finland has a dual system of parliament 
and, as in Iceland, presidential rule. In all the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway), the head of state is a monarch. Common to the Nordic parliaments however, is that 
a non-confidence vote against government in at least one of the (or two) houses of parliament 
results in the government stepping down, either by immediate resignation or by calling new 
elections. All five Nordic countries have parliaments consisting of a single chamber, and none 
of the countries have Constitutional Courts, although in Norway, there is space for a legal 
revision of Parliamentary sovereignty, exclusively by the ordinary courts. In spite of the 
exclusive power of Parliament, all the Scandinavian countries have witnessed the 
development of extensive decision-making powers rested in local government, thanks to the 
delegation of the administration of public funds destined to such diverse purposes as the 
maintenance of infrastructure, education and health service, not to mention social benefits. 
The electoral systems in Scandinavia are all based on the principle of proportional 
representation, inserted in fundamental legislation already in 1907 in Sweden and Norway, 
and in 1915 in Denmark197. This stimulates electoral participation and helps minorities to 
voice their opinions. Sweden has the highest minimal percentage for parliamentary 
representation (4%). In Denmark, for example, only 2% of votes are needed to gain 
parliamentary representation. This is another indication of the institutional belief in the 
cooperative strength of the system. The power of the political parties has increased over time, 
with the result that personal votes are, practically inexistent. In other words, you always vote 
for a national list. Indeed, according to calculations performed by Lane and Ersson, on the 
basis of Mackie and Rose’s as well as Bartolini and Mair’s methods, all the Scandinavian 
countries have a very high degree of proportionality of representation198. The Scandinavian 
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model is often used as an ideal social state model by persons and organisations that tend to 
the left on the political spectrum. In a certain sense, the introduction of welfare provisions for 
the more vulnerable part of the population for which Scandinavia is so well known, was 
another attempt by the elite to counter the sense of insecurity and uprootedness among this 
part of the population. Erik Damgaard tries to capture the image of Scandinavia: 
 
In a global perspective the Nordic countries traditionally appear as 
small, peaceful and homogenous modern welfare states with political 
systems that largely work through party compromises, corporativism 
and consensus. That picture emerges from a number of publications 
which are a bit dated and may be an overdrawn rendering of the 
message in more recent works, such as Einhorn and Logue (1989) 
and Elder at al. (1982). Nevertheless, if one inspects the details of 
contemporary Scandinavian politics then other, and perhaps less 
comforting, traits emerge… [W]hat still seems to be the general view 
of Scandinavian politics does not capture several important changes 
in the past two decades199. 
 
The Nordic Council, is a 87-member council, thus not an actual parliament. It cannot pass 
laws or sanction the implementation of tis recommendations. Its delegates are not elected by 
popular vote, but nominated by the five national assemblies and the three devolved 
assemblies. It has no chamber of its own, but does have several secretariats in the different 
Nordic countries. The actual council meets only once per year, for one week. Furthemore, it 
has a list of topics that conventionally are not discussed in the council. It has thus become 
conventional to preclude matters of security, defence and, invariably, foreign policy from the 
agenda of the Nordic Council. This convention arose to safeguard the so-called ‘Nordic 
Balance’. The Nordic Balance was the agreement among the Scandinavian countries to 
prioritize stability and peace in the region by, effectfully, splitting the alliances. Thus, during 
the cold war, when Finland was militarily linked to the Soviet Union by a Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, instead of creating tension with the neighbouring 
countries, Sweden prioritized armament in order to stay neutral, and Norway and Denmark 
were Nato members. It was clear enough to both Americans and the Soviets that, whatever 
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should happen, the Scandinavian countries would not engage their neighbours in combat. 
The Nordic Council attempted to control such issues as an atomic weapons-free zone, 
requesting that allies not bring atomic weapons into the region., although the Council’s 
weakness in terms of implementation and control were later evident when it was revealed 
that atomic weapons had, nevertheless, been present on and off in Greenland much later 
than that. In a real sense, however, the Nordic Council has been immeasurably more 
important an assembly than a review of its formal powers might indicate200. It has been a 
long-standing arena in which to express the string-felt connections between the member-
states, as well as a forum for exploration and experimentation, as the member states have 
continuously found new ways of collaborating. The council has a farly simple infrastructure, 
which reflects the structure of the national assemblies of the member states. It has 
specialised standing committees, the yearly plenary sessions, as well as party group 
meetings. Besides this, the strong percieved bonds between the Scandinavian countries, in 
large part caused by the similar history and constitution of the three countries, and partly 
because of the linguistic similarities among the three main languages and the exchange of 
cultural production which has resulted from that. All three countries have relatively small 
linguistic minorities (in the case of Denmark: German, in the case of Norway and Sweden: 
Lapponian). Why is there talk of a Scandinavian, and not a Nordic socio-political model? The 
particularities of the model, according to Lane and Ersson201, are in the constellation of 
national and local government, the party system, interest groups, and the economic system. 
Thus, maybe there are the real basis for maintaining that a specific Scandinavian model 
exists, even though there are many internal variations, both in the quality of the institutions, 
and in the relationship among these. Lane and Ersson defines the core of the model in the 
following way: “Its nucleus is a mixture of oppositional politics and compromise in which inter-
party competition places itself within the political and social cooperation”202.  But this definition 
completely overlooks how Finland has, possibly, been the most concensus-prone political 
system in the Nordic region. Furthermore, it overlooks the fact that all three Scandinavian 
countries are constitutional monarchies. Little doubt should remain that the social democratic 
parties in Scandinavia have enjoyed great and stable success. Arter worte in 1984 that in 
1983 the party could claim well over a quarter of the active electorate in Finland, just below 
and rather more than one-third of the vote in Denmark and Norway respectively and as much 
as 45.6% in Sweden. Only in Iceland has support for social democracy been relatively weak 
at under one-fifth of the total poll. The regional strength of the movement has been founded 
upon notably high levels of political cohesion among the industrial work-/ ing class. At the 
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Swedish general election in September 1982, for example, 72% of the industrial working 
class voted for the Social Democratic Party compared with only 8% of the blue-collar 
population supporting the Conservatives203. Parties that are national nostalgic, such as 
Dansk Folkeparti, often include in their policy programme a reference to the local Lutheran 
church, which in most Scandinavian cases means a state church, or People’s Church. This 
fact provides these parties with a large part of their historical pondus and creates a sense of 
historical continuity. For the state churches in question, the support by the populist parties is 
not unilaterally a positive instrument to be used in the attempt to reenter public life. It is likely 
to damage the image of the church, as the parties themselves are happy to approve, or even 
propose, laws that go against basic Christian ideas, such as the sanctity of life, generosity 
towards your neighbour and those in need etc. In addition, the fact that these parties, in 
several of the Scandinavian countries, are one of only two parties to even mention the 
Christian religion means that in the popular mind, the distinction between the opinion of the 
populist party and the opinions of the People’s Church becomes blurred. This may be of more 
severe consequence for the Chruch than for the Party, as the Party has much more space in 
the public media than the Church does, and since the Party members can, in a credible way, 
explain which part of Church life the Party identifies with, which is often solely the history of 
the Church as a national institution that has spoken to the people and unified the fragmented 
population. Everything else, for example the Church’s doctrine, does not need to be accepted 
by the party. Put in other, more exacting, words, the parties accept the Church as a symbol 
of the history and distinctiveness of their nation, but not usually as religious truth. 
Explaining the Rise and Transformations  
 
The Scandinavian countries have witnessed the typical distribution of the political 
parties along the left-right continuum, according to the socio-economic policy of each party. 
Fragmentation has increased over the last decades, especially since the mid-1970s. The 
interesting observation of the new parties that are now, or have since then been, represented 
in parliament tells us that they, rather than attaching themselves to one position along the 
left-right continuum, combine diverse and changing positions depending on which subject is 
being treated and the general political atmosphere. As the political orientations available to 
the electorate diversify, a siginificant number delineate from the traditional parties’ policies 
and reorganise themselves in a stable manner around the new parties. This is what Lane and 
Ersson call the dealignment and re-alignment of the electorate. All the Nordic countries have 
a relatively high number of parties represented in parliament, especially Denmark and 
Finland. The only exception is the Icelandic parliament, which has, generally speaking, had 
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4 to 5 parties in parliament. Tendencially, the three Scandinavian countries have seen the 
main political contrast between two coalitions; the social-democrats, possibly backed by 
another leftist party in the form of either a socialist, or a communist, party on the one hand, 
and the conservative party, necessarily backed by one or more centrist parties on the other 
hand.204 Also this coalition forming has changed character in most of the Scandinavian 
countries over the last three to four decades. What often happens, is that the new, mix-and-
match parties are left out of the initial coalition negotiations prior to the general elections, for 
then to be invited into which ever coalition eventually forms government. This, evidently, 
lends them a disproportionately high level of influence on government, since it is clear that 
government stands or falls with their support. We may add as a factor that the national-
populist parties in Scandinavia may have benefitted from the fact that the political 
establishment in each of the countries is relatively small. Afterall, there cann only be very few 
new faces in national politics every year in Norway, for example. The argument here is that 
the populist parties appear as the only ‘fresh’ members of the establishment, with the rest 
having already had their try at governing the country. This leads us to look at the behaviour 
of the members of populist parties when they enter parliament. At that point, their individual 
behaviour determines the fate of their party in parliament, but they must first solve the 
dilemma of whether to change their image to a less critical party, in order to get more direct 
influence and a possibility to enter government, or whether they wish to stay true to their 
voters, which often means being in perpetual opposition. As Mudde has suggested, many 
parties have imploded after their initial electoral success, unable to deal with the new 
pressures of parliamentary work and increased media scrutiny205. To this consideration we 
would add the concern of whether the parliamentary majority will construct a ‘cordon sanitair’ 
around the party in question. 
 
The Role of Economic Crisis and globalisation 
 
The Scandinavian region is known for its social welfare experiments. Especially 
noteable are the early introduction in Sweden of a universal pension system, and the post-
WWII social economic and financial reforms in Denmark. These, and numerous other welfare 
initiatives, have determined the picture of Scandinavia which, thanks to statistical research 
that places Scandinavian countries among the best and happiest countries to live in. What 
often goes unnoticed abroad, but is very much felt internally, are the consequences of the 
expensive welfare system in terms of economic and social crises. We shall consider these 
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superficially. The sort of paternalistic considerations that were presented by John Stuart Mills, 
are what have focused Danish parliamentarians’work on ‘improving day-to-day conditions in, 
for example, Greenland and the Faeroer Island, rather than aiming at their independence. No 
one would claim that the Greenlandic people belong to the same ethnic group, but since their 
community is seen as a ‘weak’ community, or a lesser, more primitive nation, the Danish 
state sees itself as the Greenlandic people’s ‘protector and patron’. In Denmark, especially 
one person has been identified as a sort of initiator of the extremely centralised control of 
industry and trade and simultaneous widening of the scope of the welfare model. That person 
was Jens Otto Kragh. The young Kragh joined the Social Democratic party and obtained a 
masters in political science. At 27, he was elected to parliament, but he was already a 
welknown member of the party and was, undoubtedly, the main author of the 1945 work 
programme of the Social Democratic Party, “Fremtidens Danmark”. The programme was 
much more radical than any preceeding programme, and ended with the following words: 
 
Should this task succeed, it will be well worth the while. The Danish 
people vil obtain not only material things, such as food on the table, 
clothers on the back and tools in hand. But also a social 
emancipation, a spiritual, cultural and moral redemption will follow in 
the wake of a well-organised economy – in line with the increase in 
wealth. Against the dark background of the war, a completely new 
people will grow up. A people who will feel ownership of the Country 
it calls its own, who will love it, and who, within the framework of 
increasing collaboration with other nations, can give the example 
from a country of democratic pioneering, from a Denmark for the 
people206 
The Scandinavian welfare model refers to the particular experience of the Scandinavian 
countries, especially in the decades following World War I. Early Scandinavian welfare 
projects were very similar to the Beveridge reforms in Britain. The precondition for the 
unfolding of these reforms was the ascent to governmental power of the Social Democratic 
                                                          
206 Translated by the author from: Social Demokratiet and Jens Otto Krag, “’Fremtidens Danmark’ – 
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parties. The peak of the reforms was in the 1960s and 1970s. Peter Baldwin writes about 
what made these developments so unique:  
These developments were noticeable for two things: first turning the 
state’s attention to a broad, all-encompassing series of risk and thus 
distinguishing  intervention here from those nations in which the state 
remained restricted to a more modest role, and second, creating a 
solidaristic, egalitarian, democratic alternative to the old-fashioned, 
socially conservative and hierarchical Bismarckian and Bonapartist 
version of social insurance for the working class207. 
Both of these features were later shared with welfare systems elsewhere, but at the time, the 
extent, rather than the initial idea, was groundbreaking. Bent Greve writes with a distinction 
in mind, between welfare states and welfare societies, without making explicit in what this 
distinction consists. It is true that one may have an instinctive, yet partial, perception of what 
the difference is between the two types of systems. He mentions that “[t]he Scandinavian 
welfare state has been characterised by its ability to make compromises between classes 
and different interest groups. Further, it seems to have been able to respond to citizens’ 
demands and changing needs. In this century the Scandinavian model gradually moved 
towards a universal type of welfare state with an all-encompassing state activity – in 
Beveridge’s words, ‘From the cradle to the grave. Bent Greve concludes that it is not really 
possible to give a single definition or description of the Scandinavian welfare state. However, 
some features can be outlined. The main one in Scandinavia is universality. Greve explains 
the universality in the Scandinavian model in the following words. Traditional Fordist model 
of welfare: participation in the workforce was the prerequisite. Over time, the need to provide 
for workers who were ill and/or their relatives increased. In fact, these systems were built 
differently in different countries which would cope with the increasing problems of the 
workers208. The basis for the consensus necessary to set up this elaborate system was the 
old social pact between workers, employers and the state. The welfare system such as it 
stood in the 1960s and early 1970s was the result of slow developements. Furthermore, the 
Scandinavian model has had to respond, and therefore transform, to changing political 
wishes over time. For example, for a period, everyone was guaranteed a fairly high standard 
of living, even if unemployed. Over the last decades, however, there have been severe cuts 
to transfer incomes, in favour of investment in education and health care. This has been the 
famous ‘backlash’ of welfare. Nevertheless, it seems that the Scandinavian economies have 
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managed to come out on the other side, with some damange to the social tissue, which it is 
difficult to directly ascribe to the changes in welfare, but with a stable economy. The 
Norwegian situation here is a bit different because of its decade-long high income from its 
oil-industry, which has been invested, rather than spent, allowing the country more space for 
maneuvering its budget spending. One of the factors that has made the maintenance of the 
Scandinavian model possible, has been the small size of the population and the high sense 
of national pride, without which, not many state would be able to sustain support for 25% 
standard VAT, and taxation on fatty foods. Real social conflict appeals little when you are a 
member of such a small community, because of the real risk of social exclusion. 
In all the Scandinavian countries, there is a dual income taxation system; meaning that 
taxation on private income is higher than on capital. Nevertheless, both types of income tax 
are among the highest in the world. The tax systems in Scandinavia are, in general designed 
to be equitable, following these criteria: everyone should be guaranteed a fair level of income, 
all families should be sustained economically, income should be distributed, but it should 
always pay to find a job. Although income taxation and duties remained numerically the most 
important ways of financing welfare in the Scandinavian countries in 1996, the level of 
reliance upon other ways of financing these policies were very varied among the 
Scandinavian countries. The welfare backlash has resulted in a rethinking of government 
spending, resulting in privatisations, but also in a decreased quality of the health care system. 
The question is how the approach to welfare will be in the future, whether it will persist, or 
whether it will succome to pressure from an aging population and sustained immigration209. 
The Scadìndinavian countries have, in general, been able to switch to the so-called 
knowledge economy in pace with industrial jobs being moved abroad. However, the part of 
the population which had reached middle age by the time globalisation had ransacked most 
of the Scandinavian industry, were left behind. Although they were offered re-integration 
schemes, many felt alienated and discarded. This, together with the lenient position taken by 
the trade unions, has fed the resentment among these people against the political 
establishment and the trade unions.  
We may conclude that the economic crisis, which also influenced the Scandinavian 
countries, in a certain sense appealed to the unity of the nation, in as much as a sense of 
common purpose arises from acknowledging that one is in a situation of crisis. The appeal to 
personal sacrifice for the purpose of sustaining the welfare state through this difficult time 
permeated in government awareness campaigns, and largely, the populations accepted cuts 
in government spending without too much fuss. On the othe hand, however, the standards of 
welfare that the Scandinavian population has been used to, easily creates consensus around 
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national-populist policies of restrictions to immigration, and increased taxation on large 
companies and managerial jobs.   
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The Role of Increased Immigration 
 
Literature about the success of both national-populist, but especially radical-right 
parties in Western Europe almost always include references to ‘the problem of immigration’. 
The importance of this issue to the founding and later development of these parties is 
emphasized by the fact that it very quickly became one of the main concerns of the 
Fremskridtspartiet in Denmark. In fact, already in its 1973 programme do we find mention of 
what they frame as a threat to the Danish population. The object of the concern was already 
at that time, not the fact that other ethnicities lived in the country, but that too much Muslim 
immigration would threaten the survival of the native population because of the high fertility 
rate among this group of immigrants. It is true that there was a voluminous immigration, 
especially from Turkey at that time. The two main arguments as to why immigration was a 
threat were the following: 1) immigrants – especially the women who were brought to the 
country as wives of work-migrants - who are illiterate and do not speak the Danish language 
will not work and will, therefore, receive social benefits. This would put too high a strain on 
the universal welfare economy in the country 2) our culture will be under threat when there 
will be more Muslim inhabitants than ethnic Danish. The second argument presupposes that 
a sort of multicultural integration policy would be applied. The problems, as percieved by the 
Scandinavian populists, regarding increased immigration actually is combined with the 
national autonomy crisis, not only in the context of European integration. Immigration is 
percieved as a problem at three geographical levels: The European-wide and the nation-wide 
levels are joined by the third, Nordic-wide, level. The recent European refugee problem has 
also created problems within the otherwise harmonious relationship between Sweden and 
Denmark, where the open border between the two countries has become a political ‘hot 
potatoe’ that the populist partie sin both countries like to speak about, but that none of the 
governments wish to resolve. The problem is that Sweden accepts considerable more 
refugees than Denmark, and very quickly provide them with a residency permit. With this 
permit, the asylum seekers are allowed to move freely into Denmark. The Dansk Folkeparti 
has complained loudly about this arrangement. For example, another Dansk Folkeparti 
member, who is also part of the Danish representation in the Nordic Council, Henrik 
Brodersen, 24th of May, 2017, asked the Danish Immigration and Intergration Minister the 
following question:  
 
Does the minister think it is a threat to the Nordic cooperation that 
Sweden has a very different view of immigration from the third world 
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from the view of the rest of the Nordic countries, since they indirectly 
impose troubles and expenses on their neighbouring countries? 
 Continuing his explanation, we says:  
The reason that I bring this up is precisely that Sweden, over several 
years, has worked as flypaper to immigration from the third world... 
because there have been some very, very lenient asylum rules etc. 
That which worries me is exactly that they... indirectly also become a 
country of transit to the rest of the Nordic region. 
And finally the real concern is that it has been so destructive for the noble regulation we have 
had since the 1950s, that Nordic citizens may travel freely within the Nordic region, without 
having to show identification etc. This is then destroyed because they have had, in my eyes, 
a failed immigration policy. I also think about the terrible developments in Malmø, where there 
are sometimes war-like conditions, and it is only just over on the other side. When, at the 
same time, one knows how easy it is to get asylum in Sweden, and thereby become Swedish, 
and thereby become a Nordic citizen so that one can travel freely to the other countries; then 
I think it is cause for concern210.    
In more general terms, there are, according to Hechter, two ways of solving problems 
of ethnic conflict and assimilation: ‘assimilation’ or ‘nationalism’. Assimilation would happen, 
according to Hechter’s theory, when minorities are frustrated because of isolation from 
national culture. Education and socialization would solve the problem of for example ghettoes 
and culture(s) of poverty. Hechter claimed instead that the core will exploit the periphery. 
Nationalism instead, occurs where “the cultural division of labour leads individuals to identify 
themselves with their groups and contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic 
identification.”211 For these mechanisms to kick in, certain conditions must be in place. For 
instance, the economic inequality must be systematic and visible, and there must be social 
awareness of the situation in combination with a shared definition of the situation as being 
unjust. In the case of immigrants in the different Scandinavian countries, there are some 
differences from country to country. For example, immigrants in Sweden have, as a 
government policy, been encouraged to spread out over the whole country. This has ensured 
a fairly quick integration of, for example children into the education system. In Denmark, on 
the other hand, this process has been much slower because the first immigrants, in the 
1970s, were work immigrants, and would thus go to live near their work. 
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The Role of European Integration 
 
The Nordic Council’s precedent was the Kalmar Union in the 14th century. This short-
lived union was formed when Denmark, Norway and Sweden, including Greenland, Iceland, 
the Faroe Islands were under the rule of the first female regent in Europe, Margareth I, regent 
of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The attempts at bringing the administration of Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden closer together by writing a constitution failed miserably when 
arguments about which type of political union should be forged, either federal, or cooperative 
proved difficult to settle. When the initiative to found the Nordic Council was the remeniscent 
outcome of the failure of a Swedish initiative in 1948 to a Scandinavian Defence Union.212 
Also other attempts were made, for example, at organising a Nordic Customs Union. An early 
achievement of the Nordic Council was the reaching of a Free Labour Market Agreement, 
already in 1954. This agreement, over the years, has helped about 2 million people to work 
outside their nnational borders. For nearly twenty years, however, regional co-operation 
mainly involved regular meetings of Nordic parliamentarians: indeed, until the 1970s the 
Nordic Council was the only institutional expression of the undoubtedly strong sense of 
regional affinity felt among the Nordic peoples. There are limited forms of inter-governmental 
co-operation which date back to 1914, when regular meetings of the Nordic Foreign Ministers 
were first organised. Between the wars, the Ministers of Social Affairs and then Ministers of 
Education did likewise. The Nordic Council of Ministers was founded in 1971. This was to 
remedy the length of the period that typically passed between a recommendation was issued 
and its passing into national legislation. The council of Ministers meets frequently, and its 
decisions are binding on member-nations, unless parliamentary acceptance is required. 
Already with the idea of a necessary connection between the primordial character of 
nationality on the one hand, and sovereignty as deposited solely in the nation on the other 
hand, we run into problems with the Scandinavian cases. The Scandinavian countries share 
the Nordic Council, which the national-populist parties support, at least to a much larger 
extent than they support NATO or the European Union. This should be in contradiction to the 
nationalist ideal, as well as the populist ideal, since it, effectfully alienates sovereignty and 
adds another, more distant layer, of representational democracy.  
The Nordic Council’s standing committees are subject-specific. In terms of 
institutional resources, the Nordic Council, and especially its standing committees, have been 
delegated more than even the standing committees of both the Danish and the Finnish 
national assemblies. It is interesting also to note that the party mechanisms within the Nordic 
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Council and its standing committees has enjoyed increasing formalisation. It is interesting to 
note that most political parties of all the member countries are represented in the Nordic 
Council, but also that they are organised, not only according to their national belonging, but 
to their political orientation into the five party groupings: The Social Democratic Group, the 
Conservative Group, the Centre Group, Nordic Freedom, or Liberty, and the Left-socialist 
Green Group. At the moment, the vice-president of the Nordic Council is the Danish Mikkel 
Sjøberg Dencker, a member of the Dansk Folkeparti. All of the developments to enlarge and 
refine the Nordic Council have been costly, and have given the Scandinavians a sense of 
dejavu, in respect to European integration. In addition, the level of familiarisation, and 
therefore of trust, among the citicens of the Nordic countries is much higher than the trust 
Scandinavians have in the other European countries. We may then, cautiously entertain the 
idea that the complications in the European integration process of the Scandinavian countries 
is partially due to these factors. Denmark acceded to the European Community in 1972 
whereas Finland, Norway and Sweden, at that time, signed only Free Trade Agreements with 
the Common Market. In the case of Finland, this was because of its commercial agreement 
with the Comecon countries.213  
In Norway, the discussions around the accession to the European Community and 
the negotiations around the European Economic Area and EFTA were direct causes of the 
difficulties of the established parties to create a stable majority government. Thus, as has 
happened so often in Scandinavia, in 1987, the Bundtland government in spite of having lost 
its majority. The Labour government was forced into varying allegiances, with both the left 
and the right, not to mention the populist Progress Party. After an unsuccessful attempt to 
form a non-socialist government in 1987, the minority government stayed in place until the 
1989 election, where a Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party 
coalition failed to get the majority and had to invite the Progress Party to be an external 
supporting party to the coalition. Hilmar Rommetvedt has studied the dynamics of this period 
and writes: “In the autumn of 1990, however, the Syse government had to resign because 
the parties in power could not agree on Norway’s attitude to the negoatioations between the 
EC and the EFTA concerning a European Economic Area.” The affair led to a government 
crisis, and already in November, Bundtland became prime minister again214. These days, we 
often hear mention of Brexit as the first real case of a country opting out of the EC after having 
joined it. However, in 1982, in Greenland a local referendum showed that 52% of the 
Greenland population were in favour of giving up membership of the European Community. 
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Greenland had, in 1973, already joined the European Economic Community as part of 
Denmark, but when Greenland gained homerule in 1979, they opted out of the EU. The 
causes of the scepticism in Greenland were two: the fear that the Inuit-speaking Eskimo 
population would suffer from too large fishing quotas granted to fellow European countries 
and that the Inuit lifestyle was threatened by the Europen Union ban on seal imports. It was 
felt that, if these communities were to feel welcome in the European Community, the 
European Community should ‘hold out a helping hand’215. Mudde and Kaltwasser show us 
that outside intervention against populist developments strengthens the populist claim, and 
they give some examples: The double standards of the European Union – violent reaction 
when Austria saw coalition between FPÖ and ÖVP, but said nothing when Berlusconi formed 
coalition with Gianfranco Fini’s National Alliance and Umberto Bossi’s Northern League. The 
result was that in Austria “many right-wing people rallied behind the government mainly to 
protest the perceived illegitimate and hypocritical EU interference”181. 
 
The Decline of Parties in Scandinavia 
 
The relatively high election turnout in the Nordic countries, David Arter wrote in 1984, 
allows parliament to reflect the will of the people, in terms of support for party programmes. 
However, he warns, the internal selection procedures have led to the creation of a political 
establishments which is more like a social elite. The system thus is formally representative 
and yet, it provides populists with arguments to attack its representativeness. Ideally, of 
course, the mediation of the opinion of the electorate, should not depend on one’s social 
position. Nevertheless, there is a case to be made also in favour of representatives using 
their intellect and ideals of ‘national interest’ when serving the voters.216 
In the Scandinavian countries, there never was much support for a classical 
conservative party, whereas the rural-based liberal parties were the stronger for a long 
duration of time. In Iceland, however, in 1929, a liberal-conservative, Independence Party, 
with the main goal of achieving independence from Denmark, was founded. The Social 
Democrats, on the other hand, managed to boost their proportion of the electorate in the 
1960s, through moving further away from Marxist rhetoric. This made them the pronounced 
catch-all parties, bridging most social divides. If Western Europe, as Arter and Werner-Müller 
sustain, has entered a ‘post-political’ or ‘post-ideological’ era, the decline of political parties 
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affects the wellbeing of the representative democracies in this part of the world. This point-
of-view is supported by the studies that have shown how Scandinavian parliamentary 
systems are suffering from the decline of the political party as an organising and initiating 
entity in the representation of wishes of the voters217. The decline of political parties in 
Scandinavia has been comparable to that in other parts of Western Europe. As government 
financial support has decreased, parties have taken less social tasks upon themselves. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, the electoral systems in the Scandinavian countries secure 
a low threshold to enter parliament and as a result, parliamentbecomes more fragmented 
and it becomes more difficult to form majority government. Moreover, the much higher 
frequency of minority governments this has led to in Scandinavia, has in many people’s 
opinion crippled the strength of governments to implement political reform. In terms of their 
own organisational structure, some authors claim that populist parties thrive without a stable 
party structure. However, many populist parties have traditional party organisations of their 
own (Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and Fremskrittspartiet in Norway), while others run a very 
tight ship and prefer a small organisation they can easily control (Partij van de Vrijheid). We 
thus, at least in the context of political movements that seek to become represented in 
parliament, dismiss this idea. It is quite different when we speak of populist protest 
movements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is often stated that populist movements, as a rule with few exceptions, cope badly 
with taking part in government. In support of this argument, two main supportive statements 
are used: 1) that these movements usually create instable governments and cause untimely 
elections and, 2) that they usually loose the support of a significant part of their electorate 
after any spell in government. Studying and comparing the Scandinavian cases of Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway may provide a more nuanced view of the objective problems these 
parties, or movements, actually experience as coalition partners; whether they are in 
government or in opposition. Another point often made by those that attempt to discredit 
populism as a widespread protest movement is, as the Social democrat René Cuperus puts 
it: “Their aversion to traditional party structures deprives them of political machines built 
around “cadres” that enable a degree of continuity and consistency in programs. 
Furthermore, the strong leadership that often comes with populism does not necessarily 
mean ‘politics of personality’. People want leadership without loosing too much time on 
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democratic participation themselves, and without having to be confronted with lots of political 
dilemmas.  
The problem with immigration in Scandinavia is the homogenous culture that has 
prevailed in this, rather remote, corner of Europe. The few colonial initiatives in the distant 
past never brought significant numbers of persons with different traits to this part of the world. 
The contemporary populist parties in Scandinavia have all been founded in the period 
between the early 1970s and today. They did not all start out as anti-immigration parties. 
Although the anti-immigration stand has been taken by the national-populist partis in 
Scandinavia, we cannot, as Cuperus attempted, reduce the political program of all populist 
movements and parties in Europe to the following: “halt all new immigration and compel old 
immigrants to adapt or to assimilate218. This is further complicated by the anti-immigration 
stance which traditionally liberal parties, and even some social democratic parties, have 
adopted.  
Hilmar Rommetvedt points out that the general level of conflictuality in a national 
society also influences the conflictuality within parliament and, occasionally within 
government. The latter is only more frequently the case in countries that are known for their 
coalition governments, such as the Scandinavian countries are. He gives the example of the 
positive correlation between the number of working days lost on the one hand, and the 
number of dissenting remarks noted in the Storting on the other. It should be noted that he 
uses the measure of industrial conflicts although he does not in turn prioritize explaining the 
contributing causes of these conflicts, such as the oil crisis, which might also have had a 
more direct influence on the number of dissenting remarks in parliament. Hilmar 
Rommetvedt, while explaining the impact of societal conflict on the level of dissenting 
remarks in parliament, remarks that the largest increase in the number of dissenting remarks 
presented in parliament came especially from two of the new parties in Norwegian politics, 
the Progress Party and the Socialist Electoral Alliance, and that the munber of remarks 
decreased after 1977 again. He links this decrease to the fact that the two parties had lost, 
or decreased their representation significantly. Rommetvedt’s theory, however, does not 
explain the long term rise in dissenting remarks219. There is thus a general tendency towards 
parliamentary conflict.  
What arises from the study of the changes in the parliamentary systems in the 
Scandinavian countries performed by Damgaar et al. is a picture wherein there has been a 
move away from politicians concerning themselves mainly with the economic situation of the 
country and of specific social groups, and with the economic consequences to the individual 
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of government decisions, towards a race in which introducing ever more aspects of the life of 
the individual onto the political stage assures a good electoral result. This expansion of the 
range of politically laden aspects of life, has increased the level of political conflict. The 
question is what has caused what. Is it the introduction of non-economic concerns in the 
policies of the new parties, which are more conflict-prone than the old established parties for 
questions of visibility on the side of the new parties and for questions of maintaining an image 
of willingness to compromise on the side of the established parties, which, together with 
simultaneous, international developments - such as the rapid developments of European 
integration and the refugee crisis - has increased the level of political conflict in the 
Scandinavian countries? Of particular relevance, and something which could be investigated 
in future studies, is how the populist parties have contributed to this development by their 
transformation from agrarian/libertarian parties into social-nationalist parties. Anders 
Sannerstedt and Mats Sjölin put it niftily when they wrote that 
  
The traditional image of Sweden is that of a “consensual democracy”: 
political debate being concerned with matters-of-fact and having few 
ideological overtones, and decision-aking having the form of frequent 
compromising rather than heated conflict. Today, this image of 
consensus is less salient, although political negotiations continue to 
be of great importance220.  
These words might as well have been written about any of the other two Scandinavian 
countries. What could also be said about any of the Scandinavian parliaments during this 
period is that historically there have always been two stable political blocks, with the Social 
Democrats and their left-wing supporting parties on the one hand and the Liberal and/or 
Conservative party and its right-wing supporters on the other. This two-block constellation 
has been changing ever since the EU debates started carving up the political field according 
to other criteria. This is where the populist parties come into the picture. Although some of 
them started out as libertarian parties, thus on the far right of the political spectrum, their 
move towards a combination of socialist welfare policies combined with nationalistic and 
patriotic imaging makes them a clear example of the fact that politics is no longer only divided 
into left and right, but also into nationalist and internationalist politics etc. 
 
Contemporary Populist Ideology in Scandinavia  
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Unlike Italy and Germany, the Scandinavian countries have enjoyed centralised 
government and administration for a long time already. This has contributed to promoting 
national pride and the popular belief in the nation as being, if not primordial, then perennial. 
Moreover, we have seen how ‘banale nationalism’ is reproduced on a large scale in the 
Scandinavian context and we know that populist parties exist in the region. Some of the 
parties have been successful, others less so. We must now turn our gaze to these parties in 
order to understand, first of all, what kind of populist party they are, and have been. If they 
are national-populist, we will try to understand why, and if not, we will try to understand why 
not. This we will do by looking at the history of the parties in question. Furthermore, we will 
try to identify which have been the most important influences on the parties. Finally, we will 
also consider the success of each of the parties and try to understand what has caused it, or 
what has undermined it. In this process, we will keep the following in mind: The peasantry of 
Europe has changed significantly since the time of the narodniki in Russia and the American 
Populists.  
In Scandinavia, as in other Western European realities, based on their largely rural 
societies, there were, traditionally three types of political parties before 1970; an agrarian 
party, an orban-based liberal party, and a moderately right-wing conservative party. In the 
very early phases of the mobilisation of a mass electorate in the late nineteenth century, a 
non-socialist Left, an alliance of peasant farmers and a few urban intellectuals had opposed 
the Right, a loose union of officials, senior clergy and industrialists based in the towns and 
capital cities (there are interesting comparisons here with the contemporary leadership of the 
academics in the populist raznochintsy movement in Czarist Russia which was also founded 
on groups of urban intellectuals defending the peasants’ interests). The Right remained 
predominantly town-based; the ‘old Left’, however, split. The urban intellectuals formed the 
core of the Liberals, leaving the farmers to found their own party, which they did successfully: 
on two occasions in Finland, in 1929 and 1962, the Agrarian Party, maalaisliitto, was the 
largest single party. However, a steady decline in the size of the farming population, 
accelerating after the Second World War, led the agrarian parties in the 1950s and 1960s to 
re-name themselves Centre parties with a view to adding an urban string to their bow. 
Incidentally, although interest-specific farmers’parties never emerged on any scale in 
Denmark and Iceland, the Agrarian Liberals, Venstre, in Denmark and the Progressive Party, 
Framsóknarflokkurinn in Iceland have relied above all on agricultural support.”221 Although 
the Danish Venstre once was an outspoken agrarian party, it has let its past image go, in 
favour of a simpler, Liberal stance. 
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Indeed, in Europe, the socio-economic profile of the peasant has changed 
dramatically with the automatization of rural production. As a result, rather than referring to 
the needs of real, present-day peasants, the populist parties in Western Europe, such as the 
Dansk Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark, now appeal to the rural populations that have been ‘left 
behind’ as industrialisation, automatization, and globalisation has taken hold of all facets of 
production - rural or urban. Their new electoral base are thus the industrial workers, those 
who work in the public sectors that are under pressure from liberal, neo-liberal, and socio-
democratic governments, such as health and education professionals, those who work in 
sectors that are under pressure from (work) migration, and lastly, the unemployed. We will 
also consider the presumption that many of the populist parties loose support once they join 
government. We may, on the one hand, consider that some of the populist parties, such as 
the People’s Party of Denmark and the Swedish New Right, not to mention the Italian Fascist 
party itself, did not loose the support of the electoral base after joining the government. Is this 
a sign that they have been successful in re-inventing their own image from a protest – to a 
responsible party? On the other hand, we acknowledge that populist parties that have policies 
which are irreconcilable with governing, or where their electorate will immediately recognise 
them as corrupt if they join government, will loose their electoral base as a result. Anders 
Hellström analyses the three main national populist parties in Scandinavia, the Swedish 
Sverigedemokratarna [SD], the Danish Dansk Folkeparti [DF], and the Norwegian 
Fremskrittspartiet [FrP]. He investigates the communicative strategies employed by these 
three parties in order to obtain support for their policies. He concludes that the SD and the 
DF “used national myths to attempt to cross the threshold of credibility,” but that the FrP did 
not, in their party programmes, appeal to national myths222. This begs the question of why 
the FrP does not make the appeal to national myths while the other two parties do. The 
following section will help us understand more about the types of populist parties all three 
parties belong to. 
 
Denmark: One Party, Two Leaders, and Their Apparently Conflicting Political 
Orientations  
 
Before looking at the contemporary populist parties in Denmark, some general 
observations about the political history if the country are necessary. The Kingdom of Denmark 
became a constitutional democracy in 1849. Several movements were operational, with 
broad bases of support in both urban and rural communities. For instance, in the cities, the 
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national-liberal movement was operational. Niels Finn Christiansen writes about the 
movement that it,  
 
created organisations not of the workers but for the workers, with 
representatives from other classes. The aim was a double one: first 
to solve some very obvious social problems and secondly to mobilise 
the workers to support bourgeois or petit-bourgeois political causes, 
to create a sort of mass basis for the political élites in the towns and 
cities223. 
 
Also the farmers put a lot of energy into their social organisation, but looked on the urban 
labour movement with scepticism, preferring to organise their own activities in the revivalist 
movements. Certainly, this was part of the protestant, nationalist ethics. The revivalist 
movements in all the Scandinavian countries were a very important factor in the early 
formation of democratic political awareness. In spite of the popularity of Grundtvigianisme 
among the independent farmers in Denmark, this particular revivalist movement, which 
encouraged political involvement, did not reach out to the lower rural working class. This 
social group was much more often reached by the Indre Mission. Within this religious 
community, political involvement was considered harmful to salvation. The revivalist 
movement thus served both to mobilise politically, and to pacify the poor, rural workers.224 
One of the causes supported by the revivalist movement was the nationalist cause of re-
conquest of Slesvig-Holstein from Prussia. The underlying civilizing idea behind the national-
liberal movement, was to keep the working class occupied in holesome activities and simple 
educational engagements, so as to mold responsible and civil persons from those individuals. 
Although not at the forefront of their declared objectives, the idea that one day the working 
class might participate in elections, most likely, underlay their ideas. Within these 
organisations, cooperatives were established, but, foremost, the organisers worked to 
educate and instill a nationalist ideology among the workers.225 The socialists, upon finally 
entering the political arena, made these liberal organisations their main target, accusing them 
of passifying the proletariat and of trying to mobilise them for causes that lay outside their 
interests (and, some came to argue, in contrast with their interests). When, what we may call 
the Bildingsbürgertum split in the 1870s, with the more radical democratic wing splitting off to 
join, first Venstre, and later to ally with the Social Democrats. On the other hand, the remnants 
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of the National Liberals, the landed aristocracy, and parts of the urban petit-bourgeoisie 
formed Højre, and the political landscape had changed, never to transform back. Reality was 
now a two-sided struggle about the contents of political democracy. In this process, the 
socialists, the third political grouping, were effectfully pushed out of active politics for a while, 
confronted as they were with an unreceptive rural proletariat and, as mentioned above, a 
large part of the urban working class were organised in non-socialist organisations. As a clear 
minority they had the choice between organising in clandestine, revolutionary groupings, or 
ally with the democratic left in the struggle for democratic rights. In fact, the socialist 
movement had illegal status for a period, and its supporters were openly accused of being 
strangers to the Danish nation and illoyal in nationalist questions.226 They eventually chose 
to enter the democratic political arena, allying themselves, first with Venstre in order to secure 
parliamentary democracy, and then with the newly founded Radical Left (Det radicale 
Venstre) of 1905. Thereby, they completely integrated into the democratic system, and they 
slowly transformed into a typical Social Democratic movement. 
The focus on nationalism in Denmark was thus present already from the outset of 
parliamentarianism. Another aspect of Danish democratic politics which, as we have already 
mentiones shortly and shall elaborate on further, has persisted over the ages, is the tendency 
towards compromise social and political compromise. In fact, the particular social and/or 
political structure of Denmark in particular, with each social class organised under its own 
representative group, never allowed one party to have a comfortable majority and, therefore, 
the ability to implement policies without having to compromise with the other social classes. 
Finally, the absence of a strong socialist movement in Denmark left a lot of room to the social 
democratic party.227 An interesting fact is that in Denmark it was the Social Democrats who 
tried to spread socialist knowledge, although they only accepted “the economic analysis of 
the laws of capitalist development and never the political implications, nor the Marxist concept 
of the state.” They believed that a democratised state would be able to transform capitalism. 
In fact, they quickly accepted the state as mediator in social conflict. In 1899, after a long-
lasting conflict, the September-forliget [the September Agreement] came into place. This was 
the agreement between the workers unions, the employers, and the state. The agreement 
was that two central workers- and employers- organisations would always sit at the 
negotiation table together with a representative of the state. Indeed, as another example of 
how compromising and alliance-building across social divides have been a persistent 
element of Danish political history, was the fact that the Social Democrats were happy to form 
an alliance with the ‘capitalist’ Venstre for as long as it took to achieve the extension of the 
franchise to women, servants and the lower working classes. This happened in 1915, after 
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which their alliance with Venstre dissolved and the two parties became the real political 
opponents. Especially, the first three decades of the 20th century were dominated by the 
‘battle for supremacy’ between these two former allies. In 1953, a parliamentary reform led 
to the abolishion of the Landsting, and parliamentary power has since been vested 
exclusively in the lower house [Folketinget]. 
Denmark is known for having frequent (extreme) minority governments. By extreme 
is meant that the government represented only a very small number of seats in Folketinget. 
Government formation after the 1973 elections was especially challenging and chaotic.228 
The outcome was a liberal minority government, based on only 22 of the 179 seats in 
Folketinget, but that was not the most significant novelty. The first populist party in Denmark, 
Fremskridtspartiet [DFrP], entered Folketinget for the first time, with no less than 28 
delegates. The party had been founded by the tax lawyer, Mogens Glistrup, in August 1972, 
after a short appearance on television in which he declared that he had been able to pay zero 
income taxes. Not even he expected his party to be so successful in the elections and, 
effectfully, had to, at the last minute, go and recruit additional delegates. If we are to define 
the type of party it was, we must use vocabulary such as ‘libertarian’, ‘popular’ and ‘grassroot 
organisation’. The party, at the outset only really have one objective: to diminish taxation, and 
all its other policy points were an effect of this. One of the provocative suggestions he made 
in those years was to dismantle the Department of Defence completely and put it its place an 
answering machine with the recorded message ‘we surrender’ in Russian. In more 
constructive terms, the policies of the party during the first years were the gradual abolishion 
of income tax, the dismantling of bureaucracy and the majority of the civil service, as well as 
the simplification of legislation. 
In the following elections, in 1975, the DFrP lost a few seats due to internal disagreements 
about the stance on collaborating with government, which was a Social Democratic minority 
government. In the years following this election, Glistrup incorporated an anti-islamic stance 
into his policy. He quite literally stated that one of his porposes was to have Denmark free of 
‘Mohammedanes’, a term forged by Glistrup himself. He kept scrutinizing public spending, 
and on one occasion explained his theory of why public spending had been increasing 
exponentially:  
 
Parliament is controlled by organised interests because pressure 
groups finance the leading parties and in consequence expect 
Folketing delegates to push excessive group demands for increased 
expenditure.’ The increased subordination of the legislature to 
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corporate interests, according to Glistrup, had contributed 
substantially to Denmark’s poor post-war record of economic 
management.229 
 
Over the first years of the existence of the party, Glistrup decided to include what some call 
anti-immigration stances but others would call scepticism of multiculturalism, which was in its 
hayday during the mid-70s, in the party programme. Glistrup had already won a large 
audience during his anti-tax campaigns, but with the new turn, with his outspoken critique of, 
and contempt for especially muslim immigrants, whom he famously called 
“muhammedanere”, or muhammedanes, he managed to reach an even wider audience. 
While Mogens Glistrup was in complete control of the party programme at the beginning, 
during his spell in prison for tax-evasion, some of the other party members, and especially 
Pia Kjœrsgaard, gained a strong leadership position within the party. A split within the party 
was inevitable, and the result was that Pia Kjœrsgaard, together with a few other prominent 
former members of the Progress Party, founded Danks Folkeparti, or the Danish Party of the 
People. This party is often referred to as Danish People’s Party, but this does not render 
justice to the Danish understanding of the prefix ‘Folke-‘, which means ‘of the people’.  
Since the Danish parliamentary system is highly proportional, Folketinget has hosted 
a high, and increasing, number of parties, especially after the so-called new politics, which 
followed in the wake of the earthquake elections of 1973. In fact, another minority government 
followed in the 1978 elections. This tendency of short-lived, minority governments continued, 
and yet the DFrP was not invited to support the government. 
When one such minority government resigned, in 1982, the so-called ‘clover’ 
government came to power. It was yet another minority government consisting of 
Conservatives, Liberals, Centre Democrats and the Christian People’s Party representatives, 
and enjoying occasional support from the Radical Liberals and the DFrP. Surprisingly, the 
outcome of the next two elections was to confirm a Liberal-oriented minority government on 
the basis of varying alliances. In short, at least between 1971 and 1992 but possibly even 
longer, no guaranteed, majority coalition formed government in Denmark. One does well to 
remember that these were the years in which the major increase in public employment as 
well as increase in taxation and welfare provisions exploded. Although minority governments 
were common also before 1973, the volatility of the external supportive alliances increased 
noticeably. So much, in fact, that they are the most frequent cause of the fall of government.230 
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Returning to the DFrP, Mogens Glistrup was sentenced to three years of 
imprisonment for tax fraud in 1983. During his absence, a deputy, belonging to the more 
pragmatic faction of the party, Pia Kjaersgaard, took over leadership of the party. On her 
watch, several agreements were made with government and when Glistrup refused to second 
the agreements upon his return, he was withdrawn as an MP by the party he had founded. 
Disgruntled, Mogens Glistrup ended up leaving the party to start another party, 
Trivselspartiet. The internal disagreements did not end there though, and in 1995, a group of 
DFrP MPs, led by the former nurse, Pia Kjaersgaard, broke away from the party, forming 
instead the Dansk Folkeparti. In 1999, Glistrup was invited back as the leader of the party, 
but he made such offensive statements against muslims, that the other MPs, by then only 
four, left to form yet another party, the Frihed 2000. In the 2001 election, the DFrP had lost 
almost all its backing and could not muster enough support to enter parliament.231 
We should not forget that ‘banale nationalism’ is still influencing the daily lives of the 
Danes, and is by no means confined to the national-populist party. An interesting case of a 
historical event being used to forge a sense of integration with the natonal history is the 
filmatisation of a mini-series about the second Dano-Prussian War in 1864. The build-up and 
progress of this war has been depicted in the Danish, statefunded, TV series “1864”. The 
series, rightly, points out the strong nationalistic feeling that spiralled out of proportion when 
the past greatness of the Kingdom of Denmark and the victory of one military battle against 
Prussia were taken as signs of the invincible Danish fortress. The national history books 
depict the 1864 defeat as something unexpected and unjust, whereas, with a minimal sense 
of military realism, the outcome was very much predictable at the hands of the much superior 
and more numerous Prussian forces. Nevertheless, the nationalistic inspiration of several of 
the most influential Danish political leaders, their idea of the superiority of constitutional 
monarchy, and their belief in the Danish people as chosen by God, contributed to a sense of 
potency and infallibility of the nation. This is just one of the historical events, anecdotes and 
founding myths that are regularly invoked in history books, TV programmes, tours of historical 
sites etc. 
Returning to the DF, we note that the party has, generally done well in elections and 
are, at present the second larges party in parliament with 37 mandates out of 179. To find 
out a bit more about the policies of the party, as well as the rhetorical style it emloys in its 
promotional material, we read the current Programme, written in 2009. The opening 
statement sets the patriotic tone: “Denmark is the land of the Danes. The continued existence 
of our little country as a stable democracy is depending on that our population-mix will not be 
changed to an extensive degree.” Then it goes on to suggest local solutions to migration 
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problems and famine.  About the population in Third World countries it states that “they can 
only obtain stable conditions through adopting significant cultural traits from the Westerm 
World, i.e. liberty, democratisation, equality, knowledge, economic reforms and a reduction 
in the population growth.” The tone is really quite spiteful when it says that  “…we do not want 
to be forced to accept the immigration of people who despise the cultural principles that have 
created our country and who cannot provide for themselves.” We also recognise that the 
party perceives immigration as a threat to the societal structure as such: 
 
The redistributive principle and the idea of equality behind our welfare 
model is completely incomprehensible for most cultures… There is 
no logic in changing our society radically, so that the standards of 
living are adapted to people who fled or migrated from the standards 
of living that they have at home. It is not Denmark that is in the wrong, 
it is not Danish culture or societal structure that is in need of change 
– if that were the case, so many people would not be trying to come 
here and to get a residence permit.” In this latter comment, we 
recognise the construction of the idea of a ‘heartland’.232  
 
As an introduction to their political programme, the current leader of Dansk Folkeparti writes 
the following: “I Dansk Folkeparti er vi stolte af Danmark; vi elsker vort fædreland, og vi føler 
en historisk forpligtelse til at værne om landet, folket og den danske arv. Med denne 
forpligtelse følger nødvendigheden af et stærkt forsvar samt trygge og sikre grænser. Kun i 
et frit Danmark kan landet udvikle sig efter folkets vilje”233. This seems to be a reference to 
what Billig mentioned about the effects of permeating signs of ‘banal nationalism’; a feeling 
that one has the right to a sense of familiarity and security within the national borders, based 
on the idea that all other Danes share ones own values and traditions. It seems to almost be 
a question of the nation as extended family. That the parties try to appeal to the common, 
reasonable man-on-the-street is evident in what Peter Skaarup said at the Dansk Folkeparti’s 
annual meeting in September 2013: “’In recent years there has been much discussion of a 
culture clash [Kulturkamp] and the ‘Danish values’. I think this debate has often been too 
abstract and too academic. In reality, I prefer to talk about ‘the struggle for common sense’ 
or ‘the struggle for common decency’. It should pay off to be a decent citizen and take 
responsibility for one’s own actions. It should pay off to endure training and feed oneself by 
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means of honest work – for everyone, both the Danes and the foreigners. These are not 
extreme opinions’. It is sound politics at the centre!”234 
The feeling of connectedness with the other Scandinavian nations is, as we have 
seen, an unusual feature of the DF world-view. At the same time, DF is a nationalist party in 
a multi-national realm, which includes both Greenland and the Faeroer. An illustration is the 
question which Henrik Brodersen (DF), asked the Danish Minister of Culture, Per stig Møller, 
on 23rd of October 2017. In his question, Brodersen shows concern because, in his opinion, 
the Danish Broadcasting service had not been screening enough televisison programmes 
from the other Nordic countries, or the other countries within the realm. 235  So far, DF has, 
by any standards turned out to be a very successful party. Its electoral base has shown to be 
stable, if not increasing. In addition, many of its proposals have, usually after vivid public 
debate and some revision, been passed. For example, Denmark now has a ministry 
dedicated to immigration and integration and a ban on forced matrimony, the so-called 24-
rule. Dansk Folkeparti proposed amendments to the Law on Parliamentary Elections to stop 
members of Folketinget who are residents elsewhere in the country from receiving an 
accommodation allowance for the purpose of purchasing temporary accommodation in the 
Capital. The idea behind this proposed law was clear as day; to hit the “élite” where it hurts 
the most.236 Eventually, the amendment was passed with a unanimous vote in favour. On 
numerous occasions, Dansk Folkeparti’s parliamentary group has proposed amendments to 
the Criminal Code regarding the definition, abolishment of, or punishment for ‘hate speech’ 
free of punishment.237 It is an interesting contrast to their wish to otherwise increase 
punishment for other criminal acts, such as their 2005 proposal to put the burning or 
desecration of the Danish national flag, or the scuffing or ridiculing of Denmark, at a par with 
similar treatment of other nations and their national symbols.238 Finally, the former party 
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chairman and founder of the Dansk Folkeparti, Pia Kjœrsgaard, is the current Speaker of 
Folketinget.  
 
Norway: Lange’s legacy  
 
Also Norway got a parliamentary system early on, in 1884. However, the principle has 
developed through practice alone and has never been written into the Constitution. In fact, 
article 1 of the Norwegian Constitution grants the King the authority to select the members of 
his council among all Norwegian citizens qualified to vote. This thus conflicts with the 
Norwegian constitutional common law.239 In Norway, the Labour Party was dominant for 
many years. It gained a majority in the first elections after the end of World War II, and stayed 
in a majority government position until 1961, with Einar Gerhardsen (PM: 1945-51 and 1955-
63) and Oscar Torp (1951-55) at the helm of government. Changing, sometimes right wing 
and/or minority governments followed, the first of which was the third Gerhardsen cabinet 
which stayed on in spite of being a minority government. Labour government was interrupted 
only by a Conservative, Christian, Centre Party and Liberal coalition which lasted only a few 
weeks in 1963. In the 1965 elections, the right-wing coalition gained a majority, and the fourth 
Gerhardsen cabinet stepped down. The liberal cabinet, headed by Per Borten lasted until 
internal disagreement on EC membership forced its resignation in 1971. When the right-wing 
parties failed to form a new government, the cabinet-formation was left to Labour to form 
another minority government which lasted until a referendum was held on membership of the 
EC. The result showed that the majority of the Norwegian population wanted to stay out of 
the EC, which was clearly against the political stance of the Labour Party and, in effect, a 
vote of no confidence not by parliament but by the Norwegian people. After this, a right-wing 
minority coalition government was constructed around Lars Korvald but this time without the 
Christian People’s Party. After this time, although mostly in a minority position, the Labour 
party stayed in government until 1981; effectuating cabinet and PM changes according to 
internal Labour dynamics. After 1981 a Conservative one-party government based on the 
majority this party created in parliament together with the Centre Party and the Christian 
People’s Party. The result of the 1985 elections meant that the Progress Party entered 
parliament with two pivotal seats. This was far form the initial electoral success the Dainsh 
sister party had the same year, but what the party lacked in initial success with the electorate, 
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it made up for later.With the support of the FrP MPs, the conservative government could stay. 
Thus, the moment the party entered parliament, it was much discussed and could exert 
influence on government policy from the outset. But the happy union only lasted until 1986, 
when the FrP joined the opposition in a no confidence vote, paving the way for another Labour 
minority government, headed, for the second time, by Ms Gro Harlem Brundtland. In 1989, 
when a right-wing coalition received the expressed support of the Progress Party, the second 
Brundtland cabinet resigned. During 1990 however, the government headed by the 
conservative party PM, Jan P. Syse, “had to resign because the parties in power could not 
agree on Norway’s attitude to the negotiations between the EC and the EFTA concerning a 
European Economic Area.”240 The third Brundtland-led cabinet was the result. Norway, at 
least until 1992, had never had a Centre-Left coalition government, although that would have 
secured such a government the majority in Parliament.  
Norway is an important oil – and natural gas exporter. During the 40s and 50s, the 
Labour Party was the parliament strong-man. The historian Jens Arup Seip even called 
Norway a ‘single-party state’ during this period. Even if such a statement is an incomplete 
reconstruction of the party dynamics during this period, it is certainly a witness to the strength 
of the Labour Party. The Labour Party lost its majority in the Storting in 1961. When, in 1963, 
the new Socialist People’s Party withdrew the support of its two MPs on a matter of a no 
confidence motion, the Labour Party prime minister, Einar Gerhardsen, was forced to step 
down. From then onwards, although governments were generally majority governments, they 
were all coalition governments. The big electoral changes started only after the 1972 
erferendum on EC membership. The voters response was negative (53,5% against joining 
the EC). In December 1972, the New People’s Party, consisting of the 8, of the 13 Liberal 
Party MPs, who had not been willing to join a Liberal anti-Marketeer government, was formed.  
Already in the 1960, the political agrarian agitation, Anders Lange, had been trouring 
the country with his ideas of the minimal state. It was only, however, in April 1973 that Anders 
Lange established his ‘minimal state’ party which, following the model of the DFrP, founded 
by Mogen Glistrup, wanted minimum state intervention and drastic cuts on taxation. Also in 
Norway, like in Denmark, the general election of 1973 saw the fragmentation of the party 
system. The elections brought about the introduction of three new parties, at the expense of 
support for both the Labour Party, which lost 12 seats, and the Norwegian party with the 
longest history at the time, the Liberal Party, which lost 11 seats, leaving it with only 2 seats 
in the Storting.241 In the period following the 1973 landslide elections, the Conservative party 
increased it’s support from 17,4% in 1973 to 31,7% in 1981. The Conservative party lost 
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significant numbers of votes in the elections after the 1987 local government elections, but 
over the whole period, the most significant decline was the one of the Labour Party, which 
had controlled 48,3% of votes in 1957, but which only swayed 34,3% in 1989. 
Fremskrittspartiet, on the other hand, gained 12,3% and 13,0% in the elections in 1987 and 
1989.242 
Anders Lange passed away within a year after having established his party. After his 
death, his party adopted a new name. The FrP is a libertarian party, and very similar to the 
DFrP. The programme of the FrP has consistently mirriored that of the DFrP: significant tax 
cuts, less bureaucracy, and market liberalism. It even adopted the anti-immigration message 
of the Danish sister party. The FrP was initially placed behind a cordon sanitaire, partially 
because of its populism and partially because the government could afford to leave it out. As 
we remember, the Danish minority governments were not in a position where they could 
completely ignore the DFrP mandates. The electoral support of the FrP has been steadily 
increasing, at least until the party entered government after the 2013 elections. What has 
characterised the party’s time in government, has been its focus on symbolic cases that 
created a disproportionate amount of press coverage, but would have little impact on people’s 
everyday lives. It is very interesting to observe how the public opinion is much less tolerant 
in Norway than in Sweden, in terms of anti-immigration and other, potentially hurtful 
remarks.243 See for example the case where the FrP Minister of Justice, Sylvi Listhaug, in 
March 2018, was forced to resign as a result of having written a comment which some thought 
would be hurtful to the relatives of the victims of the Utøya attack. In the comment she 
accused a labour party MP of being more concerned with the rights of terrorists, than with 
national safety. The media storm was fierce, and she chose to resign. 
 
Sweden: Populist Parties in Passing  
 
The founding of a national-populist party in Sweden, the Sverigedemokraterna [SD], 
came significantly later than the founding of the DFrP and the FrP in Denmark and Norway 
respectively. Furthermore, the connections between the party and the other Scandinavian 
national-populist parties has been much less intense. The general political history in Sweden 
is very similar to that of Denmark in terms of the struggle for the socialists to loosen the hold 
of the protestant churches and the revivalist movements on the poorest social strata. While 
Sweden had the first Liberal government, more precisely in 1913, the world’s first universal 
pension system was introduced in this country. The scheme was financed by the introduction 
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in the same period of taxation of individual income. The need for the pension scheme was, 
according to the economist Andreas Bergh, more determined by the comparatively extreme 
old population in Sweden. Almost 1 milion Swedish citizens, usually young adults, had 
emigrated most frequently to the United States.244 In Sweden, the important social agreement 
was the Kohandeln, or ‘the horse-trade’ from 1933. In this agreement, the Agrarian party and 
the Social Democratic party agreed on an exchange:  the Farmers supported the Social 
Democratic policy for dealing with the economic crisis, while the government increased 
support for the farmers.245 A political difference between Sweden and Denmark was that 
Sweden had a Communist party, while Denmark had not. The result was that political 
agreements with the opposition were easier to make in Dansh politics than in Swedish. 
Nevertheless, the Social Democrats in Sweden also sought the alliance of the liberal party in 
order to increase the pressure for universal suffrage. Also in Sweden, a long period of Social 
Democratic rule (44 years), ended, around the time of the Danish and Norwegian landslide 
elections, more precisely in 1976. What followed were the well-known short-term 
governments. Also in Sweden there has been an increase in the number of written 
reservations in the committee reports, indicating more political conflict. 246 (It is interesting 
thaht these authors do not mention anything about the new populist parties and how these 
may have influenced Swedish parliamentarism). In their own words, “Sverigedemokraterna 
is a social-conservative party with a nationalistic foundation.” Thus, in other words, a national-
populist party. The party sees the preservation of the welfare-model as the way to improve 
society. The programme even mentions explicity, that the party aims at “combining the best 
elements of the traditional rightist- and leftist- ideologies.”247 Under the heading ‘Demokrati’, 
they write about their support for more instances of direct democracy at local, regional and 
national levels. But they also spend many more words on explaining the following:  
 
Democracy means government by the people and 
Sverigedemokraterna’s opinion is that the word ‘people’ in the 
concept of ‘government by the people’cannot be ignored and that 
government by the people may, in the long run, become very 
problematic to maintain in a state inhabited by several peoples, since 
it does not possess concensus about whom to include among ‘the 
people’ and since there may not even be a common arena for debate 
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because the residents of the state do not speak a common language. 
We do thus view the creation of a shared, national identity among the 
population as one of the fundamental cornerstones in a strong and 
well-functioning democracy.248 
 
The idea of the nation as being homogenous, sharing a space and a language with 
eachother. It is regrettable, that the programme does not include the intended strategy for 
instilling the national identity among the population. Here follows an example of SD’s 
inconsistent socio-economic policy suggestions. In terms of increasing social welfare, they 
wish to significantly increase A-kassan’s contribution to the recently unemployed to 1200 
Swedish Kronar, during the first 100 days, and 800 kronar after that. They also want to make 
this insurance free for all. This, together with the fact that they wish to increase the defense 
budget and reinstate compulsory military service, means that if the party is to have any say 
in government, the overall budget for public spending would have to increase significantly. 
Regrading the safeguarding of the environment, they do not wish to have any increases in 
the level of taxation on driving, including petrol- and car taxes. In short, the only thing that 
they would wish to save money on is the help for developing countries (U-lands hjem). This 
policy of increased public spending is in sharp contrast to the Norwegian FrP’s libertarianism, 
as it would have been to the DFrP if it had still existed. However, the policy is more similar to 
the socio-economic policies of the DF that also see the safeguarding of the welfare system 
as a way to, ultimately, safeguard the national identity. To the youth-organisation of the SD, 
mentiones that it wishes to bring to full fruition the possibilities offered by Nordic collaboration:  
“We see ourselves, in order of importance, as a part of a Nordic, a European and a Western 
state. In line with this, we will work simultaneously to strengthen the Nordic identity as well 
as broaden and deepen Nordic collaboration.”249 The website of the youth organisation is 
also more explicit about what the party understands by Swedish identity. “Swedish identity is 
generally constructed on the fact that one sees Sweden as one’s country, Swedish as one’s 
language and Swedish culture, history and traditions as part of one self.” They also express 
their wish to, one day, see the implementation of a similar test to the Danish 
‘medborgerskabsprøve’.250 It is interesting then that the national-populist party which, 
historically, has the most clear roots in fascism, is the one that now promotes this sort of 
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‘open swedishness’. Indeed, after the party was founded in 1988, the political establishment, 
but also the media, refused to cooperate with the SD.251 
In the landslide election of 1991, two new parties gained representation, one of which 
was the Ny Demokrati [NyD]. NyD was a party that took the FrP and DFrP as models. It was 
in favour of curtailing immigration, tax cuts, cuts on public services and increased 
opportunities for direct democratic participation. The party’s success was shortlived, as it 
already exited the Riksdag in the 1994 election. After the 1991 election, the political 
establishment on the political right could have chosen to cooperate with the new NyD. 
However, they preferred to form a four-party minority government instead. A pattern thus 
seems to develop which indicates that the political elite in Sweden, and to a smaller degree 
in Norway, seek an active policy of keeping the national-populist parties out of government 
office and, in the Swedish case, even out of a cooperative position.252 
 
Conclusion: Scandinavian national-populism - Separate, yet the same 
 
Before making the comparison among the Scandinavian national-populist parties, we 
shall see how these parties compare with the first manifestations of populism and 
nationalism. From the Narodniki, current national populist parties in Scandinavia can be said 
to have inherited the agrarian ideal society, as well as the perception that the country of origin 
is somehow ‘on a different path’ than the rest of the western world, and finally that it’s ‘native’ 
population has some special, internal sense of what is right and just – in the latter exhibiting 
an almost religious belief in a moral hierarchy within the human species. 
It is the lack of an appeal to violence which is the main distinction between the national 
– populist parties in Scandinavia today on the one hand, and the fascist movements of post-
WWI Western Europe on the other. Undoubtedly, they have similar ancestors though, and 
thus share the hatred of foreigners, foreign influences, liberalism as well as their advocacy of 
strong leadership. They are not all largely oriented towards the past, rather than the future.  
Where they differ is in the lack of glorification of violence (possibly explained by the small 
size of the national populations and economies of these countries), anti-Semitism (explained 
by the events of the WWII, which is still a point of “glory” for the Scandinavian countries due 
to their official neutrality,) the resistance (which all of a sudden was tripled towards the end 
of the war) and efforts to help the Jews (in Denmark and Sweden, the trafficking of Jews 
across the canal in the night before the planned apprehension of the majority of Danish Jews 
has become national myths). Moreover, the national enemy is no longer to be found among 
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the neighbouring countries, but in the European Union, which embodies the idea of the 
exploitative and bureaucratic, impersonal, democracy, with its highly educated elite which 
corrupts the efforts of the “real” citizens. Finally, there are no expansionist pretences in the 
core party programmes of these parties. This is most likely because such ideas would in any 
case cause self-harm during a process of retraction from the European Union (with the 
economic damages this would cause), and because such plans would have to be backed up 
by internationally recognised power – something which, in respect of German and Russia 
(the most obvious borders across which to extend are either with other Scandinavian 
countries, or with these two countries). It is also true that the Scandinavian country which has 
had an empiricist history, Denmark, has spent the last centuries trying to carefully balance 
the costs and benefits, not to mention the ethical questions related to governing non-national 
territory.  
None of the Scandinavian national-populist parties have geographical expansion as 
a serious part of their political programme. However, some of them, Denmark and Sweden, 
deal with issues of muliticultural states. What is interesting here is the fact that in this case, 
so when they may reasonably consider themselves an accepted political force within their 
national political system, they distinguish between the ‘other’ in terms of the other cultures 
(linguistic and cultural) that are represented within the nation because of the inclusion of their 
native geographical areas in the ‘mother state’, and the ‘other’ as immigrants and refugees.  
As regards the ‘banal nationalism’ which one may witness in Scandinavia, it includes all 
aspects of life; in Denmark it is everything from the traditional birthday song with its 
accompanying small national flags that greet each individual on the morning of their birthday, 
over the traditional ‘burning of a witch’ on mid-summer night, to the rutine reference in 
talkshows and TV programmes to “us, the Danish” or “the small kingdom of Denmark”. 
Besides these everyday signals, there are proper institutions and projects of nationalism. 
Again about Denmark, there has been a very significant increase in the amount of the national 
broadcasting agency’s budget for programmes about national history. An interesting point is 
that the nationalist feeling in Scandinavian societies, but also in other Western countries is 
nowadays far removed from nationalist intellectuals. It is not acceptable to adhere to the 
political doctrine of nationalism, but its practices live on in the best of health. This has meant, 
with the political link officially removed, more people feel free to continue national symbolism 
than ever before, and they have taken the absolute priority all over the political spectrum (with 
the only exceptions being the communist and other Universalist ideologies). No political 
movement is thus needed in order to maintain nationalism as a political program, it is simply 
integrated, not at the level of political goals in party or movement programs, but as a basic 
assumption of a communal goal, which is beyond reproach and attack. So, what we have 
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seen in Denmark, and partially also in Sweden, is the sort of national revival thought of by 
Anthony Smith, but it doesn’t fit entirely within either lateral or vertical ethnic promotion. 
Ernst Gellner’s argument that it is modernism, with its urbanisation, social uprooting, 
intra-class competition and breaking of traditional social ties which makes the invention of 
nations necessary in contemporary states. In Smith and Hutchinson’s words; “If the 
newcomers resemble the old inhabitants and share their culture, the conflict remains purely 
social, a case of class conflict. But if they differ in terms of language, customs, religion and 
pigmentation, cultural and ethnic conflict is likely to ensue. The newly urbanised peasants 
and workers who experience discrimination tend to heed their co-cultural intelligentsias and 
secede from the polity, to form a new nation of their own. As a result, nationalism creates 
new nations on both sides of the divide.”253 In other words, the confrontation with other 
cultures and nations reinforces our definition of the ‘other’, but also of our own identity. The 
process in Scandinavia is complicated by the extra layer of Nordic internationalism. From 
what we have seen, it is typical for members of the national-socialist parties in Scandinavia 
to create an image of other Nordics as a kind of extended group of co-nationals. That 
Scandinavia, as a region which incorporates Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland, 
compels a lot of feeling of companionship and belonging even down to the level of each 
individual is certainly because of the shared linguistic background of the whole region. 
Nevertheless, all the parties are either immigration sceptical or anti-immigration, emphasizing 
the differences in culture as the reason for exclusionist policy suggestions. The communality 
of this background is sustained through initiatives by the Nordic Council’s Cultural Secretariat, 
which has been successful in obtaining the agreement of the different national broadcasting 
services to show a certain amount of hours of television, either in the language of one of the 
other Scandinavian countries, or about one of the countries. Furthermore, at the traditional 
Folk High Schools, youth and pensioners may indulge in singing each morning from the 
Danske Hoejskole Sangbog, by now an indispensable item in most Danish homes, which, 
with some exceptions, consists of nationalistic or Protestant songs from the three main 
Scandinavian countries, with the occasional song in dialect as well, so that the population 
may get to know, and try their best at pronouncing, all of the languages and dialects of the 
region. As Paul R. Brass mentions, elites may use nationalist sentiments as tools to achieve 
their political goals. The relevant elites may also be the national-populist party leadership, 
which can choose to emphasize or downplay ethnic differences during periods with differing 
exigences. So, for example, the leadership of Dansk Folkeparti chose to change their tune 
regarding the regulations for foreign immigrants with medical or social service training to have 
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their diplomas recognised by the Danish authorities, when the country turned out to be in 
severe shortage of social service workers and nurses. 
The images utilised to reinforce national sentiment in the Scandinavian countries are 
by no means restricted to the use made by the national-populist parties. The national-
populists seem to promote ‘lateral ethnies’ in the sense of the image of a ‘golden age’ and a 
return to ‘romanticist images of nature’. However, they are not the only source of such 
images. On the contrary, this sort of nationalist romanticism seems to be part of a much wider 
social code in Scandinavia. There have been intensive national revivals against other states 
in the past (Sweden against Denmark; Denmark against Prussia; Norway against both 
Sweden and Denmark). Possibly the difference this time is that the revival is posed against 
‘internal enemies’. Hutchinson’s idea that conflicting ethnic repertoires that are inevitably 
present in any nation, lead to competition between different political projects. This seems 
similar to what is happening in Scandinavian nationalism, where each political party pick and 
choose which elements they wish to emphasize; for example cooperationism, Nordic identity, 
plainness, gender avant-guardism, emancipation of the individual, specific Protestant 
tradition etc. How then may we explain that sometimes nationalism, not as a political goal but 
as a sense of community, can thrive even better in periods where outside threats to the 
national community are relatively weak? This was the case in Denmark until a few years ago. 
Now, the perception of the threat posed by increasing immigration and the difficulties of 
integration has increased drastically and (as a result maybe?) the idyllic picture of social life 
within the nation all of a sudden appears as empty as it really is (and has been already for 
decades). Therefore, possibly, the nationalist programme has been surrounded by a sense 
of urgency which otherwise might not have been there. Small nation-states have the 
advantage, from a nationalist point-of-view, that the number of citizens is quite small. If we 
look at Iceland, which is a clear example of a small nation-state, within which the citizens 
speak a language which is not spoken anywhere else in the world, the shared space is known 
to each and every individual citizen, and the country has its own values, traditions and 
traditional pre-christian popular beliefs. In addition, the country has a history of being subdued 
to another state. These conditions make it easy to create a bond among the Icelandic 
population, which can quite clearly designate the national ethnic group. The level of 
homogeneity is simply so high that every question with any cultural, linguistic, historical, 
economic or geographical implications will, necessarily be interpreted in a nationalist key. 
That is not to say that the Icelandic are particularly hostile towards other ethnicities. This lack 
of aggressivity is determined by the absence of external threats in the form of foreign states, 
of internal threats, such as high numbers of immigrants and of class conflict.  
We may, on the basis of our study, conclude that there are two main types of national-
populist party in Scandinavia; the first type was founded in Denmark, but quickly established 
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a parallel in Norway. These are, of course, the DFrP and the FrP. Initially, these parties drew 
on the American libertarian tradition, but they were quick in changing their focus to include 
nationalist elements as well. When considering the definitions of populism that we have 
consulted in this study, there is only a narrow basis on which to call these parties populist, 
namely the fact that their anti-bureaucatic ideals are somehow an expression of anti-elitism. 
However, from the moment they adopted anti-immigration rhetoric and thus combining their 
libertarian idea with a nationalist ideology, they became national-populist. As we have seen, 
the situation in Sweden was different. The later DFrP, the DF, and the DS are similar in that 
their ideological stance is not libertarian, but neither does it belong to any fixed point on the 
left-right divide. They see it as their prerogative to combine policies as they wish. The danger, 
which the DF was quick in recognizing and circumventing, is that the political establishment 
will keep the party outside the sphere of influence, such as it happened, with the exception 
of a short period in which it supported the minority government. A remedy against this danger 
which the DF quickly found, is to quickly choose the combination of ideological ideals the 
party will pursue and stick with it. As a result, the DF has gained much more influence than 
both the DFrP and the DS did. The last political party we have looked at is the Swedish NyD. 
Since its policies were just a slightly diluted version of the FrP policies, we shall be looking 
more at why it arose so much later than, for example, the FrP. Certainly, the fact that the 
political establishment had already had luck in creating a corde sanitaire around the DS made 
it difficult for the NyD to get a foothold. Overall, we may conclude that there is some ground 
for claiming that there is a special Scandinavian model. This model consists in a combination 
of a strong welfare-state and a high level of regional integration, thorough cultural exchange, 
similar languages, and, to some extent, a shared history, all promoted through the activities 
of the Nordic Council, which means by the national assemblies of all the Nordic countries.  
Although there are many similarities among the political systems in Scandinavia, and 
although some of the populist parties in these countries share key ideological points, they are 
never completely coordinated. Especially when studied over the course of time, one can 
identify different streams and, especially, significant transformations within each country as 
well as within most of these parties. There has been a general movement towards what we 
have defined as national-populist policies. We thus question the ‘saga’ of Scandinavia-wide 
uniformity of political systems and political idologies, at least as far as national-populism is 
concerned. Overall, we may say that in the three Scandinavian countries, the tendency 
towards more minority governments has been uniform in form, but different in strength. 
We have studied first the historical and then the contemporary political genealogy of 
contemporary forms of populism. Firstly, by tracing influences from the classical streams of 
populism in Revolutionary France, Russia, and North America. And, secondly, by looking at 
some similarities and differences between populism and nationalism. We found that in some 
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respects, contemporary forms of populism, which exist in very diverse contexts, are similar 
to one or more of the classical forms of populism. However, we have also come to accept 
that populism is a so-called thin-cored ideology. This means that, as a collection of features 
which fulfil their potential as an ideology only when combined with a thick-cored ideology, it 
is able to stand alone, but only as a rhetorical modus and an anti-elitist, and anti-pluralist, 
critique of liberal democracy. As such, it is not able to serve up an alternative set of political 
ideals. Populists would most likely say that their core policy is to express the ‘will of the 
people’, but as we have seen, there are inconsistencies in this regard. One inconsistency is 
the very conception of ‘the people’ by populists. The other inconsistency is the claim that 
populists make to know the real, unspoken, ‘will of the people’, even when confronted again 
and again by the fact that the majority of the electorate does not feel they are represented in 
the views and ideas of the populist parties. Furthermore, we have seen that also nationalism, 
although in some of its forms it may be regarded as a fully-fledged ideology - significantly in 
the form of German romanticism -, in other of its forms, it also constitutes a so-called thin-
cored ideology.  
Through an attentive reading of the definitions of populism that are current in 
international scholarly literature, we have tried to problematise these definitions, proposing 
alternatives which variably appear either more or less inclusive than the classical definitions, 
depending on the latter’s ability to comprise and describe the populist phenomenon. This was 
followed by a detailed explanation of the motives for prioritising the use of “national-populist”, 
rather than the laternative “radical populism”, “right-wing populism” and “anti-elitism”. Why do 
these parties do so well? Partially because of the natural reaction consisting in the aversion 
to change when people feel insecure. A sort of glorification of a, sometimes imagined, better 
past. In Scandinavian countries, because of the extent of the welfare policies implemented 
in the past, it is maybe not so difficult to imagine that a large part of the population would 
prefer turning back time by a couple of decades, and in many the idea has taken root that it 
is a real possibility, and that their current political establishment is simply too preoccupied 
with protecting their own interests or the interests of certain, economically potent, interest 
groups to wish to make such a return to a more humane, more tranquil and more … past, as 
it were. In conclusion, what stands between large parts of the population in Scandinavia and 
their nirvana, is the political establishment. Although many people are convinced it is not so, 
such a return to the past is impossible in a world that has moved far along the line of global 
integration, both in terms of trade and finances, but certainly also in terms of language, 
communication modality and cultural production. A romantizised past, in other words, may 
easily be presented to us as a possible salvation from the real threats that are perceived to 
be a consequence of global economic and cultural integration.  
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